The Normative Autonomy of Good Faith in Public International Law
(2022) LAGF03 20222Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The thesis overreaching aim is to examine the normative autonomy of the principle of good faith. More specifically, whether the principle can inde-pendently create an obligation to negotiate. The research in the thesis is guided by a legal dogmatic method.
The idea that general norms or principles can affect the way courts decide cases is not confined to treaty regimes. International courts have always had the power to refer to general principles of law. They lay down parameters that affect the way that states exercise their discretionary powers; they set limits, provide guidance, and determine how conflicts between other rules and principles will be resolved. The principle of good faith is one such general principle of law. It... (More) - The thesis overreaching aim is to examine the normative autonomy of the principle of good faith. More specifically, whether the principle can inde-pendently create an obligation to negotiate. The research in the thesis is guided by a legal dogmatic method.
The idea that general norms or principles can affect the way courts decide cases is not confined to treaty regimes. International courts have always had the power to refer to general principles of law. They lay down parameters that affect the way that states exercise their discretionary powers; they set limits, provide guidance, and determine how conflicts between other rules and principles will be resolved. The principle of good faith is one such general principle of law. It incorporates notions of fairness and reasonableness. The principle is particularly important in the context of negotiations, where it broadens the scope and concept of what is considered fair conduct. Nevertheless, there has been much debate about whether the principle is capable of producing binding legal obligations by itself.
The examination of legal doctrine revealed wildly divergent opinions. Some authors propose that good faith primarily acts as an ethical principle, whilst others argue that it is an intensely normative notion that could be directly applied as a principle yielding legal obligations. The pronouncements from the ICJ on the legal status of the norm can be seen as an end to this debate. The development of case law indicates that the principle of good faith does not operate through a direct application of its own substance. As such, the principle has minimal value as an autonomous source of rights and duties.
The thesis consequently finds that the role that good faith plays in international law is that of a catalyst; the principle only gains legal significance when it is tied to a more precise and well-defined rule. To illustrate this, the thesis shows that negotiations must be carried out in good faith. However, this hinges on whether an obligation to negotiate has been ascertained, as the principle of good faith cannot alone impose an obligation to enter negotiations. The thesis concludes with stating that despite this, good faith plays a vital role in international law by delineating the content of given commitments. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Uppsatsens övergripande syfte är att undersöka den autonoma räckvidden av principen om good faith. I synnerhet ämnar uppsatsen att undersöka huruvida principen kan tillämpas självständigt för att skapa en bindande förhandlingsskyldighet. För att uppnå detta syfte har en rättsdogmatisk metod använts.
Internationella domstolar har alltid haft befogenhet att använda sig av allmänna rättsprinciper. De fastställer parametrarna som påverkar hur stater utövar sina diskretionära befogenheter; de sätter gränser, ger vägledning, och fastställer hur konflikter mellan andra regler och principer ska lösas. Principen om good faith är en sådan allmän rättsprincip. Den innefattar föreställningar om rättvisa och rimlighet. Principen är särskilt viktig... (More) - Uppsatsens övergripande syfte är att undersöka den autonoma räckvidden av principen om good faith. I synnerhet ämnar uppsatsen att undersöka huruvida principen kan tillämpas självständigt för att skapa en bindande förhandlingsskyldighet. För att uppnå detta syfte har en rättsdogmatisk metod använts.
Internationella domstolar har alltid haft befogenhet att använda sig av allmänna rättsprinciper. De fastställer parametrarna som påverkar hur stater utövar sina diskretionära befogenheter; de sätter gränser, ger vägledning, och fastställer hur konflikter mellan andra regler och principer ska lösas. Principen om good faith är en sådan allmän rättsprincip. Den innefattar föreställningar om rättvisa och rimlighet. Principen är särskilt viktig i samband med förhandlingar, där den vidgar ramarna för vad som anses vara ett rättvist beteende. Good faith må vara förenat med idén om förhandlingar, men det har varit mycket omdiskuterat huruvida principen i sig kan ge upphov till bindande förpliktelser.
Åsikterna går vitt isär inom den juridiska doktrinen. Vissa författare föreslår att good faith enbart är en etisk princip, medan andra hävdar att det är en intensivt normativ princip som kan tillämpas självständigt för att ge upphov till rättsliga förpliktelser. ICJ:s uttalanden om normens rättsliga status kan ses som ett slut på denna debatt. Utvecklingen av rättspraxis tyder på att principen endast har ett marginellt värde som en självständig källa till rättigheter och skyldigheter. Med andra ord, tyder praxis på att principen inte kan tillämpas självständigt.
Uppsatsen konstaterar följaktligen att den roll som good faith spelar inom folkrätten är likt en katalysator; principen får endast rättslig effekt när den är knuten till en mer exakt och väldefinierad regel. För att illustrera detta belyser uppsatsen att förhandlingar måste genomföras i good faith. Detta är emellertid beroende på om en konkret förhandlingsskyldighet har fastställts, eftersom principen kan inte självmant ge upphov till en förhandlingsskyldighet. Uppsatsen avslutar med att poängtera att trots detta har principen en viktig roll inom folkrätten genom att avgränsa innehållet i givna åtaganden. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9104668
- author
- McCready, Victoria LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20222
- year
- 2022
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- folkrätt, public international law, principle of good faith, obligation to negotiate, obligation to negotiate in good faith
- language
- English
- id
- 9104668
- date added to LUP
- 2023-02-03 16:30:07
- date last changed
- 2023-02-03 16:30:07
@misc{9104668, abstract = {{The thesis overreaching aim is to examine the normative autonomy of the principle of good faith. More specifically, whether the principle can inde-pendently create an obligation to negotiate. The research in the thesis is guided by a legal dogmatic method. The idea that general norms or principles can affect the way courts decide cases is not confined to treaty regimes. International courts have always had the power to refer to general principles of law. They lay down parameters that affect the way that states exercise their discretionary powers; they set limits, provide guidance, and determine how conflicts between other rules and principles will be resolved. The principle of good faith is one such general principle of law. It incorporates notions of fairness and reasonableness. The principle is particularly important in the context of negotiations, where it broadens the scope and concept of what is considered fair conduct. Nevertheless, there has been much debate about whether the principle is capable of producing binding legal obligations by itself. The examination of legal doctrine revealed wildly divergent opinions. Some authors propose that good faith primarily acts as an ethical principle, whilst others argue that it is an intensely normative notion that could be directly applied as a principle yielding legal obligations. The pronouncements from the ICJ on the legal status of the norm can be seen as an end to this debate. The development of case law indicates that the principle of good faith does not operate through a direct application of its own substance. As such, the principle has minimal value as an autonomous source of rights and duties. The thesis consequently finds that the role that good faith plays in international law is that of a catalyst; the principle only gains legal significance when it is tied to a more precise and well-defined rule. To illustrate this, the thesis shows that negotiations must be carried out in good faith. However, this hinges on whether an obligation to negotiate has been ascertained, as the principle of good faith cannot alone impose an obligation to enter negotiations. The thesis concludes with stating that despite this, good faith plays a vital role in international law by delineating the content of given commitments.}}, author = {{McCready, Victoria}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{The Normative Autonomy of Good Faith in Public International Law}}, year = {{2022}}, }