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Remedying mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds - The EU competition law treatment of non-reportable M&A transactions

Hertsberg Åsander, Samuel LU (2023) JURM02 20231
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Europeiska kommissionen har sedan en tid tillbaka upplevt brister i EU:s kontroll av företagskoncentrationer. Detta eftersom EU:s koncentrationsförordning inte anses fånga alla potentiellt konkurrensrättsligt problematiska företagsförvärv. Diskussionerna har gällt både förordningens kriterier för
"unionsdimension", alltså tröskelvärdena för omsättning, och "koncentration", alltså gränsen för att förvärva kontroll. Trots detta har dessa kriterier för
koncentrationsförordningens tillämpning lämnats oförändrade.
Den senaste tiden har dock jurisdiktionen för att granska företagsförvärv som
inte omfattas av anmälningsskyldighet utvidgats. Detta med anledning av att
kommissionen 2021 utfärdade sin vägledning om tillämpningen av den mekanism... (More)
Europeiska kommissionen har sedan en tid tillbaka upplevt brister i EU:s kontroll av företagskoncentrationer. Detta eftersom EU:s koncentrationsförordning inte anses fånga alla potentiellt konkurrensrättsligt problematiska företagsförvärv. Diskussionerna har gällt både förordningens kriterier för
"unionsdimension", alltså tröskelvärdena för omsättning, och "koncentration", alltså gränsen för att förvärva kontroll. Trots detta har dessa kriterier för
koncentrationsförordningens tillämpning lämnats oförändrade.
Den senaste tiden har dock jurisdiktionen för att granska företagsförvärv som
inte omfattas av anmälningsskyldighet utvidgats. Detta med anledning av att
kommissionen 2021 utfärdade sin vägledning om tillämpningen av den mekanism för hänskjutande av ärenden som anges i artikel 22 i koncentrationsförordningen samt EU-domstolens dom från 2023 i målet Towercast v Autorité de la concurrence och Ministère de l'Économie, vilket behandlade vilken
roll artikel 102 FEUF har vid kontrollen av företagskoncentrationer.
När jurisdiktion väl har etablerats över ett potentiellt konkurrenshämmande
förvärv, föreskriver EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning olika sätt att avhjälpa transaktionens konkurrensskadliga effekter. Detta sker genom vad som kallas för
korrigerande åtgärder eller frivilliga åtaganden. I arbetet med att utvidga konkurrenslagstiftningens omfattning har dock aspekten av hur transaktionernas
konkurrensskadliga effekter ska avhjälpas varit nästan helt frånvarande.
Den här uppsatsen syftar till att förklara hur företagsförvärv som inte når upp
till EU:s jurisdiktionströsklar ändå kan granskas enligt EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning, samt hur deras konkurrensskadliga effekter därefter kan åtgärdas.
Uppsatsen ämnar också analysera hur avvägningen sker mellan dels åtgärdernas effektivitet och dels proportionalitet i dessa bedömningar samt huruvida
EU:s konkurrensrätt behandlar dessa transaktioner konsekvent och likvärdigt
när det gäller att åtgärda deras konkurrensskadliga effekter.
Slutsatserna är att beroende på hur jurisdiktion har fastställts över det icke
anmälningspliktiga förvärvet, kommer korrigerande åtgärder och frivilliga
åtaganden antingen att bedömas inom ramen för koncentrationskontroll eller
missbruk av dominerande ställning. Under dessa regelverk anses olika avhjälpande åtgärder vara effektiva och därför ha företräde. Koncentrationskontrollen föredrar strukturella åtgärder, medan för missbruk av dominerande ställning föredras beteendemässiga åtgärder. Dessutom är det för närvarande
oklart hur åtgärdernas effektivitet och proportionalitet ska vägas mot
varandra. Detta skapar ett system som riskerar att leda till att icke anmälningspliktiga företagsförvärv behandlas på ett inkonsekvent och olikvärdigt sätt. I
samband med att jurisdiktionen över dessa förvärv utvidgas finns det därför
behov av klargöranden och vägledning kring hur konkurrenshämmande företagsförvärv som ligger under EU:s jurisdiktionströsklar ska åtgärdas. (Less)
Abstract
The European Commission has for some time perceived enforcement gaps in relation to the jurisdictional scope of EU merger control not being adequate in capturing all potentially competitively problematic mergers and acquisitions. The discussions have been both in regard to the criteria of ‘Union dimension’, i.e. the turnover thresholds, and to the criteria of ‘concentration’, i.e. the threshold of control. Even so, the jurisdictional thresholds as provided by the EUMR have been left unchanged.

