Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

A False Sense of Security? - A Critical Analysis of the Civilian Protection Against Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants in International Armed Conflicts

Boekelman, Sam LU (2022) LAGF03 20222
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Mot bakgrund av kriget mellan Ryssland och Ukraina i närheten av kärnkraft-verket i Zaporizjzja frågar sig många hur civilbefolkningar i dag är skyddade mot en potentiell kärnkraftskatastrof orsakad av krig. Syftet med denna upp-sats är således att undersöka vilka bestämmelser som finns för att skydda ci-vila mot militära attacker på kärnkraftverk i internationella väpnade konflikter, samt att undersöka hur effektivt de nämnda bestämmelserna skyddar civila. Därför undersöks och kritiseras grundligt de olika skyddsnivåer som före-skrivs i Tilläggsprotokoll I till Genèvekonventionerna ur ett civilt perspektiv. I uppsatsens undersökande del används en kritisk rättsdogmatisk metod för att beskriva och granska, med hjälp av erkända... (More)
Mot bakgrund av kriget mellan Ryssland och Ukraina i närheten av kärnkraft-verket i Zaporizjzja frågar sig många hur civilbefolkningar i dag är skyddade mot en potentiell kärnkraftskatastrof orsakad av krig. Syftet med denna upp-sats är således att undersöka vilka bestämmelser som finns för att skydda ci-vila mot militära attacker på kärnkraftverk i internationella väpnade konflikter, samt att undersöka hur effektivt de nämnda bestämmelserna skyddar civila. Därför undersöks och kritiseras grundligt de olika skyddsnivåer som före-skrivs i Tilläggsprotokoll I till Genèvekonventionerna ur ett civilt perspektiv. I uppsatsens undersökande del används en kritisk rättsdogmatisk metod för att beskriva och granska, med hjälp av erkända folkrättsliga källor, de olika skydd som föreskrivs i Tilläggsprotokoll I. I det sista avsnittet nyttjar uppsatsen en normativ diskussion kring den gällande rätten för att bedöma skyddets effektivitet ur ett civilt perspektiv.
Uppsatsens resultat visar att det finns tre olika nivåer av skydd mot attacker på kärnkraftverk enligt Tilläggsprotokoll I och alla dessa innehåller komplexa och rikt nyanserade formuleringar. Den första nivån av skydd är skyddet av civila objekt. Om kärnkraftverket inte anses vara ett civilt objekt utan ett mili-tärt sådant finns det en sekundär skyddsnivå, nämligen det särskilda skyddet av kärnkraftverk. Om det särskilda skyddet inte är tillämpligt eller upphör, är det återstående och slutgiltiga skyddet av kärnkraftverk genom proportionalitetsprincipen. Den gemensamma nämnaren för varje skyddsnivå är att de är tämligen vaga till sin utformning, vilket innebär att stater har ett stort tolkningsutrymme vid tydningen av de enskilda bestämmelserna och deras sam-spel. I slutändan beror därför skyddets effektivitet på staternas vilja att tolka bestämmelserna till förmån för det civila intresset. Emellertid har försök att ytterligare utvidga eller förstärka det nuvarande skyddet genom att ingå nya avtal konsekvent misslyckats, vilket tyder på att stater är ovilliga att prioritera civilbefolkningens säkerhet framför den potentiella militära fördel en attack kan innebära. Följaktligen dras slutsatsen att det civila skyddet mot attacker på kärnkraftverk i stort sett är ineffektivt och oförutsebart för civilbefolkningar. (Less)
Abstract
In light of the warfare between Russia and Ukraine around the nuclear power plant in Zaphorizhzhya, many wonder how civilians today are protected against a potential nuclear disaster caused by war. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate which regulations there are to protect civilians against military attacks on nuclear power plants in international armed conflicts, as well as to examine the aforementioned regulations’ efficacy in protecting civilians. Therefore, the different layers of protection stipulated in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions are thoroughly examined and criticized from the perspective of civilians. The thesis employs a critical legal dogmatic method in its main body to outline and examine... (More)
In light of the warfare between Russia and Ukraine around the nuclear power plant in Zaphorizhzhya, many wonder how civilians today are protected against a potential nuclear disaster caused by war. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate which regulations there are to protect civilians against military attacks on nuclear power plants in international armed conflicts, as well as to examine the aforementioned regulations’ efficacy in protecting civilians. Therefore, the different layers of protection stipulated in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions are thoroughly examined and criticized from the perspective of civilians. The thesis employs a critical legal dogmatic method in its main body to outline and examine the different protections stipulated in Additional Protocol I, using the acknowledged sources of international law. In its final section, the paper engages in a normative discussion around the outlined valid law to assess the efficacy of the protections from a civilian perspective.
