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Is Externalism Compatible with the KK-thesis?

Ask Zaar, Balder LU (2021) FTEM01 20211
Theoretical Philosophy
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the compatibility of externalism about epistemic justification with the well-known KK-thesis in epistemic logic. A weaker form of the KK-thesis (if one knows, one is also in a position to know that one knows) is first defended against Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments. Given some base assumptions about the nature of human beings and states of knowing, it is argued that some varieties of externalism are compatible with the KK-thesis if one relativizes this to non-ideal human agents and maintains only a weaker form of the KK-thesis. Causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge are deemed compatible with the KK-thesis, but Williamson's theory of knowledge and his variety of externalism is deemed not to be... (More)
In this paper I discuss the compatibility of externalism about epistemic justification with the well-known KK-thesis in epistemic logic. A weaker form of the KK-thesis (if one knows, one is also in a position to know that one knows) is first defended against Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments. Given some base assumptions about the nature of human beings and states of knowing, it is argued that some varieties of externalism are compatible with the KK-thesis if one relativizes this to non-ideal human agents and maintains only a weaker form of the KK-thesis. Causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge are deemed compatible with the KK-thesis, but Williamson's theory of knowledge and his variety of externalism is deemed not to be compatible with the KK-thesis. It is concluded that internalists and externalists are forced into similar assumptions about the nature of knowledge in order for the KK-thesis to hold and that since externalism permits a broader conception of knowledge including a wider variety of species, it can be deemed preferable to internalism. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Ask Zaar, Balder LU
supervisor
organization
course
FTEM01 20211
year
type
H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
subject
keywords
Self-intimating knowledge, Cartesian/Non-Cartesian knowledge, Externalism's compatibility with the KK-thesis, Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments, The nature of human knowledge.
language
English
id
9061773
date added to LUP
2021-10-04 09:20:14
date last changed
2021-10-04 09:20:14
@misc{9061773,
  abstract     = {{In this paper I discuss the compatibility of externalism about epistemic justification with the well-known KK-thesis in epistemic logic. A weaker form of the KK-thesis (if one knows, one is also in a position to know that one knows) is first defended against Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments. Given some base assumptions about the nature of human beings and states of knowing, it is argued that some varieties of externalism are compatible with the KK-thesis if one relativizes this to non-ideal human agents and maintains only a weaker form of the KK-thesis. Causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge are deemed compatible with the KK-thesis, but Williamson's theory of knowledge and his variety of externalism is deemed not to be compatible with the KK-thesis. It is concluded that internalists and externalists are forced into similar assumptions about the nature of knowledge in order for the KK-thesis to hold and that since externalism permits a broader conception of knowledge including a wider variety of species, it can be deemed preferable to internalism.}},
  author       = {{Ask Zaar, Balder}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Is Externalism Compatible with the KK-thesis?}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}