Recent developments in EU competition law have nonetheless expanded the jurisdictional scope of reviewing non-reportable M&A transactions. Most notably so through the Commission in 2021 issuing its Guidance on the application of the referral... (More)
The European Commission has for some time perceived enforcement gaps in relation to the jurisdictional scope of EU merger control not being adequate in capturing all potentially competitively problematic mergers and acquisitions. The discussions have been both in regard to the criteria of ‘Union dimension’, i.e. the turnover thresholds, and to the criteria of ‘concentration’, i.e. the threshold of control. Even so, the jurisdictional thresholds as provided by the EUMR have been left unchanged.

Recent developments in EU competition law have nonetheless expanded the jurisdictional scope of reviewing non-reportable M&A transactions. Most notably so through the Commission in 2021 issuing its Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases and the 2023 judgment of the CJEU in Towercast v Autorité de la concurrence and Ministère de l’Économie. The latter in regard to the residual role of Article 102 TFEU in merger control.

Once jurisdiction has been established over a potentially competitively problematic merger or acquisition, EU competition law provides different ways to remedy the competitive harmfulness of the transaction. However, the aspect of remedies has been almost entirely absent in the discussions on how to bridge the perceived enforcement gaps of EU merger control.
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds can be reviewed under EU competition law, as well as how they subsequently are to be remedied. In addition, the thesis aims to analyse how effectiveness in removing competitive harm and proportionality are balanced in these remedy assessments and whether the EU competition law treatment is coherent and equivalent when it comes to remedying mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds.

The conclusions are that, dependent on which jurisdictional rule that has been used to establish jurisdiction over the non-reportable M&A transaction, the merger or acquisition will either be remedied under the legal framework of merger control or of antitrust. Under these frameworks there are different primacies for which remedies that are generally considered effective. Merger control favours structural remedies, whereas antitrust favours behavioural remedies. In addition, it is currently not clear how the effectiveness in removing competitive harm and proportionality are balanced. Altogether, this seemingly creates a system that risks leading to an incoherent and inequivalent EU competition law treatment of non-reportable M&A transactions. Hence there is need for further clarification and guidance on how mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds are supposed to be remedied, as the jurisdictional scope to review these M&A transactions expands. (Less)
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author
Hertsberg Åsander, Samuel LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM02 20231
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
EU law, Competition law, Remedies, EUMR, jurisdictional thresholds, merger control, Article 102 TFEU, EU-rätt, konkurrensrätt, företagskoncentration
language
English
id
9116351
date added to LUP
2023-06-15 15:34:22
date last changed
2023-06-15 15:34:22
@misc{9116351,
  abstract     = {{The European Commission has for some time perceived enforcement gaps in relation to the jurisdictional scope of EU merger control not being adequate in capturing all potentially competitively problematic mergers and acquisitions. The discussions have been both in regard to the criteria of ‘Union dimension’, i.e. the turnover thresholds, and to the criteria of ‘concentration’, i.e. the threshold of control. Even so, the jurisdictional thresholds as provided by the EUMR have been left unchanged.

Recent developments in EU competition law have nonetheless expanded the jurisdictional scope of reviewing non-reportable M&A transactions. Most notably so through the Commission in 2021 issuing its Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases and the 2023 judgment of the CJEU in Towercast v Autorité de la concurrence and Ministère de l’Économie. The latter in regard to the residual role of Article 102 TFEU in merger control.

Once jurisdiction has been established over a potentially competitively problematic merger or acquisition, EU competition law provides different ways to remedy the competitive harmfulness of the transaction. However, the aspect of remedies has been almost entirely absent in the discussions on how to bridge the perceived enforcement gaps of EU merger control. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds can be reviewed under EU competition law, as well as how they subsequently are to be remedied. In addition, the thesis aims to analyse how effectiveness in removing competitive harm and proportionality are balanced in these remedy assessments and whether the EU competition law treatment is coherent and equivalent when it comes to remedying mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds.

The conclusions are that, dependent on which jurisdictional rule that has been used to establish jurisdiction over the non-reportable M&A transaction, the merger or acquisition will either be remedied under the legal framework of merger control or of antitrust. Under these frameworks there are different primacies for which remedies that are generally considered effective. Merger control favours structural remedies, whereas antitrust favours behavioural remedies. In addition, it is currently not clear how the effectiveness in removing competitive harm and proportionality are balanced. Altogether, this seemingly creates a system that risks leading to an incoherent and inequivalent EU competition law treatment of non-reportable M&A transactions. Hence there is need for further clarification and guidance on how mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds are supposed to be remedied, as the jurisdictional scope to review these M&A transactions expands.}},
  author       = {{Hertsberg Åsander, Samuel}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Remedying mergers and acquisitions below the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds - The EU competition law treatment of non-reportable M&A transactions}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}