The results of the investigation finds that there are three distinct layers of protection against attacks on nuclear power plants stipulated in Additional Protocol I, all of which have complex and highly nuanced formulations. The first layer of protection is the protection of civilian objects. If the plant is not considered a civilian object, but a military one, there is a secondary layer of protection, namely the special protection of nuclear electrical generating stations. If the special protection ceases or is not applicable, the remaining protection is granted by the principle of proportionality. The common denominator for each layer of protection is their fairly vague character, which provides States with a wide margin of discretion in their interpretation of each provision and their interplay. Ultimately, the protections’ efficacy is therefore dependent on a State’s willingness to interpret the provisions in favor of the civilian interest. However, efforts made to further expand or fortify the current protection by entering into new agreements have consistently failed, indicating an unwillingness of States to prioritize civilian safety over a potential military advantage gained from an attack. Therefore, it is concluded that the civilian protection against attacks on nuclear power plants is largely ineffective and unpredictable for civilians. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Boekelman, Sam LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20222
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Folkrätt, Public international law, International humanitarian law, International armed conflicts, Nuclear power plants
language
English
id
9104807
date added to LUP
2023-02-03 15:44:02
date last changed
2023-02-03 15:44:02
@misc{9104807,
  abstract     = {{In light of the warfare between Russia and Ukraine around the nuclear power plant in Zaphorizhzhya, many wonder how civilians today are protected against a potential nuclear disaster caused by war. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate which regulations there are to protect civilians against military attacks on nuclear power plants in international armed conflicts, as well as to examine the aforementioned regulations’ efficacy in protecting civilians. Therefore, the different layers of protection stipulated in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions are thoroughly examined and criticized from the perspective of civilians. The thesis employs a critical legal dogmatic method in its main body to outline and examine the different protections stipulated in Additional Protocol I, using the acknowledged sources of international law. In its final section, the paper engages in a normative discussion around the outlined valid law to assess the efficacy of the protections from a civilian perspective. 
The results of the investigation finds that there are three distinct layers of protection against attacks on nuclear power plants stipulated in Additional Protocol I, all of which have complex and highly nuanced formulations. The first layer of protection is the protection of civilian objects. If the plant is not considered a civilian object, but a military one, there is a secondary layer of protection, namely the special protection of nuclear electrical generating stations. If the special protection ceases or is not applicable, the remaining protection is granted by the principle of proportionality. The common denominator for each layer of protection is their fairly vague character, which provides States with a wide margin of discretion in their interpretation of each provision and their interplay. Ultimately, the protections’ efficacy is therefore dependent on a State’s willingness to interpret the provisions in favor of the civilian interest. However, efforts made to further expand or fortify the current protection by entering into new agreements have consistently failed, indicating an unwillingness of States to prioritize civilian safety over a potential military advantage gained from an attack. Therefore, it is concluded that the civilian protection against attacks on nuclear power plants is largely ineffective and unpredictable for civilians.}},
  author       = {{Boekelman, Sam}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{A False Sense of Security? - A Critical Analysis of the Civilian Protection Against Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants in International Armed Conflicts}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}