Varför stöttade silovikerna de ryska konstitutionsändringarna 2020? Patronalistisk politik i det ryska säkerhetsetablissemanget
(2022) STVK03 20221Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- The purpose of this study is to examine why the Russian security forces, or siloviki, supported the 2020 amendments to the Russian constitution, using Henry E. Hale’s patronal politics as a theoretical framework. Based on this theory, the study pro-poses a hypothetical motive to explain why the siloviki supported the amendments. To strengthen the case for this motive, a number of empirical indicators are identified. The analysis identifies two potential reasons for why the siloviki supported the amendments. The first reason is that individuals who do not participate in patronal politics often find themselves in a vulnerable position as they are unable to partake in the rewards that are distributed by the patrons – in order to gain access... (More)
- The purpose of this study is to examine why the Russian security forces, or siloviki, supported the 2020 amendments to the Russian constitution, using Henry E. Hale’s patronal politics as a theoretical framework. Based on this theory, the study pro-poses a hypothetical motive to explain why the siloviki supported the amendments. To strengthen the case for this motive, a number of empirical indicators are identified. The analysis identifies two potential reasons for why the siloviki supported the amendments. The first reason is that individuals who do not participate in patronal politics often find themselves in a vulnerable position as they are unable to partake in the rewards that are distributed by the patrons – in order to gain access to these rewards clients must loyally carry out their patron’s will, from the lowest levels of the pyramid to Putin at the top. The siloviki supporting the amendments is thus a chain of events that ultimately can be explained by self-interest. The second reason is that the siloviki wish to avoid a situation where Putin becomes a lame duck, as that could lead to conflict – and the risk of losing such a conflict – within the pyramid, which in turn could mean losing access to the aforementioned rewards as a result. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9097294
- author
- Guldstrand, Jesper LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- STVK03 20221
- year
- 2022
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Amendments, constitution, patronal politics, Putin, Russia, siloviki
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9097294
- date added to LUP
- 2022-10-12 15:17:27
- date last changed
- 2022-10-12 15:17:27
@misc{9097294, abstract = {{The purpose of this study is to examine why the Russian security forces, or siloviki, supported the 2020 amendments to the Russian constitution, using Henry E. Hale’s patronal politics as a theoretical framework. Based on this theory, the study pro-poses a hypothetical motive to explain why the siloviki supported the amendments. To strengthen the case for this motive, a number of empirical indicators are identified. The analysis identifies two potential reasons for why the siloviki supported the amendments. The first reason is that individuals who do not participate in patronal politics often find themselves in a vulnerable position as they are unable to partake in the rewards that are distributed by the patrons – in order to gain access to these rewards clients must loyally carry out their patron’s will, from the lowest levels of the pyramid to Putin at the top. The siloviki supporting the amendments is thus a chain of events that ultimately can be explained by self-interest. The second reason is that the siloviki wish to avoid a situation where Putin becomes a lame duck, as that could lead to conflict – and the risk of losing such a conflict – within the pyramid, which in turn could mean losing access to the aforementioned rewards as a result.}}, author = {{Guldstrand, Jesper}}, language = {{swe}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Varför stöttade silovikerna de ryska konstitutionsändringarna 2020? Patronalistisk politik i det ryska säkerhetsetablissemanget}}, year = {{2022}}, }