En etisk analys av teodicéproblemet: ur ett katolskt perspektiv med utgångspunkt i Germain Grisez' etik
(2024) TLVM61 20241Centre for Theology and Religious Studies
- Abstract
- The aim of this thesis is to illuminate, from a Catholic view, the role of different ethical theories in the formulations of, and proposed solutions to, the problem of evil. More specifically, what happens to the problem when applying a Catholic ethic, à la the moral theologian Germain Grisez, to God is examined. This is done by first analyzing which ethical assumptions lie behind the various formulations of and proposed solutions to the problem of evil. Grisez’s ethics is then applied to the various problem formulations of, and the proposed solutions to, the problem of evil in order to investigate to what extent they are valid combined with these ethics. Regarding the problem formulations, it is first shown that some can be directly found... (More)
- The aim of this thesis is to illuminate, from a Catholic view, the role of different ethical theories in the formulations of, and proposed solutions to, the problem of evil. More specifically, what happens to the problem when applying a Catholic ethic, à la the moral theologian Germain Grisez, to God is examined. This is done by first analyzing which ethical assumptions lie behind the various formulations of and proposed solutions to the problem of evil. Grisez’s ethics is then applied to the various problem formulations of, and the proposed solutions to, the problem of evil in order to investigate to what extent they are valid combined with these ethics. Regarding the problem formulations, it is first shown that some can be directly found to be invalid according to Grisez’s ethics, while all the others can be referred to the question of the defense of free will.
Regarding the defense of free will, it is first established that, according to Grisez’s ethics, it would not have been good for God to eliminate the moral evil that man chooses. Two different explanatory models of natural evil, which can be considered compatible with Grisez’s ethics, are then discussed. Furthermore, it is stated that Grisez’s ethics removes the need for the axiomatic premises, in Plantinga’s and other modern arguments based on the defense of free will, which say that not even an omnipotent God can do the logically impossible and that existence as a whole is more good than evil.
The conclusion is that the problem of evil in its classical forms need not make the belief in a good and omnipotent god irrational – not even with Mackie's definition that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do – when adopting Grisez’s ethics. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9150788
- author
- Samnegård, Ola LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- TLVM61 20241
- year
- 2024
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- Germain Grisez, Alvin Plantinga, teodicéproblemet, den fria viljans försvar, Gud, allmakt, godhet
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9150788
- date added to LUP
- 2024-09-18 14:16:21
- date last changed
- 2024-09-18 14:16:21
@misc{9150788,
abstract = {{The aim of this thesis is to illuminate, from a Catholic view, the role of different ethical theories in the formulations of, and proposed solutions to, the problem of evil. More specifically, what happens to the problem when applying a Catholic ethic, à la the moral theologian Germain Grisez, to God is examined. This is done by first analyzing which ethical assumptions lie behind the various formulations of and proposed solutions to the problem of evil. Grisez’s ethics is then applied to the various problem formulations of, and the proposed solutions to, the problem of evil in order to investigate to what extent they are valid combined with these ethics. Regarding the problem formulations, it is first shown that some can be directly found to be invalid according to Grisez’s ethics, while all the others can be referred to the question of the defense of free will.
Regarding the defense of free will, it is first established that, according to Grisez’s ethics, it would not have been good for God to eliminate the moral evil that man chooses. Two different explanatory models of natural evil, which can be considered compatible with Grisez’s ethics, are then discussed. Furthermore, it is stated that Grisez’s ethics removes the need for the axiomatic premises, in Plantinga’s and other modern arguments based on the defense of free will, which say that not even an omnipotent God can do the logically impossible and that existence as a whole is more good than evil.
The conclusion is that the problem of evil in its classical forms need not make the belief in a good and omnipotent god irrational – not even with Mackie's definition that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do – when adopting Grisez’s ethics.}},
author = {{Samnegård, Ola}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{En etisk analys av teodicéproblemet: ur ett katolskt perspektiv med utgångspunkt i Germain Grisez' etik}},
year = {{2024}},
}