En rättsekonomisk analys av handelsförbudet i artikel 19.11 MAR. Särskilt om relationen till offentliggörandet av finansiella rapporter
(2022) JURM02 20221Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- När personer i ledande ställning inom ett bolag äger stora aktieposter i bolaget brukar det tolkas som en positiv signal på de finansiella marknaderna. Samtidigt är insiders förehavanden strikt reglerade och inom EU sker detta genom marknadsmissbruksförordningen (MAR). Denna uppsats fokuserar på det så kallade handelsförbudet i artikel 19.11 MAR. Handelsförbudet innebär att personer i ledande ställning inte får vidta transaktioner i finansiella instrument emitterade av bolaget där personen arbetar under en 30-dagarsperiod inför finansiella rapporter. Handelsförbudets existensberättigande härrör från den ökade förekomsten av insiderinformation inom bolagen inför offentliggörandet av finansiella rapporter. Syftet med denna uppsats är att... (More)
- När personer i ledande ställning inom ett bolag äger stora aktieposter i bolaget brukar det tolkas som en positiv signal på de finansiella marknaderna. Samtidigt är insiders förehavanden strikt reglerade och inom EU sker detta genom marknadsmissbruksförordningen (MAR). Denna uppsats fokuserar på det så kallade handelsförbudet i artikel 19.11 MAR. Handelsförbudet innebär att personer i ledande ställning inte får vidta transaktioner i finansiella instrument emitterade av bolaget där personen arbetar under en 30-dagarsperiod inför finansiella rapporter. Handelsförbudets existensberättigande härrör från den ökade förekomsten av insiderinformation inom bolagen inför offentliggörandet av finansiella rapporter. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda huruvida handelsförbudet i sin nuvarande form är adekvat utformat med beaktande av dess ändamål.
Uppsatsen är huvudsakligen skriven enligt den rättsdogmatiska metoden. Med hänsyn till MARs inneboende förhållande till de finansiella marknaderna innehåller det avslutande kapitlet även en rättsekonomisk analys. I syfte att sätta den europeiska regleringen i ett sammanhang görs i uppsatsen en översiktlig utblick till den amerikanska regleringen av insiderhandel, men inte i form av en renodlad komparativ metod.
Handelsförbudet är en komplex regel att tillämpa. En närmare granskning ger upphov till en mängd frågetecken och tillämpningsproblem, primärt avseende handelsförbudets relation till senarelagda offentliggöranden av finansiella rapporter, men även i relation till vinstvarningar och frivilliga offentliggöranden av finansiella rapporter. I vissa avseenden är rättsläget klart, men ändock otillfredsställande med beaktande av regelns och MARs syften. I andra avseenden är rättsläget oklart vilket ger upphov till oklarheter som i förlängningen riskerar att påverka de finansiella marknadernas effektivitet.
Uppsatsens slutsatser mynnar ut i att handelsförbudet, trots dess brister, är en nödvändig regel. Vissa justeringar till regelns tillämpningsområde behöver emellertid göras, där det mest angelägna är att ta bort möjligheten för personer i ledande ställning att köpa aktier efter kvartalets utgång när kvartalsrapporten har senarelagts. Därtill krävs klargöranden avseende hur handelsförbudet förhåller sig till vinstvarningar och avslutningsvis borde även frivilligt offentliggjorda kvartalsrapporter omfattas av handelsförbudets tillämpningsområde. (Less) - Abstract
- A management of a company with “skin in the game”, meaning insiders owning a considerable amount of stock, is seen as a positive signal on the markets. At the same time, insider dealings is a heavily regulated area, which in the EU is constituted by the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). The focus of this essay is on the trade prohibition in article 19.11 MAR, which stipulates that persons discharging managerial responsibilities are barred from buying or selling financial instruments issued by the company where they work within 30 days from the publication of financial reports. The reason for the trade prohibitions existence is the increased presence of insider information within issuers in the period before an earnings release. Hence, the... (More)
- A management of a company with “skin in the game”, meaning insiders owning a considerable amount of stock, is seen as a positive signal on the markets. At the same time, insider dealings is a heavily regulated area, which in the EU is constituted by the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). The focus of this essay is on the trade prohibition in article 19.11 MAR, which stipulates that persons discharging managerial responsibilities are barred from buying or selling financial instruments issued by the company where they work within 30 days from the publication of financial reports. The reason for the trade prohibitions existence is the increased presence of insider information within issuers in the period before an earnings release. Hence, the purpose of this essay is to examine whether the trade prohibition in its current form is appropriately constructed with regards to its overarching purpose, or if certain amendments should be made.
