Will AI Change How We Innovate? - A Study of Inventive AI, Patentability, and Inventorship in Light of the DABUS case
(2021) JURM02 20212Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The U.S. painter Helen Frankenthaler, a behemoth of post-war American abstractionist painting, once described the act of inventing as an activity without rules. ”This is how art is born, how breakthroughs happen. Go against the rules or ignore the rules. That is what invention is about”, she is quoted saying in a 1994 interview with legendary publisher Ken Tyler.
In contrast with the precise and careful methodology of the law, the process of the artist or the inventor appears wildly different. Yet, within the construct of patent law, the two are forced to coexist, creating a fascinating matrix wherein attempts can be made to bring structure to the complex and precision to the unprecise.
This thesis aims to shine the light on an up... (More) - The U.S. painter Helen Frankenthaler, a behemoth of post-war American abstractionist painting, once described the act of inventing as an activity without rules. ”This is how art is born, how breakthroughs happen. Go against the rules or ignore the rules. That is what invention is about”, she is quoted saying in a 1994 interview with legendary publisher Ken Tyler.
In contrast with the precise and careful methodology of the law, the process of the artist or the inventor appears wildly different. Yet, within the construct of patent law, the two are forced to coexist, creating a fascinating matrix wherein attempts can be made to bring structure to the complex and precision to the unprecise.
This thesis aims to shine the light on an up until very recently rather undiscovered area of patent law, namely the patentability of AI inventions and AI’s ability to attain inventorship status. This has not been a major issue in the past, seeing how even the most advanced AIs at most could be considered advanced machinery, appropriate for use as a tool or a means to a specific end by a training professional. Today, however, AI systems have grown far more advanced. So advanced, in fact, that they seemingly invent on their own as well as in a manner not unlike how humans invent.
Building on a foundation of existing Swedish and European patent legislation and a comparative study of relevant Australian, British, and American statutes and precedence, this thesis seeks to find whether now is the time to challenge the existing interpretation of AI’s standing vis-a-vis patentability and inventorship.
In summary, this thesis sets out to answer the above by asking whether or not an AI may achieve inventive step, and whether or not an AI, in lieu of achieving legal status, may succeed rights related to any inventive works to a natural person in accordance with Swedish and European patent law.
In its findings, this thesis argues that the concept of inventor and inventorship is neither exhaustively defined in a legal sense nor applied correctly in a dictionary sense. By reviewing Swedish and European patent law, this thesis also discusses alternative interpretations of relevant patent law provisions in contrast to the rapid development in the field of inventive AI. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- I en intervju med publicisten Ken Tyler så beskrev den amerikanska
efterkrigskonstnären och abstraktionisten Helen Frankenthaler
uppfinnarskapet som en regellös aktivitet: “Så föds konsten, på det sättet sker
genombrott. Bryt mot reglerna eller ignorera dem. Det är vad uppfinnarskap
handlar om.”
Jämfört med juridikens precisa och noggranna metodik så framstår
uppfinnandets skapande metod något annorlunda. Inom patenträtten så kan
dessa två krafter dock samverka och skapa en fascinerande matris inom vilken
försök att strukturera det komplexa och precist formulera det oprecisa kan ske
naturligt.
Detta examensarbete riktar in sig på den relativt nyetablerade grenen av
patenträtten som berör AI-uppfinningar och AI som... (More) - I en intervju med publicisten Ken Tyler så beskrev den amerikanska
efterkrigskonstnären och abstraktionisten Helen Frankenthaler
uppfinnarskapet som en regellös aktivitet: “Så föds konsten, på det sättet sker
genombrott. Bryt mot reglerna eller ignorera dem. Det är vad uppfinnarskap
handlar om.”
Jämfört med juridikens precisa och noggranna metodik så framstår
uppfinnandets skapande metod något annorlunda. Inom patenträtten så kan
dessa två krafter dock samverka och skapa en fascinerande matris inom vilken
försök att strukturera det komplexa och precist formulera det oprecisa kan ske
naturligt.
