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Om betalningsskyldighetens odelbarhet i rättskraftshänseende

Fröbrant, Fredrika LU (2023) LAGF03 20231
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Att en tappande säljare på grund av res judicata hindras att yrka betalning för samma vara i ett senare mål är uppenbart, men för en köpare kan det komma som en överraskning att hon därmed beskurits möjligheten att tala å fel i det sålda godset. Enligt principen om betalningsskyldighetens odelbarhet anses betalningsskyldigheten för en vara eller tjänst odelbar i rättskraftshänseende. HD uttrycker detta sålunda att köparen efter en dom avseende betalningsskyl-digheten inte kan få prövat invändningar avseende samma rättsföljd eller al-ternativa och ekonomiskt likvärdiga rättsföljder, vilka är att anse som samma sak. Enligt 17:11 rättegångsbalken (RB) får nämligen den sak som blivit fö-remål för dom inte tas upp till prövning ånyo. Principen... (More)
Att en tappande säljare på grund av res judicata hindras att yrka betalning för samma vara i ett senare mål är uppenbart, men för en köpare kan det komma som en överraskning att hon därmed beskurits möjligheten att tala å fel i det sålda godset. Enligt principen om betalningsskyldighetens odelbarhet anses betalningsskyldigheten för en vara eller tjänst odelbar i rättskraftshänseende. HD uttrycker detta sålunda att köparen efter en dom avseende betalningsskyl-digheten inte kan få prövat invändningar avseende samma rättsföljd eller al-ternativa och ekonomiskt likvärdiga rättsföljder, vilka är att anse som samma sak. Enligt 17:11 rättegångsbalken (RB) får nämligen den sak som blivit fö-remål för dom inte tas upp till prövning ånyo. Principen etablerades ursprung-ligen genom NJA 1965:94 och har sedan bekräftats i NJA 1999:520 samt NJA 2021:407.
Syftet med föreliggande arbete är att klarlägga den rättskraftsteoretiska bak-grunden till odelbarhetsprincipen, såsom den fastslogs i NJA 1965:94. Arbe-tet åstadkommer detta syfte genom följande frågeställning: Hur påverkas odelbarhetsprincipen beroende på vilken rättskraftsteori som läggs till grund för begreppet ”sak” i 17:11 RB? För att angripa den uppställda frågeställ-ningen begagnas en rättsdogmatisk metod. Det teoretiska ramverket utgörs av de rättskraftsteorier som framförts av Ernst Kallenberg, Karl Olivecrona och Per Olof Ekelöf.
Med avseende på betalningsskyldighetens odelbarhet ställs den klassiska rättskraftsläran emot de moderna rättskraftsteorier som utarbetats av Oli-vecrona respektive Ekelöf. Sålunda undersöks kollisionen mellan gestalt-ningsrätter och anspråk, liksom principen om preklusion av svarandens mot-fakta som ett utflöde av orubblighetsprincipen.
Undersökningen utmynnar i slutsatsen att valet av rättskraftsteori och därmed grunden för begreppet ”sak” i 17:11 RB får stor återverkan på odelbarhets-principen. Enligt de moderna rättskraftslärorna prekluderas samtliga motfakta svaranden förfogat över med avseende på betalningsyrkandet och odelbar-hetsprincipen blir ett faktum. Av den klassiska läran följer däremot att svaran-den i en senare process äger åberopa en konkurrerande gestaltningsrätt för att frigöra sig från den förpliktelse han ålagts genom den första domen, varvid odelbarhetsprincipen upphör att existera. Sålunda måste odelbarhetsprincipen betraktas som ett direkt utflöde av preklusionsprincipen, dvs. Ekelöfs och Olivecronas rättskraftsläror. På så sätt blir domen relevant inte bara istället för rättsfakta till vilka den refererar, såsom orubblighetsprincipen traditionellt formulerats, utan dessutom istället för rättsfakta till vilka den inte refererar. Tydligen är detta detsamma som att domskälen vinner rättskraft, trots det ut-tryckliga stadgandet om motsatsen i 17:11 1 st. RB. (Less)
Abstract
Owing to the principle of res iudicata, it is obvious that a seller of goods who have found himself on the losing side of a court case may not again pursue further litigation against the defendant. For the defendant however, it may come as a surprise that she is thus cut off from the opportunity to initiate a lawsuit against the seller on the grounds of the goods being faulty. According to the principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay, the obligation to pay for a good or service is considered indivisible in terms of res iudicata. According to the Supreme Court of Sweden (HD), the buyer can no longer raise objections against his obligation to pay for the good once the payment claim has been decided in court. According to... (More)
Owing to the principle of res iudicata, it is obvious that a seller of goods who have found himself on the losing side of a court case may not again pursue further litigation against the defendant. For the defendant however, it may come as a surprise that she is thus cut off from the opportunity to initiate a lawsuit against the seller on the grounds of the goods being faulty. According to the principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay, the obligation to pay for a good or service is considered indivisible in terms of res iudicata. According to the Supreme Court of Sweden (HD), the buyer can no longer raise objections against his obligation to pay for the good once the payment claim has been decided in court. According to 17:11 of the Swedish Code of Procedure (RB), a case that has been decided may not be taken up for consid-eration again. The principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay stems from NJA 1965:94 and has since been confirmed by NJA 1999:520 and NJA 2021:407.
