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LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

ABL, vinstsyftet och lojalitetsplikten

Larsson, Axel LU (2023) JURM02 20232
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Den svenska aktiebolagsrätten ger upphov till ett antal intressekonflikter mellan olika parter. En av dessa intressekonflikter är mellan aktieägarna och företagsledningen, där företagsledningen kan ha incitament att driva företaget på ett sätt som strider mot aktieägarnas bästa intresse. Kompe-tensfördelningen i aktiebolag är uppställt på så sätt att ägandet och kontrol-len för aktiebolaget kan i viss utsträckning sägas ha separerats. Relationen mellan aktieägarna och företagsledningen kan således beskrivas som ett principal/agent-förhållande.
Från lagstiftningssidan har man försökt att angripa denna intressekonflikt med hjälp av olika rättsliga principer som ska förmå företagsledningen att agera på ett sätt som speglar aktieägarnas... (More)
Den svenska aktiebolagsrätten ger upphov till ett antal intressekonflikter mellan olika parter. En av dessa intressekonflikter är mellan aktieägarna och företagsledningen, där företagsledningen kan ha incitament att driva företaget på ett sätt som strider mot aktieägarnas bästa intresse. Kompe-tensfördelningen i aktiebolag är uppställt på så sätt att ägandet och kontrol-len för aktiebolaget kan i viss utsträckning sägas ha separerats. Relationen mellan aktieägarna och företagsledningen kan således beskrivas som ett principal/agent-förhållande.
Från lagstiftningssidan har man försökt att angripa denna intressekonflikt med hjälp av olika rättsliga principer som ska förmå företagsledningen att agera på ett sätt som speglar aktieägarnas intressen. Två av dessa principer är vinstsyftet och lojalitetsplikten.
I 3 kap. 3 § ABL framgår det att ett aktiebolag ska bedrivas med vinstsyfte om det ej framgår annat av bolagsordningen. Vinstsyftet kan kort sägas innebära att samtliga åtgärder som företagsledningen vidtar i förvaltningen av bolaget ska vara ägnat att leda till vinst som kan delas ut till aktieägar-na.
Lojalitetsplikten gäller som allmän princip i svensk aktiebolagsrätt. Lojali-tetsplikten innehåller i sin tur flera olika förpliktelser för företagsledning-en. Bland annat är företagsledningen skyldiga att undvika intressekonflik-ter, såsom jävssituationer och konkurrensförbudet och generalklausulen i 8 kap. 41 § ABL, som innebär att en aktieägare eller någon annan ej får ges en otillbörlig på en annan aktieägares eller bolagets bekostnad. Även lyd-nadsplikten får ses som en del av lojalitetsplikten. Enligt lydnadsplikten ska organ lägre i den aktiebolagsrättsliga hierarkin som utgångspunkt följa anvisningar från högre organ.
Situationen som denna framställning behandlar är när lojalitetsplikten och vinstsyftet inte är förenliga, det vill säga när lojalitetsplikten innebär att styrelsen ska vidta en åtgärd som strider mot vinstsyftet. Frågan blir då vilken princip som får företräde, och vilken som ska ge vika. Svaret av denna fråga beror på ett antal faktorer, bland annat hur vinstsyftet ska tol-kas, vad som ska anses vara gränserna för lojalitetsplikten och hur 8 kap. 41 § 2 st. ABL ska tolkas. Framställningen når dock slutsatsen att vinstsyf-tet i det flesta fall bör vara avgörande, om inte vinstsyftet omtolkas i sådan mån att det inte längre föreligger någon konflikt mellan vinstsyftet och lojalitetsplikten. Det finns även möjlighet för undantag, men det förutsätter att samtliga aktieägare samtycker till att en åtgärd som strider mot vinst-syftet ska genomföras. (Less)
Abstract
Swedish company law gives rise to several conflicts of interests between different parties. One of the conflicts of interest is between shareholders and the company management, where the latter may have incentives to run the company in a way that does not align with the best interests of the shareholders. The distribution of decision-making powers in the company is also set up in such way that ownership and control of the company is essentially separated. Thus, the relationship between shareholders and company management can be described as a principal/agent-relationship.
The legislator has adopted certain legal principles in an effort to contain the aforementioned conflict of interest. The purpose of these measures are to prompt the... (More)
Swedish company law gives rise to several conflicts of interests between different parties. One of the conflicts of interest is between shareholders and the company management, where the latter may have incentives to run the company in a way that does not align with the best interests of the shareholders. The distribution of decision-making powers in the company is also set up in such way that ownership and control of the company is essentially separated. Thus, the relationship between shareholders and company management can be described as a principal/agent-relationship.
