Ratification and Reservations: A Window-Dressing Exercise? A Study on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties
(2021) LAGF03 20212Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- For the conditions under which States may reserve themselves to certain provisions of a Convention, which they nevertheless wish to oblige themselves to, are regulated in Article 19 VCLT. States may make reservations under this Article unless: (a) a reservation is prohibited by the treaty, (b) the treaty provides that only reservations of a certain kind – and the reservation in question is not of that kind, or (c) the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The latter gives rise to certain problems in relation to human rights treaties in the light of the fact that there is a desire for universal ratification of these treaties, and hence an incentive to adopt an approach of greater flexibility in cases of... (More)
- For the conditions under which States may reserve themselves to certain provisions of a Convention, which they nevertheless wish to oblige themselves to, are regulated in Article 19 VCLT. States may make reservations under this Article unless: (a) a reservation is prohibited by the treaty, (b) the treaty provides that only reservations of a certain kind – and the reservation in question is not of that kind, or (c) the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The latter gives rise to certain problems in relation to human rights treaties in the light of the fact that there is a desire for universal ratification of these treaties, and hence an incentive to adopt an approach of greater flexibility in cases of these kind of treaties. In the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ from 1951, which addresses the issue of reservations to the Convention against Torture and subsequently provided the groundwork for the provision in the VCLT, the Court stated that a reservation is permissible as long as the reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. In cases where a State asserts that it can make any reservation it desires in view of its sovereignty, these reservations must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The possibility of objecting to reservations is further regulated in Article 20 VCLT. The ICJ stated in its Advisory Opinion that an objecting State may, if it so desires, opt not to consider the reserving State as a party to the Convention. The effect of a State not being considered a party to the Convention differs depending on whether it is a commercial treaty or a human rights treaty, as the latter does not have reciprocal effect. The inhabitants of the State – who are not subject to international law – are the beneficiaries of the rights established in human rights treaties. It is thus not a question of exchanging rights and obligations between States, but for the State to provide these rights to their citizens. Due to the absence of a bilateral consequences, States often lack the incentive to object to other States’ reservations – even though they may be considered as incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Furthermore, even if they do, it seldom implies any effect for the subjects to the rights of the reserving State, unless the State withdraws its reservation.
This raises the issue of the integrity of a treaty versus the prospect of universal ratification in order to extend the scope of the treaty. Regardless of the subjective answer to this question, which cannot be said to have a definite answer, it however becomes clear that general reservations, in which States reserve themselves against core Articles for the object and purpose of the treaty, inhibit the scope of the treaty’s object and purpose and are permissible despite their incompatibility. This is primarily owing to the fact that the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion had a bigger influence than it may had anticipated, and that the VCLT, which codified the Court’s established rule, is based on a bilateral model, and so the implications of the acquis differ significantly when applied to multilateral treaties. The safety net in terms of objections to reservations practically ceases to exist, which has the consequence that reservations, which are inherently impermissible, are accepted. States that, e.g., reserve themselves to a general provision obligating the contracting parties to abolish discrimination against women may continue to be a State party to the the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and enjoy the benefits it entails, whilst the inhabitants of the State may not enjoy the fundamental rights that the Convention aims to guarantee. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- För under vilka förutsättningar stater kan reservera sig till vissa bestämmelser i traktat, som de ändock vill binda sig till, regleras framför allt i Wienkonventionens artikel 19. Stater får enligt denna artikel göra reservationer såvida inte: (a) en reservation är förbjuden enligt fördraget, (b) fördraget föreskriver att endast reservationer av visst slag får göras och reservationen inte är av detta slag, eller (c) reservationen är oförenlig med traktatens ändamål och syfte. Det sistnämnda ger upphov till viss problematik i förhållande till traktat om mänskliga rättigheter mot bakgrund av att där det finns en önskan om en universell ratificering av traktaten och därav incitament till att ha en mer flexibel inställning till reservationer.... (More)
- För under vilka förutsättningar stater kan reservera sig till vissa bestämmelser i traktat, som de ändock vill binda sig till, regleras framför allt i Wienkonventionens artikel 19. Stater får enligt denna artikel göra reservationer såvida inte: (a) en reservation är förbjuden enligt fördraget, (b) fördraget föreskriver att endast reservationer av visst slag får göras och reservationen inte är av detta slag, eller (c) reservationen är oförenlig med traktatens ändamål och syfte. Det sistnämnda ger upphov till viss problematik i förhållande till traktat om mänskliga rättigheter mot bakgrund av att där det finns en önskan om en universell ratificering av traktaten och därav incitament till att ha en mer flexibel inställning till reservationer. I ICJ:s Advisory Opinion från 1951 där frågan om reservationsrätten i förhållande till tortyrkonventionen – och som sedermera lade grunden till utformningen i Wienkonventionen – uttalade domstolen att en reservation är tillåten så länge en reservation inte är motstridig med fördragets ändamål och syfte. I de fall en stat hävdar att de, mot bakgrund av dess suveränitet, kan göra vilka reservationer som helst måste dessa undersökas från fall till fall.