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the theoretical background behind the principle of indivisibility, as established through NJA 1965:94. The thesis thus postulates the following question: How is the principle of indivisibility affected depending on which theory of res iudicata is used as the basis for 17:11 RB? The issue is addressed through the legal doctrinal method, within the framework of the res iudicata theories developed by professors Ernst Kal-lenberg, Karl Olivecrona and Per Olof Ekelöf.
The classical theory of res iudicata is contrasted with the modern theories of res iudicata, with regard to the principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay. Thus, the collision between claims and the right to legal amendment is examined, as well as the principle of preclusion of the defendant’s counter-facts, as a direct consequence of the principle of finality.
The thesis culminates in the conclusion that the election of a certain theory of res iudicata has significant impacts on the indivisibility principle. On the one hand, according to the modern theories of res iudicata, all counterfacts availa-ble to the defendant with respect to the payment obligation are excluded from further litigation, whereby the principle of indivisibility becomes a fact. On the other hand, the classical theory dictates that the defendant may invoke a right to legal amendment to free herself from the obligation imposed by the first judgement, whereby the indivisibility principle ceases to exist. Thus, the prin-ciple of indivisibility must be regarded as a direct consequence of the principle of preclusion of counterfacts, as established through the theories advocated by Ekelöf and Olivecrona. Consequently, the judgement becomes relevant not only instead of the legal facts to which it refers, as dictated by the principle of finality, but also instead of legal facts to which it does not refer. In effect, this means that the reasoning behind the judgement becomes legally binding, de-spite the provision in 17:11 RB prohibiting it. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Fröbrant, Fredrika LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20231
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Processrätt, Civil Procedure, Rättskraft, NJA 1965:94
language
Swedish
id
9133653
date added to LUP
2023-09-11 07:35:26
date last changed
2023-09-11 07:35:26
@misc{9133653,
  abstract     = {{Owing to the principle of res iudicata, it is obvious that a seller of goods who have found himself on the losing side of a court case may not again pursue further litigation against the defendant. For the defendant however, it may come as a surprise that she is thus cut off from the opportunity to initiate a lawsuit against the seller on the grounds of the goods being faulty. According to the principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay, the obligation to pay for a good or service is considered indivisible in terms of res iudicata. According to the Supreme Court of Sweden (HD), the buyer can no longer raise objections against his obligation to pay for the good once the payment claim has been decided in court. According to 17:11 of the Swedish Code of Procedure (RB), a case that has been decided may not be taken up for consid-eration again. The principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay stems from NJA 1965:94 and has since been confirmed by NJA 1999:520 and NJA 2021:407. 
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the theoretical background behind the principle of indivisibility, as established through NJA 1965:94. The thesis thus postulates the following question: How is the principle of indivisibility affected depending on which theory of res iudicata is used as the basis for 17:11 RB? The issue is addressed through the legal doctrinal method, within the framework of the res iudicata theories developed by professors Ernst Kal-lenberg, Karl Olivecrona and Per Olof Ekelöf. 
The classical theory of res iudicata is contrasted with the modern theories of res iudicata, with regard to the principle of the indivisibility of the obligation to pay. Thus, the collision between claims and the right to legal amendment is examined, as well as the principle of preclusion of the defendant’s counter-facts, as a direct consequence of the principle of finality.
The thesis culminates in the conclusion that the election of a certain theory of res iudicata has significant impacts on the indivisibility principle. On the one hand, according to the modern theories of res iudicata, all counterfacts availa-ble to the defendant with respect to the payment obligation are excluded from further litigation, whereby the principle of indivisibility becomes a fact. On the other hand, the classical theory dictates that the defendant may invoke a right to legal amendment to free herself from the obligation imposed by the first judgement, whereby the indivisibility principle ceases to exist. Thus, the prin-ciple of indivisibility must be regarded as a direct consequence of the principle of preclusion of counterfacts, as established through the theories advocated by Ekelöf and Olivecrona. Consequently, the judgement becomes relevant not only instead of the legal facts to which it refers, as dictated by the principle of finality, but also instead of legal facts to which it does not refer. In effect, this means that the reasoning behind the judgement becomes legally binding, de-spite the provision in 17:11 RB prohibiting it.}},
  author       = {{Fröbrant, Fredrika}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Om betalningsskyldighetens odelbarhet i rättskraftshänseende}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}