Justice vs Democracy
(2022) FKVK02 20221Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- 123 of the 195 countries in the world are States Parties to the Rome Statute and under the jurisdiction of the ICC. This court is structured on two pillars, a judicial pillar and an enforcement pillar the latter belongs to the states, meaning that the court is reliant on the states to enforce its operations. It then follows that when targeting state representatives/elites in electoral conflicts friction arises systematically, given that the ICC is reliant on cooperation of the same elites it is targeting. As this wasn’t messy enough, such interventions into electoral conflicts have path-dependent outcomes on democracy. This paper seeks to sort out the mechanics and inner workings of these interventions by using ‘two-person’ game theory as... (More)
- 123 of the 195 countries in the world are States Parties to the Rome Statute and under the jurisdiction of the ICC. This court is structured on two pillars, a judicial pillar and an enforcement pillar the latter belongs to the states, meaning that the court is reliant on the states to enforce its operations. It then follows that when targeting state representatives/elites in electoral conflicts friction arises systematically, given that the ICC is reliant on cooperation of the same elites it is targeting. As this wasn’t messy enough, such interventions into electoral conflicts have path-dependent outcomes on democracy. This paper seeks to sort out the mechanics and inner workings of these interventions by using ‘two-person’ game theory as proposed by Anatol Rapoport to analyze the cases of Ivory coast 2010/2011 and Kenya 2007/2008. The findings suggest that when intervening with cooperation it can create a constant-sum game yielding democratic reversal, and when intervening without cooperation it creates a non-constant sum game yielding democratic consolidation. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9097745
- author
- Mrad, Edgar LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- A game theoretic approach to investigate the impact of the ICC´s interventions on democratization in post-election violence societies.
- course
- FKVK02 20221
- year
- 2022
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Keywords: International criminal court, ICC, Game theory, Democracy Antal ord: 9916
- language
- English
- id
- 9097745
- date added to LUP
- 2022-10-04 13:30:31
- date last changed
- 2022-10-04 13:30:31
@misc{9097745, abstract = {{123 of the 195 countries in the world are States Parties to the Rome Statute and under the jurisdiction of the ICC. This court is structured on two pillars, a judicial pillar and an enforcement pillar the latter belongs to the states, meaning that the court is reliant on the states to enforce its operations. It then follows that when targeting state representatives/elites in electoral conflicts friction arises systematically, given that the ICC is reliant on cooperation of the same elites it is targeting. As this wasn’t messy enough, such interventions into electoral conflicts have path-dependent outcomes on democracy. This paper seeks to sort out the mechanics and inner workings of these interventions by using ‘two-person’ game theory as proposed by Anatol Rapoport to analyze the cases of Ivory coast 2010/2011 and Kenya 2007/2008. The findings suggest that when intervening with cooperation it can create a constant-sum game yielding democratic reversal, and when intervening without cooperation it creates a non-constant sum game yielding democratic consolidation.}}, author = {{Mrad, Edgar}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Justice vs Democracy}}, year = {{2022}}, }