Möjligheten att motsätta sig reservationer regleras vidare i Wienkonventionens artikel 20. ICJ uttalade i det ovan nämnda fallet att de stater som motsätter sig en reservation kan, om den så önskar, välja att inte anse den reserverande staten som part till konventionen. Effekten av att inte beakta en stat som part till konventionen varierar beroende på om det är fråga om kommersiella traktat eller traktat om mänskliga rättigheter eftersom de sistnämnda inte har reciprok verkan. Förmånstagarna av de rättigheter som traktat om mänskliga rättigheter uppställer är nämligen statens invånare, vilka inte är föremål för internationell rätt. Det är således inte fråga om ett utbyte av rättigheter och skyldigheter stater emellan, utan en skyldighet för staten att tillhandahålla dessa rättigheter för dess invånare. I och med avsaknaden av bilaterala följder saknar stater ofta incitament för att invända mot andra staters reservationer, även om de kan anses strida mot traktatens ändamål och syfte. Skulle stater trots allt invända mot reservationen innebär detta sällan någon faktisk effekt för de som åtnjuter de garanterade rättigheterna, såvida inte staten tar tillbaka sin reservation.
Detta aktualiserar frågan om en traktats integritet kontra tanken om en universell ratificering i syfte att öka genomslaget för traktaten. Oavsett det subjektiva svaret på frågan, som inte kan sägas ha något absolut svar, blir det emellertid tydligt att allmänna reservationer där stater reserverar sig mot uttalade kärnartiklar för traktatens ändamål och syfte, hämmar genomslaget för traktatens syfte och tillåts trots dess stridighet. I mångt och mycket beror detta på att ICJ:s Advisory Opinion fått större genomslag än vad som kan bör ha ämnats och att Wienkonventionen, som kodifierat domstolens upprättade regel, bygger på en bilateral modell och att effekterna av regelverket därmed skiljer sig nämnvärt när det appliceras på multilaterala traktat. Säkerhetsnätet i form av invändningar mot reservationer upphör i princip att fungera, vilket får till följd att reservationer som i sig själva är otillåtna accepteras. Staterna som t.ex. reserverar sig mot en allmän föreskrift om skyldigheten att avskaffa diskriminering av kvinnor får således fortsätta att vara part till kvinnokonventionen och ta del av de fördelar det innebär, medan medborgarna i staten inte får ta del av de grundläggande rättigheter som följer med konventionen. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9070389
- author
- Egelberg, Sara LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20212
- year
- 2021
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Public international law, reservations, human rights treaties, treaties, human rights
- language
- English
- id
- 9070389
- date added to LUP
- 2022-02-15 11:33:26
- date last changed
- 2022-02-15 11:33:26
@misc{9070389, abstract = {{For the conditions under which States may reserve themselves to certain provisions of a Convention, which they nevertheless wish to oblige themselves to, are regulated in Article 19 VCLT. States may make reservations under this Article unless: (a) a reservation is prohibited by the treaty, (b) the treaty provides that only reservations of a certain kind – and the reservation in question is not of that kind, or (c) the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The latter gives rise to certain problems in relation to human rights treaties in the light of the fact that there is a desire for universal ratification of these treaties, and hence an incentive to adopt an approach of greater flexibility in cases of these kind of treaties. In the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ from 1951, which addresses the issue of reservations to the Convention against Torture and subsequently provided the groundwork for the provision in the VCLT, the Court stated that a reservation is permissible as long as the reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. In cases where a State asserts that it can make any reservation it desires in view of its sovereignty, these reservations must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The possibility of objecting to reservations is further regulated in Article 20 VCLT. The ICJ stated in its Advisory Opinion that an objecting State may, if it so desires, opt not to consider the reserving State as a party to the Convention. The effect of a State not being considered a party to the Convention differs depending on whether it is a commercial treaty or a human rights treaty, as the latter does not have reciprocal effect. The inhabitants of the State – who are not subject to international law – are the beneficiaries of the rights established in human rights treaties. It is thus not a question of exchanging rights and obligations between States, but for the State to provide these rights to their citizens. Due to the absence of a bilateral consequences, States often lack the incentive to object to other States’ reservations – even though they may be considered as incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Furthermore, even if they do, it seldom implies any effect for the subjects to the rights of the reserving State, unless the State withdraws its reservation. This raises the issue of the integrity of a treaty versus the prospect of universal ratification in order to extend the scope of the treaty. Regardless of the subjective answer to this question, which cannot be said to have a definite answer, it however becomes clear that general reservations, in which States reserve themselves against core Articles for the object and purpose of the treaty, inhibit the scope of the treaty’s object and purpose and are permissible despite their incompatibility. This is primarily owing to the fact that the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion had a bigger influence than it may had anticipated, and that the VCLT, which codified the Court’s established rule, is based on a bilateral model, and so the implications of the acquis differ significantly when applied to multilateral treaties. The safety net in terms of objections to reservations practically ceases to exist, which has the consequence that reservations, which are inherently impermissible, are accepted. States that, e.g., reserve themselves to a general provision obligating the contracting parties to abolish discrimination against women may continue to be a State party to the the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and enjoy the benefits it entails, whilst the inhabitants of the State may not enjoy the fundamental rights that the Convention aims to guarantee.}}, author = {{Egelberg, Sara}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Ratification and Reservations: A Window-Dressing Exercise? A Study on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties}}, year = {{2021}}, }