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Högsta domstolens gränsdragning av medvetenhetskravet i NJA 2020 s. 169 – En förflyttning eller precision?

Johansson, Erika LU (2022) LAGF03 20221
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Av skuldprincipen följer att ett brott inte föreligger såvida gärningen inte företagits med uppsåt. I uppsåtsrekvisitet ligger ett allmänt krav på medvetenhet. Uppfyllande av detta krav utgör en nödvändighet för att uppsåt ska anses föreligga. Vart gränsen för medvetenhet går har utformats i praxis och doktrin och bedömningen åligger domstolarna.

Medvetenhetskravet torde bli särskilt aktuellt i de fall den otillåtna gärningen företagits av någon under påverkan av en psykisk störning. Detta eftersom denna tenderar att sänka gärningsmannens medvetenhetsgrad. Innan brottsbalkens införande år 1965 undantogs denna kategori av lagöverträdare från straffrättsligt ansvar då det ansågs vara otillräkneliga. En sådan undantagsregel lämnades... (More)
Av skuldprincipen följer att ett brott inte föreligger såvida gärningen inte företagits med uppsåt. I uppsåtsrekvisitet ligger ett allmänt krav på medvetenhet. Uppfyllande av detta krav utgör en nödvändighet för att uppsåt ska anses föreligga. Vart gränsen för medvetenhet går har utformats i praxis och doktrin och bedömningen åligger domstolarna.

Medvetenhetskravet torde bli särskilt aktuellt i de fall den otillåtna gärningen företagits av någon under påverkan av en psykisk störning. Detta eftersom denna tenderar att sänka gärningsmannens medvetenhetsgrad. Innan brottsbalkens införande år 1965 undantogs denna kategori av lagöverträdare från straffrättsligt ansvar då det ansågs vara otillräkneliga. En sådan undantagsregel lämnades utanför den nya brottsbalken och en vanlig uppsåtsbedömning skulle göras även i dessa fall.

