Syftet med syftet - En analys av syftesöverträdelser inom EU-konkurrensrätten med fokus på matpriskriget inom Sverige 2023
(2023) LAGF03 20231Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The thesis begins by investigating the purposes behind competition law, how vertical price restraints are regulated, and the consequences of applying a vertical price restraint. For a contemporary contextualization, a mapping of the legal dogmatic situation is created based on one of Sweden's largest grocery retailers' price reduction campaigns. Considering their high market shares a more impactful price reduction campaign, where their retail stores are forced to sell products at a specific price, would be considered a vertical price restraint.
Vertical price restraints are regarded as a particularly severe limitation on competition. It is presumed to be a violation by object rather than a violation by effect. As a consequence the main... (More) - The thesis begins by investigating the purposes behind competition law, how vertical price restraints are regulated, and the consequences of applying a vertical price restraint. For a contemporary contextualization, a mapping of the legal dogmatic situation is created based on one of Sweden's largest grocery retailers' price reduction campaigns. Considering their high market shares a more impactful price reduction campaign, where their retail stores are forced to sell products at a specific price, would be considered a vertical price restraint.
Vertical price restraints are regarded as a particularly severe limitation on competition. It is presumed to be a violation by object rather than a violation by effect. As a consequence the main provision for anticompetitive agreements, Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is deemed to be fulfilled without a concrete examination of the agreement's effect on the market. Vertical price restraints are presumed to be violations by object regardless of market shares. Case law also reveals that this presumption only needs to be established through the most essential factual circumstances to establish the existence of the agreement.
The presumption requires companies to make a self-assessment of whether they meet the four cumulative requirements under Article 101(3) of the TFEU. One of these requirements, the preservation of competition, will indirectly be presumed to not be achievable. Even if a company can argue for efficiency gains benefiting consumers, the investigation suggests that an individual exemption would not be granted. The burden of proof also differs from that of the Commission, as case law emphasizes that the justification for the exemption must be well-founded and comprehensive. This can be seen as in line with the legislative purposes of competition law. At the same time, it can be discussed whether it is desirable in itself that companies do not have their agreements assessed through rule of reason. Thus, a deterrent effect is achieved. The consequences of going too far can, therefore, be summed up as the company risking a fine of up to 10% of their global yearly turnover. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Uppsatsen gör avstamp i att utreda konkurrensrättens syften, hur vertikala prisbindningar regleras och vad konsekvenserna av att tillämpa en vertikal prisbindning innebär. För en samtidsrelevant förankring skapas en kartläggande rättsdogmatisk situation utifrån en av Sveriges största dagligvaruföretags prissänkningskampanjer. I förhållande till deras höga marknadsandelar skulle en slagkraftigare prissänkningskampanj, där dess återförsäljande butiker tvingas sälja produkter till ett specifikt pris, anses vara en vertikal prisbindning.
Vertikala prisbindningar anses vara en särskilt allvarlig begränsning av konkurrensen. De presumeras därför vara syftesöverträdelser i stället för en resultatöverträdelse. Konsekvensen blir att... (More) - Uppsatsen gör avstamp i att utreda konkurrensrättens syften, hur vertikala prisbindningar regleras och vad konsekvenserna av att tillämpa en vertikal prisbindning innebär. För en samtidsrelevant förankring skapas en kartläggande rättsdogmatisk situation utifrån en av Sveriges största dagligvaruföretags prissänkningskampanjer. I förhållande till deras höga marknadsandelar skulle en slagkraftigare prissänkningskampanj, där dess återförsäljande butiker tvingas sälja produkter till ett specifikt pris, anses vara en vertikal prisbindning.
Vertikala prisbindningar anses vara en särskilt allvarlig begränsning av konkurrensen. De presumeras därför vara syftesöverträdelser i stället för en resultatöverträdelse. Konsekvensen blir att huvudbestämmelsen för konkurrensbegränsande avtal, artikel 101.1 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (FEUF), anses vara uppfylld utan en konkret prövning av effekten avtalet har på marknaden. Vertikala prisbindningar presumernas nämligen vara syftesöverträdelser oaktat av aktörens marknadsandelar. Av praxis framkommer det även att denna presumtion endast måste styrkas genom de absolut mest nödvändiga sakomständigheterna för att fastställa avtalets existens.
Presumtionen leder till att företag måste göra en egenbedömning av om de uppfyller fyra kumulativa rekvisit i artikel 101.3 FEUF. Ett av rekvisiten, att konkurrensen upprätthålls, kommer indirekt att presumeras inte vara uppfylld. Även om företaget kan argumentera för effektivitetsvinster som gynnar konsumenterna, talar utredningen för att ett individuellt undantag inte skulle ges. Bevisbördan skiljer sig även från kommissionens, då praxis framhåller att undantagets motivering måste vara välgrundad och omfattande. Detta kan ses vara i linje med lagstiftningens uppställda syften för konkurrensrätten, en avskräckande effekt uppnås därför. Samtidigt kan det diskuteras om det i sig är eftersträvansvärt att företag inte får sina avtal prövade materiellt. Konsekvensen för företaget vid en utvidgning av sin kampanj kan därför subsumeras till att riskera en bot om upp till 10% av sin globala årsomsättning. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9128564
- author
- Hentschel Lund, Martin LU
- supervisor
-
- Mariya Senyk LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20231
- year
- 2023
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- konkurrensrätt, syftesöverträdelse
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9128564
- date added to LUP
- 2023-09-13 08:39:55
- date last changed
- 2023-09-13 08:39:55
@misc{9128564,
abstract = {{The thesis begins by investigating the purposes behind competition law, how vertical price restraints are regulated, and the consequences of applying a vertical price restraint. For a contemporary contextualization, a mapping of the legal dogmatic situation is created based on one of Sweden's largest grocery retailers' price reduction campaigns. Considering their high market shares a more impactful price reduction campaign, where their retail stores are forced to sell products at a specific price, would be considered a vertical price restraint.
Vertical price restraints are regarded as a particularly severe limitation on competition. It is presumed to be a violation by object rather than a violation by effect. As a consequence the main provision for anticompetitive agreements, Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is deemed to be fulfilled without a concrete examination of the agreement's effect on the market. Vertical price restraints are presumed to be violations by object regardless of market shares. Case law also reveals that this presumption only needs to be established through the most essential factual circumstances to establish the existence of the agreement.
The presumption requires companies to make a self-assessment of whether they meet the four cumulative requirements under Article 101(3) of the TFEU. One of these requirements, the preservation of competition, will indirectly be presumed to not be achievable. Even if a company can argue for efficiency gains benefiting consumers, the investigation suggests that an individual exemption would not be granted. The burden of proof also differs from that of the Commission, as case law emphasizes that the justification for the exemption must be well-founded and comprehensive. This can be seen as in line with the legislative purposes of competition law. At the same time, it can be discussed whether it is desirable in itself that companies do not have their agreements assessed through rule of reason. Thus, a deterrent effect is achieved. The consequences of going too far can, therefore, be summed up as the company risking a fine of up to 10% of their global yearly turnover.}},
author = {{Hentschel Lund, Martin}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Syftet med syftet - En analys av syftesöverträdelser inom EU-konkurrensrätten med fokus på matpriskriget inom Sverige 2023}},
year = {{2023}},
}