The legislator has adopted certain legal principles in an effort to contain the aforementioned conflict of interest. The purpose of these measures are to prompt the company management into acting in a way that better aligns with the interest of the shareholders. The presumption of a pursuit of profit maximization and the duty of loyalty are two of these legal principles.
Chapter 3 section 3 of the Swedish Companies Act stipulates that unless otherwise stated in the articles of association, the purpose of a company is to pursue a maximization of profits. This pursuit of profit maximization can better be described as a directive to the company management that all measures taken within the management of the company should have the goal of leading to a profit that can be paid out as dividends to the share-holders.
The duty of loyalty is a general principle in Swedish company law. The duty of loyalty contains several obligations for the management of a com-pany. Amongst other things, the management is obliged to avoid conflicts of interest and abide by the general clause in chapter 8 section 41 of the Swedish Companies Act. Furthermore, the duty of loyalty contains a duty to obey. According to the duty of obedience, a company organ that is lower in the corporate hierarchy should prima facie obey directives that come from organs higher up in the hierarchy.
The situation that this essay concerns itself with is when the duty of loyalty and the profit maximization principle are incompatible. That is to say, when the duty of loyalty dictates that the management should act in a way that is contrary to the profit maximization principle. The question then is which principle that should take precedence. The answer to this question is contingent upon a number of elements, such as how the profit maximiza-tion principle should be interpreted, where the boundaries for the duty of loyalty should be drawn and how chapter 8 section 41 of the Swedish Companies Act should be read. However, the essay reaches the conclusion that in most cases the pursuit of profit maximization should be decisive, unless this principle is reinterpreted in a way where it is no longer in con-flict with the duty of loyalty. There is room for exceptions too, however this presupposes that all shareholders have consented to an action being taken that is not in line with the profit maximization principle. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Larsson, Axel LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The Swedish Companies Act, the Statutory Profit Purpose and the Duty of Loyalty.
course
JURM02 20232
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
associationsrätt, corporate law
language
Swedish
id
9143001
date added to LUP
2024-01-18 11:27:00
date last changed
2024-01-18 11:27:00
@misc{9143001,
  abstract     = {{Swedish company law gives rise to several conflicts of interests between different parties. One of the conflicts of interest is between shareholders and the company management, where the latter may have incentives to run the company in a way that does not align with the best interests of the shareholders. The distribution of decision-making powers in the company is also set up in such way that ownership and control of the company is essentially separated. Thus, the relationship between shareholders and company management can be described as a principal/agent-relationship. 
The legislator has adopted certain legal principles in an effort to contain the aforementioned conflict of interest. The purpose of these measures are to prompt the company management into acting in a way that better aligns with the interest of the shareholders. The presumption of a pursuit of profit maximization and the duty of loyalty are two of these legal principles. 
Chapter 3 section 3 of the Swedish Companies Act stipulates that unless otherwise stated in the articles of association, the purpose of a company is to pursue a maximization of profits. This pursuit of profit maximization can better be described as a directive to the company management that all measures taken within the management of the company should have the goal of leading to a profit that can be paid out as dividends to the share-holders. 
The duty of loyalty is a general principle in Swedish company law. The duty of loyalty contains several obligations for the management of a com-pany. Amongst other things, the management is obliged to avoid conflicts of interest and abide by the general clause in chapter 8 section 41 of the Swedish Companies Act. Furthermore, the duty of loyalty contains a duty to obey. According to the duty of obedience, a company organ that is lower in the corporate hierarchy should prima facie obey directives that come from organs higher up in the hierarchy. 
The situation that this essay concerns itself with is when the duty of loyalty and the profit maximization principle are incompatible. That is to say, when the duty of loyalty dictates that the management should act in a way that is contrary to the profit maximization principle. The question then is which principle that should take precedence. The answer to this question is contingent upon a number of elements, such as how the profit maximiza-tion principle should be interpreted, where the boundaries for the duty of loyalty should be drawn and how chapter 8 section 41 of the Swedish Companies Act should be read. However, the essay reaches the conclusion that in most cases the pursuit of profit maximization should be decisive, unless this principle is reinterpreted in a way where it is no longer in con-flict with the duty of loyalty. There is room for exceptions too, however this presupposes that all shareholders have consented to an action being taken that is not in line with the profit maximization principle.}},
  author       = {{Larsson, Axel}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{ABL, vinstsyftet och lojalitetsplikten}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}