Medvetenhetskravet utgör med andra ord straffansvarets nedre gräns i svensk gällande rätt. Men dess otydliga definition och gränsdragning har kritiserats för att utgöra en brist i rättssäkerheten och ett återinförande av tillräknelighetsläran har många gånger föreslagits.
I en relativt ny dom, NJA 2020 s. 169, preciseras kravet på medvetenhet. I doktrin har påståtts att Högsta domstolen i nämnda dom tagit ett steg i riktning mot ett återinförande av tillräknelighetsläran. Ett sådant påstående är detsamma som att påstå att ett skifte från det dittills rådande rättsläget skett och en förändring av svensk gällande rätt.
Uppsatsen ämnar att utröna hur Högsta domstolens gränsdragning av medvetenhetskravet ser ut samt utreda om doktrinen har rätt i sitt påstående. Genom att, med en rättsdogmatisk metod, jämföra domstolens tidigare praxis med nyss nämnda fall nås slutsatsen att domstolen varit enhetlig i sin bedömning av medvetenhetskravet och att detta gäller även 2020 års fall. Något steg mot en tillräknelighetslära har inte tagits, däremot kvarstår en otydlig gränsdragning av medvetenhetskravet. Anledningen till detta ligger emellertid i bedömningens diffusa natur och kan inte skyllas på domstolen. (Less)
Abstract
The guilt principle means that one cannot be punished for something they are not guilty of. In order to be found guilty one must be considered to be somewhat aware of what they are doing (a sort of ‘awareness requirement’). This requirement constitutes a necessity in order to be found guilty of a crime. The extent of awareness which is required has been embodied as a result of case law and legal doctrine.
The awareness requirement tends to be particularly in question in cases when an illicit act has been carried out by a person under the influence of a mental disorder, since the disorder tends to affect a person’s level of awareness. Until the Swedish Criminal Code entered into force in 1965 there was an accountability regulation in... (More)
The guilt principle means that one cannot be punished for something they are not guilty of. In order to be found guilty one must be considered to be somewhat aware of what they are doing (a sort of ‘awareness requirement’). This requirement constitutes a necessity in order to be found guilty of a crime. The extent of awareness which is required has been embodied as a result of case law and legal doctrine.
The awareness requirement tends to be particularly in question in cases when an illicit act has been carried out by a person under the influence of a mental disorder, since the disorder tends to affect a person’s level of awareness. Until the Swedish Criminal Code entered into force in 1965 there was an accountability regulation in Swedish law which considered people with mental disorders not able to be held responsible for their actions. Today, however, this group of people are considered criminally liable, and the assessment of their guilt is not to be made any different than usual.
The awareness requirement constitutes the lowest threshold for criminal liability in Swedish criminal law. The vague definition of the requirement has been subject to major criticism and considered a lack of legal certainty. Propositions to reintroduce the former accountability regulation has been made on several occasions.
In a relatively recent case, NJA 2020 s. 169, the awareness requirement is specified by the Swedish Supreme Court. In legal doctrine it is suggested that said case constitutes a step toward a reintroduction of the accountability regulation. Such statement would implicate an alteration of the current Swedish law.
The essay aims to define what extent of awareness that is required in order to be considered guilty in Swedish criminal law. It also intends to investigate whether the legal doctrine is correct when claiming that NJA 2020 s. 169 has resulted in a change of the law.
Using a legal dogmatic method, previous Supreme Court cases has been compared to the ruling in NJA 2020 s. 169. The conclusion made is that the assessment in no way has resulted in an alteration of the current law, but merely attempted to clarify what level of awareness is required to be found guilty. Where the exact limit is drawn, however, remains unclear. But the reason for this appears to be the very nature of the requirement and should not be blamed on the courts. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Johansson, Erika LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20221
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
straffrätt, medvetenhetskravet
language
Swedish
id
9081194
date added to LUP
2022-06-28 09:36:35
date last changed
2022-06-28 09:36:35
@misc{9081194,
  abstract     = {{The guilt principle means that one cannot be punished for something they are not guilty of. In order to be found guilty one must be considered to be somewhat aware of what they are doing (a sort of ‘awareness requirement’). This requirement constitutes a necessity in order to be found guilty of a crime. The extent of awareness which is required has been embodied as a result of case law and legal doctrine.
The awareness requirement tends to be particularly in question in cases when an illicit act has been carried out by a person under the influence of a mental disorder, since the disorder tends to affect a person’s level of awareness. Until the Swedish Criminal Code entered into force in 1965 there was an accountability regulation in Swedish law which considered people with mental disorders not able to be held responsible for their actions. Today, however, this group of people are considered criminally liable, and the assessment of their guilt is not to be made any different than usual.
The awareness requirement constitutes the lowest threshold for criminal liability in Swedish criminal law. The vague definition of the requirement has been subject to major criticism and considered a lack of legal certainty. Propositions to reintroduce the former accountability regulation has been made on several occasions.
In a relatively recent case, NJA 2020 s. 169, the awareness requirement is specified by the Swedish Supreme Court. In legal doctrine it is suggested that said case constitutes a step toward a reintroduction of the accountability regulation. Such statement would implicate an alteration of the current Swedish law.
The essay aims to define what extent of awareness that is required in order to be considered guilty in Swedish criminal law. It also intends to investigate whether the legal doctrine is correct when claiming that NJA 2020 s. 169 has resulted in a change of the law.
Using a legal dogmatic method, previous Supreme Court cases has been compared to the ruling in NJA 2020 s. 169. The conclusion made is that the assessment in no way has resulted in an alteration of the current law, but merely attempted to clarify what level of awareness is required to be found guilty. Where the exact limit is drawn, however, remains unclear. But the reason for this appears to be the very nature of the requirement and should not be blamed on the courts.}},
  author       = {{Johansson, Erika}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Högsta domstolens gränsdragning av medvetenhetskravet i NJA 2020 s. 169 – En förflyttning eller precision?}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}