Cyberoperationer – i gråzon av folkrättslig reglering? En kritisk analys av suveränitetsprincipens tillämplighet på cyberoperationer
(2023) LAGF03 20232Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Utvecklingen av cyberrymden och de åtgärder som kan vidtas inom dess område innebär stora utmaningar för den folkrättsliga regleringen. Det finns ännu inget regelverk som reglerar cyber-rymden; i stället appliceras gamla regler på nya moderna metoder. Det är konstaterat att vålds-förbudet i artikel 2(4) FN-stadgan samt principen om non-interventionen är tillämpliga på cy-beroperationer. Det är dock oklart vad som gäller för cyberoperationerna lågintensiva cyberop-erationer, de som faller under trösklarna för våldsförbudet i artikel 2(4) FN-stadgan och princi-pen om non-intervention.
I Tallinn Manualen (2017) klassificerades suveränitetsprincipen som en primär regel, vilket ledde till en debatt om principens verkliga existens som en... (More) - Utvecklingen av cyberrymden och de åtgärder som kan vidtas inom dess område innebär stora utmaningar för den folkrättsliga regleringen. Det finns ännu inget regelverk som reglerar cyber-rymden; i stället appliceras gamla regler på nya moderna metoder. Det är konstaterat att vålds-förbudet i artikel 2(4) FN-stadgan samt principen om non-interventionen är tillämpliga på cy-beroperationer. Det är dock oklart vad som gäller för cyberoperationerna lågintensiva cyberop-erationer, de som faller under trösklarna för våldsförbudet i artikel 2(4) FN-stadgan och princi-pen om non-intervention.
I Tallinn Manualen (2017) klassificerades suveränitetsprincipen som en primär regel, vilket ledde till en debatt om principens verkliga existens som en internationell sedvanerättslig regel på cyberområdet. Med denna klassificering kan lågintensiva cyberoperationer betraktas som otill-låtna handlingar inom folkrätten. För att avgöra om en internationell sedvanerättslig regel existe-rar måste man granska den allmänna praxis samt opinio juris på området. Uppsatsen presenterar två olika perspektiv på suveränitetsprincipens tillämplighet på cyberområdet där den antingen ses som en bindande regel eller som en vägledande princip. Om suveränitetsprincipen utgör en bindande regel innebär det att det finns en reglering för lågintensiva cyberoperationer och stater kan därmed hållas ansvariga samt att andra stater kan vidta motåtgärder. Om regeln däremot inte anses utgöra en bindande regel blir mer gråzonen definitiv, vilket innebär att stater kan dra nytta av detta för att vidta åtgärder mot andra stater men undgå statsansvar.
Den allmänna praxis och opinio juris som finns kan inte anses vara tillräcklig för att fastställa suveränitetsprincipen som en internationell sedvanerättslig bindande regel. Det kan därmed kon-stateras att rättsläget är oklart. Det finns en tydlig klassificering i doktrin, men den anses inte vara bindande. Den folkrättsliga regleringen kan därför inte anses vara tillräcklig för att omfatta de lågintensiva cyberoperationerna. Eftersom den internationella sedvanerätten på området är oklar kan det anses vara av stor vikt att stater gemensamt går samman för att genom traktat re-glera de lågintensiva cyberoperationer som hamnar i en gråzon inom folkrätten. (Less) - Abstract
- The development of cyberspace and the measures that can be taken within its area presents sig-nificant challenges for the regulation of public international law. Currently there is no frame-work specifically regulating cyberspace, old rules are instead applied to new modern methods. It is established that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention are applicable to cyber operations. However, it remains unclear how rules apply to low-intensity cyber operations that fall below the thresholds of the prohibi-tion of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention.
In the Tallinn Manual (2017), the principle of sovereignty was classified... (More) - The development of cyberspace and the measures that can be taken within its area presents sig-nificant challenges for the regulation of public international law. Currently there is no frame-work specifically regulating cyberspace, old rules are instead applied to new modern methods. It is established that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention are applicable to cyber operations. However, it remains unclear how rules apply to low-intensity cyber operations that fall below the thresholds of the prohibi-tion of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention.
In the Tallinn Manual (2017), the principle of sovereignty was classified as a primary rule, lead-ing to a debate about the actual existence of the principle as an international customary rule in the cyber area. The classification means that low-intensity cyber operations can be considered as prohibited acts under international law. To determine the existence of an international customary rule, general practice and opinio juris in the field must be considered. The paper presents two perspectives on the applicability of the principle of sovereignty in relations to cyber operations, where it is seen either as a binding rule or as a guiding principle. If the principle of sovereignty is considered a binding rule, there is regulation for low-intensity cyber operations, meaning, states can be held accountable and other states can take countermeasures. If the rule is not con-sidered a binding rule, the gray area persists, allowing states to take actions against other states without facing accountability.
The general practice and opinio juris currently available are not sufficient to establish the princi-ple of sovereignty as an internationally binding customary rule. Therefore, it can be concluded that the legal situation is unclear. While there is a clear classification in doctrine, it is not consid-ered binding. Because the international customary law in this area is unclear, it is crucial for states to come together to regulate the gray zone of public international law through a treaty. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9143427
- author
- Jakobsson, Johanna LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20232
- year
- 2023
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Folkrätt, suveränitetsprincipen, cyberoperationer
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9143427
- date added to LUP
- 2024-02-02 12:14:26
- date last changed
- 2024-02-02 12:14:26
@misc{9143427,
abstract = {{The development of cyberspace and the measures that can be taken within its area presents sig-nificant challenges for the regulation of public international law. Currently there is no frame-work specifically regulating cyberspace, old rules are instead applied to new modern methods. It is established that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention are applicable to cyber operations. However, it remains unclear how rules apply to low-intensity cyber operations that fall below the thresholds of the prohibi-tion of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention.
In the Tallinn Manual (2017), the principle of sovereignty was classified as a primary rule, lead-ing to a debate about the actual existence of the principle as an international customary rule in the cyber area. The classification means that low-intensity cyber operations can be considered as prohibited acts under international law. To determine the existence of an international customary rule, general practice and opinio juris in the field must be considered. The paper presents two perspectives on the applicability of the principle of sovereignty in relations to cyber operations, where it is seen either as a binding rule or as a guiding principle. If the principle of sovereignty is considered a binding rule, there is regulation for low-intensity cyber operations, meaning, states can be held accountable and other states can take countermeasures. If the rule is not con-sidered a binding rule, the gray area persists, allowing states to take actions against other states without facing accountability.
The general practice and opinio juris currently available are not sufficient to establish the princi-ple of sovereignty as an internationally binding customary rule. Therefore, it can be concluded that the legal situation is unclear. While there is a clear classification in doctrine, it is not consid-ered binding. Because the international customary law in this area is unclear, it is crucial for states to come together to regulate the gray zone of public international law through a treaty.}},
author = {{Jakobsson, Johanna}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Cyberoperationer – i gråzon av folkrättslig reglering? En kritisk analys av suveränitetsprincipens tillämplighet på cyberoperationer}},
year = {{2023}},
}