This essay is mainly written in accordance with the legal dogmatic method. With regards to MAR’s inherent relationship with economic considerations, the final chapter also contains an economic analysis of the law. In an attempt to contextualize the European regulation, a brief outlook to the regulation in the US will be done, but not in the meaning of a straight-out comparative method.
The trade prohibition is a more complex rule than the eye lets on and a number of uncertainties and application problems of the rule can be found. These situations relate primarily to postponements of financial reports, the publication of voluntary quarterly reports and profit warnings. In some of these instances the legal situation is clear, but can be questioned on several grounds relating to the purpose of the trade prohibition and the rest of MAR. In other instances, the legal situation is unclear, which gives rise to uncertainties that can inhibit the efficiency of the capital markets in the EU.
The conclusions of the essay are that the trade prohibition, despite its flaws, is a necessary rule. However, certain amendments should be made, in particular the removal of the possibility of persons discharging managerial responsibilities to purchase shares after the expiration of the quarter in instances where the quarterly report is yet to be published. In addition, clarification is needed regarding the relationship of the trade prohibition with regards to profit warnings and finally, all quarterly reports should be encompassed by the trade prohibition, even if voluntarily published. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9080411
- author
- Winström, Ted LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- A law and economics analysis of the trade prohibition in article 19.11 MAR. In particular regarding the relationship to the publication of financial reports
- course
- JURM02 20221
- year
- 2022
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- Finansrätt, EU-rätt, rättsekonomi, handelsförbud, MAR
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9080411
- date added to LUP
- 2022-06-12 15:37:16
- date last changed
- 2022-06-12 15:37:16
@misc{9080411,
abstract = {{A management of a company with “skin in the game”, meaning insiders owning a considerable amount of stock, is seen as a positive signal on the markets. At the same time, insider dealings is a heavily regulated area, which in the EU is constituted by the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). The focus of this essay is on the trade prohibition in article 19.11 MAR, which stipulates that persons discharging managerial responsibilities are barred from buying or selling financial instruments issued by the company where they work within 30 days from the publication of financial reports. The reason for the trade prohibitions existence is the increased presence of insider information within issuers in the period before an earnings release. Hence, the purpose of this essay is to examine whether the trade prohibition in its current form is appropriately constructed with regards to its overarching purpose, or if certain amendments should be made.
This essay is mainly written in accordance with the legal dogmatic method. With regards to MAR’s inherent relationship with economic considerations, the final chapter also contains an economic analysis of the law. In an attempt to contextualize the European regulation, a brief outlook to the regulation in the US will be done, but not in the meaning of a straight-out comparative method.
The trade prohibition is a more complex rule than the eye lets on and a number of uncertainties and application problems of the rule can be found. These situations relate primarily to postponements of financial reports, the publication of voluntary quarterly reports and profit warnings. In some of these instances the legal situation is clear, but can be questioned on several grounds relating to the purpose of the trade prohibition and the rest of MAR. In other instances, the legal situation is unclear, which gives rise to uncertainties that can inhibit the efficiency of the capital markets in the EU.
The conclusions of the essay are that the trade prohibition, despite its flaws, is a necessary rule. However, certain amendments should be made, in particular the removal of the possibility of persons discharging managerial responsibilities to purchase shares after the expiration of the quarter in instances where the quarterly report is yet to be published. In addition, clarification is needed regarding the relationship of the trade prohibition with regards to profit warnings and finally, all quarterly reports should be encompassed by the trade prohibition, even if voluntarily published.}},
author = {{Winström, Ted}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{En rättsekonomisk analys av handelsförbudet i artikel 19.11 MAR. Särskilt om relationen till offentliggörandet av finansiella rapporter}},
year = {{2022}},
}