Is Externalism Compatible with the KK-thesis?
(2021) FTEM01 20211Theoretical Philosophy
- Abstract
- In this paper I discuss the compatibility of externalism about epistemic justification with the well-known KK-thesis in epistemic logic. A weaker form of the KK-thesis (if one knows, one is also in a position to know that one knows) is first defended against Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments. Given some base assumptions about the nature of human beings and states of knowing, it is argued that some varieties of externalism are compatible with the KK-thesis if one relativizes this to non-ideal human agents and maintains only a weaker form of the KK-thesis. Causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge are deemed compatible with the KK-thesis, but Williamson's theory of knowledge and his variety of externalism is deemed not to be... (More)
- In this paper I discuss the compatibility of externalism about epistemic justification with the well-known KK-thesis in epistemic logic. A weaker form of the KK-thesis (if one knows, one is also in a position to know that one knows) is first defended against Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments. Given some base assumptions about the nature of human beings and states of knowing, it is argued that some varieties of externalism are compatible with the KK-thesis if one relativizes this to non-ideal human agents and maintains only a weaker form of the KK-thesis. Causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge are deemed compatible with the KK-thesis, but Williamson's theory of knowledge and his variety of externalism is deemed not to be compatible with the KK-thesis. It is concluded that internalists and externalists are forced into similar assumptions about the nature of knowledge in order for the KK-thesis to hold and that since externalism permits a broader conception of knowledge including a wider variety of species, it can be deemed preferable to internalism. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9061773
- author
- Ask Zaar, Balder LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- FTEM01 20211
- year
- 2021
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Self-intimating knowledge, Cartesian/Non-Cartesian knowledge, Externalism's compatibility with the KK-thesis, Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments, The nature of human knowledge.
- language
- English
- id
- 9061773
- date added to LUP
- 2021-10-04 09:20:14
- date last changed
- 2021-10-04 09:20:14
@misc{9061773, abstract = {{In this paper I discuss the compatibility of externalism about epistemic justification with the well-known KK-thesis in epistemic logic. A weaker form of the KK-thesis (if one knows, one is also in a position to know that one knows) is first defended against Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments. Given some base assumptions about the nature of human beings and states of knowing, it is argued that some varieties of externalism are compatible with the KK-thesis if one relativizes this to non-ideal human agents and maintains only a weaker form of the KK-thesis. Causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge are deemed compatible with the KK-thesis, but Williamson's theory of knowledge and his variety of externalism is deemed not to be compatible with the KK-thesis. It is concluded that internalists and externalists are forced into similar assumptions about the nature of knowledge in order for the KK-thesis to hold and that since externalism permits a broader conception of knowledge including a wider variety of species, it can be deemed preferable to internalism.}}, author = {{Ask Zaar, Balder}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Is Externalism Compatible with the KK-thesis?}}, year = {{2021}}, }