Detta examensarbete riktar in sig på den relativt nyetablerade grenen av
patenträtten som berör AI-uppfinningar och AI som uppfinnare. Tidigare så
har utvecklingen av AI inte frambragt några komplexare utmaningar av
juridisk natur då potentialen därtill hållits tillbaka av nivån på den tillgängliga
tekniken. Idag så ser dock situationen annorlunda ut tack vare enorma
framsteg på just teknikens område. AI kan idag vara så avancerad så tekniken
i vissa situationer förefaller kunna uppfinna så väl på egen hand som på ett
sätt mycket likt människans.
Genom att först utreda gällande svensk och europeisk rätt på patenträttens
område och sedan, genom komparativ metod jämföra relevanta delar av
lagstiftning och praxis från Australien, England och USA, så söker detta
examensarbete utröna huruvida tiden är kommen att utmana de existerande
tolkningarna kring AI, patentbarhet och uppfinnarskap.
Sammanfattningsvis så söker detta examensarbete finna dessa svar genom att
ställa frågan huruvida AI potentiellt kan uppfinna i lagens mening genom att
uppnå uppfinningshöjd, samt huruvida en AI som inte kan uppnå status som
fysisk eller juridisk person kan överlåta rättigheterna till en fysisk person i
enlighet med gällande svensk och europeisk patenträtt.
I slutdiskussionen argumenterar detta examensarbete för att den primära
juridiska tolkningen av uppfinnare och uppfinnarskap saknar närmare
definition samt att andrahandstolkningen enligt termens ordboksdefinition
utgör en föråldrad bild av uppfinnare och uppfinnarskap. Genom analys av
både svensk och europeisk patenträtt så diskuteras även alternativa tolkningar
av relevanta juridiska frågeställningar mot bakgrund av den snabba tekniska
utvecklingen av AI. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9070201
- author
- Hambraeus, Ludvig LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM02 20212
- year
- 2021
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- AI, Automation, Artificial Intelligence, Patentability, Inventorship
- language
- English
- id
- 9070201
- date added to LUP
- 2022-01-26 14:58:26
- date last changed
- 2022-01-26 14:58:26
@misc{9070201,
abstract = {{The U.S. painter Helen Frankenthaler, a behemoth of post-war American abstractionist painting, once described the act of inventing as an activity without rules. ”This is how art is born, how breakthroughs happen. Go against the rules or ignore the rules. That is what invention is about”, she is quoted saying in a 1994 interview with legendary publisher Ken Tyler.
In contrast with the precise and careful methodology of the law, the process of the artist or the inventor appears wildly different. Yet, within the construct of patent law, the two are forced to coexist, creating a fascinating matrix wherein attempts can be made to bring structure to the complex and precision to the unprecise.
This thesis aims to shine the light on an up until very recently rather undiscovered area of patent law, namely the patentability of AI inventions and AI’s ability to attain inventorship status. This has not been a major issue in the past, seeing how even the most advanced AIs at most could be considered advanced machinery, appropriate for use as a tool or a means to a specific end by a training professional. Today, however, AI systems have grown far more advanced. So advanced, in fact, that they seemingly invent on their own as well as in a manner not unlike how humans invent.
Building on a foundation of existing Swedish and European patent legislation and a comparative study of relevant Australian, British, and American statutes and precedence, this thesis seeks to find whether now is the time to challenge the existing interpretation of AI’s standing vis-a-vis patentability and inventorship.
In summary, this thesis sets out to answer the above by asking whether or not an AI may achieve inventive step, and whether or not an AI, in lieu of achieving legal status, may succeed rights related to any inventive works to a natural person in accordance with Swedish and European patent law.
In its findings, this thesis argues that the concept of inventor and inventorship is neither exhaustively defined in a legal sense nor applied correctly in a dictionary sense. By reviewing Swedish and European patent law, this thesis also discusses alternative interpretations of relevant patent law provisions in contrast to the rapid development in the field of inventive AI.}},
author = {{Hambraeus, Ludvig}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Will AI Change How We Innovate? - A Study of Inventive AI, Patentability, and Inventorship in Light of the DABUS case}},
year = {{2021}},
}