Palestine: The state of the “state” - Defining statehood
(2024) LAGF03 20241Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Det är stater som är subjekten inom den internationella rätten, men hur exakt begreppet ”stat” ska definieras förblir omtvistat. Montevideokonventionen är den huvudsakliga källan gällande hur begreppet ska förstås, men konventionens egentliga tillämpning kan ifrågasattas samt att den är omstridd av förespråkare av andra teorier om statsskap. Den centrala konflikten ligger i diskrepansen mellan vad som teoretiskt krävs för att bli en stat, exempelvis såsom det beskrivs i Montevideokonventionen, och vad som i praktiken verkar krävas för att en enhet ska bli en stat. Uppsatsen syftar till att kunna dra en slutsats om Palestina, enligt någon av teorierna om statsskap, bör betraktas som en stat. Med ett huvudsakligt och primärt fokus på... (More)
- Det är stater som är subjekten inom den internationella rätten, men hur exakt begreppet ”stat” ska definieras förblir omtvistat. Montevideokonventionen är den huvudsakliga källan gällande hur begreppet ska förstås, men konventionens egentliga tillämpning kan ifrågasattas samt att den är omstridd av förespråkare av andra teorier om statsskap. Den centrala konflikten ligger i diskrepansen mellan vad som teoretiskt krävs för att bli en stat, exempelvis såsom det beskrivs i Montevideokonventionen, och vad som i praktiken verkar krävas för att en enhet ska bli en stat. Uppsatsen syftar till att kunna dra en slutsats om Palestina, enligt någon av teorierna om statsskap, bör betraktas som en stat. Med ett huvudsakligt och primärt fokus på Montevideokonventionen drog jag slutsatsen att Palestina inte uppfyller de krav som ställs på en stat, särskilt med hänsyn till kraven på en regering och förmågan att ingå förbindelser med andra stater. Två huvudsakliga teorier om vad som utgör en stat har utvecklats: den konstitutiva teorin och den deklaratoriska teorin. Den deklaratoriska teorin är starkt kopplad till Montevideokonventionen eftersom det av den framgår att statsskap automatiskt inträder om konventionens kriterier uppfylls. Därmed drog jag slutsatsen att Palestina, enligt den deklaratoriska teorin, inte bör betraktas som en stat. Dock kan en del av den konstitutiva teorin, den del som enbart värdesätter erkännande från andra stater, stödja Palestinas statsskap eftersom en majoritet av FN-medlemmarna erkänner Palestina som stat. Det centrala kruxet i relation till den konstitutiva teorin är att de mest avgörande aspekterna är oklara. Exempelvis är det inte uppenbart hur många stater som måste erkänna en enhet för att den ska bli en stat, eller om det spelar någon roll vilka stater som erkänner en enhet. Det finns därför väsentliga brister inom den konstitutiva teorin vilket jag anser påverkar dess validitet och i synnerhet dess praktiska tillämpning. Sammanfattningsvis kom jag fram till att Palestina saknar det som krävs för att vara en stat enligt båda teorier, möjligtvis med undantag för en av tolkningarna av den konstitutiva teorin, samt att den mer objektiva deklaratoriska teorin bör föredras framför det högst subjektiva och politiska beslutet om att erkänna en stat eller inte. (Less)
- Abstract
- States are the subjects of international law, yet what exactly constitutes a state remains unclear. The Montevideo convention is seemingly the central source regarding the requirements for statehood, but its real-world application is questionable, and it remains contested by proponents of alternative theories. The issue lies in the discrepancy between what is theoretically required to become a state, such as the requirements the Montevideo convention outlines, and what is actually required for entities to become states. The purpose of this investigation has been to build a foundation of knowledge to later be able to conclude whether Palestine, under any of the theories of statehood, ought to be considered a state. With a primary focus on... (More)
- States are the subjects of international law, yet what exactly constitutes a state remains unclear. The Montevideo convention is seemingly the central source regarding the requirements for statehood, but its real-world application is questionable, and it remains contested by proponents of alternative theories. The issue lies in the discrepancy between what is theoretically required to become a state, such as the requirements the Montevideo convention outlines, and what is actually required for entities to become states. The purpose of this investigation has been to build a foundation of knowledge to later be able to conclude whether Palestine, under any of the theories of statehood, ought to be considered a state. With a primary focus on the Montevideo convention, I concluded that Palestine lacked that which is required of a state, particularly and especially regarding the last two requirements: a government and the capacity to enter into foreign relations. Two central theories have developed regarding what is required for statehood: the constitutive and the declarative theory. The declarative theory is heavily linked to the Montevideo convention in that it posits that statehood exists automatically should all the criteria of the convention be fulfilled. Thus, I concluded that Palestine could not be considered a state under the declarative theory as it did not fulfill the requirements set forth by the Montevideo convention. The constitutive theory can be divided into two factions, one that exclusively values recognition and one that considers recognition a fifth requirement. The faction that exclusively values recognition may support Palestinian statehood as a majority of UN members recognize Palestine as a state. The central issue with this faction of the constitutive theory is that the most crucial aspects remain unclear. For example, it is not evident how many states must recognize an entity for it to become a state, or if it matters what states recognize an entity. Therefore, vital flaws are evident within the theory, which I deem to affect its validity and certainly its applicability. To summarize, I concluded that Palestine lacks that which is required for statehood under both theories, possibly with the exception of one faction of the constitutive theory, and that the more objective declarative theory is to be favored over the highly subjective and indubitably political decision of recognition. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9152874
- author
- Bonekamp, Karl Johan Magnus LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20241
- year
- 2024
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Public international law, Palestine, Statehood
- language
- English
- id
- 9152874
- date added to LUP
- 2024-06-26 11:39:29
- date last changed
- 2024-06-26 11:39:29
@misc{9152874,
abstract = {{States are the subjects of international law, yet what exactly constitutes a state remains unclear. The Montevideo convention is seemingly the central source regarding the requirements for statehood, but its real-world application is questionable, and it remains contested by proponents of alternative theories. The issue lies in the discrepancy between what is theoretically required to become a state, such as the requirements the Montevideo convention outlines, and what is actually required for entities to become states. The purpose of this investigation has been to build a foundation of knowledge to later be able to conclude whether Palestine, under any of the theories of statehood, ought to be considered a state. With a primary focus on the Montevideo convention, I concluded that Palestine lacked that which is required of a state, particularly and especially regarding the last two requirements: a government and the capacity to enter into foreign relations. Two central theories have developed regarding what is required for statehood: the constitutive and the declarative theory. The declarative theory is heavily linked to the Montevideo convention in that it posits that statehood exists automatically should all the criteria of the convention be fulfilled. Thus, I concluded that Palestine could not be considered a state under the declarative theory as it did not fulfill the requirements set forth by the Montevideo convention. The constitutive theory can be divided into two factions, one that exclusively values recognition and one that considers recognition a fifth requirement. The faction that exclusively values recognition may support Palestinian statehood as a majority of UN members recognize Palestine as a state. The central issue with this faction of the constitutive theory is that the most crucial aspects remain unclear. For example, it is not evident how many states must recognize an entity for it to become a state, or if it matters what states recognize an entity. Therefore, vital flaws are evident within the theory, which I deem to affect its validity and certainly its applicability. To summarize, I concluded that Palestine lacks that which is required for statehood under both theories, possibly with the exception of one faction of the constitutive theory, and that the more objective declarative theory is to be favored over the highly subjective and indubitably political decision of recognition.}},
author = {{Bonekamp, Karl Johan Magnus}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Palestine: The state of the “state” - Defining statehood}},
year = {{2024}},
}