Genocidal Intent
(2024) JURM02 20241Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The prevailing view in the international case law interprets the “intent to de-stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” re-quirement in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis). This interpretation of genocidal intent has been criticized by many scholars regarding its stringent requirement of mens rea. Consequently, several alternative knowledge-based approaches have been developed. In this regard, this thesis examines the no-tion of genocidal intent, and thereby the traditional purpose-based approach and various alternative individualistic approaches within legal doctrine of in-ternational criminal law. The main purpose... (More)
- The prevailing view in the international case law interprets the “intent to de-stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” re-quirement in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis). This interpretation of genocidal intent has been criticized by many scholars regarding its stringent requirement of mens rea. Consequently, several alternative knowledge-based approaches have been developed. In this regard, this thesis examines the no-tion of genocidal intent, and thereby the traditional purpose-based approach and various alternative individualistic approaches within legal doctrine of in-ternational criminal law. The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the con-cept of genocidal intent and thus investigate whether genocidal intent should be understood in a broader sense than the purpose-based notion of genocidal intent. The analysis is conducted both from a standpoint regarding the penal character of prohibition and a humanitarian perspective.
In order to understand the genocidal intent on a deeper level, this thesis ana-lyzes case law and the literal, historical, and teleological interpretations of the phrase “intent to destroy”. After examining the case law, this thesis identifies several issues with the purpose-based approach. Also, it concludes that the literal interpretation of the “intent to destroy” does not clearly mandate that genocidal intent should be construed in a particular manner. On the other hand, a historical and teleological interpretation of intent indicate that genocide is a special crime and should be distinguished from crimes against humanity and war crimes by its genocidal intent.
The knowledge-based approach is developed as an alternative approach to the notion of the purpose-based reading of genocidal intent. It simply suggests that the perpetrator’s knowledge of the genocidal campaign should suffice to meet the “intent to destroy” requirement, as opposed to the purpose-based understanding, which requires the perpetrator’s conscious desire for the de-struction of the protected group.
Opponents to the purpose-based approach criticizes it for being a source of confusion and difficulties in applying the definition of genocide in practice. As a solution, the knowledge-based theory suggests lowering the mens rea requirement to dolus directus in the second degree (indirect intent) with regard to the low-level perpetrators. However, the knowledge-based theory expands the definition of genocide and has inconsistencies in addressing the objective of mens rea, which does not align with the integrity of the offence and the nullum crimen principle. Also, the purpose-based theory employs the com-plicity theory, which is deemed a better solution in comparison to the knowledge-based theory. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the purpose-based approach should not be interpreted in a broader sense. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- ICTR, ICTY och ICC har tolkat rekvisitet ”avsikt att helt eller delvis förgöra en nationell, etnisk, rasmässigt bestämd eller religiös folkgrupp” i artikel II i FN:s folkmordskonvention som dolus specialis. Denna tolkning av upp-såtskravet har kritiserats av många på grund av dess stränga uppsåtskrav. Följaktligen har olika alternativa tolkningar utvecklats i doktrin. I detta avse-ende undersöker denna avhandling folkmordets dolus specialis, samt den traditionella tolkningen av formuleringen ”avsikt att förgöra” och olika alterna-tiva individualistiska tolkningar inom den rättsliga doktrinen för internationell straffrätt. Huvudsyftet med denna avhandling är att analysera konceptet folk-mordets dolus specialis och därigenom undersöka... (More)
- ICTR, ICTY och ICC har tolkat rekvisitet ”avsikt att helt eller delvis förgöra en nationell, etnisk, rasmässigt bestämd eller religiös folkgrupp” i artikel II i FN:s folkmordskonvention som dolus specialis. Denna tolkning av upp-såtskravet har kritiserats av många på grund av dess stränga uppsåtskrav. Följaktligen har olika alternativa tolkningar utvecklats i doktrin. I detta avse-ende undersöker denna avhandling folkmordets dolus specialis, samt den traditionella tolkningen av formuleringen ”avsikt att förgöra” och olika alterna-tiva individualistiska tolkningar inom den rättsliga doktrinen för internationell straffrätt. Huvudsyftet med denna avhandling är att analysera konceptet folk-mordets dolus specialis och därigenom undersöka huruvida folkmordsuppsåt bör förstås i en bredare räckvidd än den traditionella tolkningens. Analysen genomförs både utifrån legalitetprincipen och brottsofferperspektiv.
För att förstå folkmordsbrottets dolus specialis på en djupare nivå analyserar denna avhandling rättspraxis, förarbeten samt bokstavstolkning och den teleo-logiska tolkningen av formuleringen ”avsikt att förgöra”. Efter att ha granskat rättspraxis identifierar denna avhandling flera problem med den traditionella tolkningen till folkmordsuppsåt. Dessutom drar den slutsatsen att varken bok-stavstolkningen av ”avsikt att förgöra” eller förarbeten kräver att formulering-en bör tolkas på ett särskilt sätt. Å andra sidan antyder den teleologiska tolk-ningen av ”avsikt att förgöra” att uppsåt till folkmord bör förstås som speciellt uppsåt för att skilja folkmordet från brott mot mänskligheten och krigsbrott.
En alternativ tolkning har utvecklats till den traditionella tolkningen. Den före-slår att förövarens kunskap om den folkmordsplan bör vara tillräcklig för att uppfylla kravet på ”avsikt att förgöra”, till skillnad från den traditionella tolk-ning som kräver att förövaren medvetet önskar förstörelsen av den skyddade gruppen.
Motståndarna till den traditionella tolkningen kritiserar den för att vara en källa till förvirring och svårigheter vid tillämpningen av definitionen av folkmord i praktiken. Som lösning föreslår den alternativa teorin att sänka uppsåtskravet till dolus directus i andra graden (indirekt uppsåt) när det gäller förövare på lågnivå. Dock utvidgar denna teori definitionen av folkmord och är inkonse-kvent när det gäller att identifiera objektet för uppsåt, vilket inte överensstäm-mer med legalitetsprincipen och brottets integritet. Dessutom använder den traditionella tolkningen medverkansläran, vilket anses vara en bättre lösning jämfört med den alternativa tolkning som föreslår att inkludera indirekt uppsåt. Därför drar denna avhandling slutsatsen att rekvisitet ”avsikt att förgöra” inte bör tolkas i en bredare räckvidd. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9153326
- author
- Gunes, Elif LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM02 20241
- year
- 2024
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, internationell straffrätt, uppsåt, folkmord, genocide, genocidal intent, dolus specialis, knowledge-based, purpose-based
- language
- English
- id
- 9153326
- date added to LUP
- 2024-06-11 11:36:50
- date last changed
- 2024-06-11 11:36:50
@misc{9153326,
abstract = {{The prevailing view in the international case law interprets the “intent to de-stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” re-quirement in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis). This interpretation of genocidal intent has been criticized by many scholars regarding its stringent requirement of mens rea. Consequently, several alternative knowledge-based approaches have been developed. In this regard, this thesis examines the no-tion of genocidal intent, and thereby the traditional purpose-based approach and various alternative individualistic approaches within legal doctrine of in-ternational criminal law. The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the con-cept of genocidal intent and thus investigate whether genocidal intent should be understood in a broader sense than the purpose-based notion of genocidal intent. The analysis is conducted both from a standpoint regarding the penal character of prohibition and a humanitarian perspective.
In order to understand the genocidal intent on a deeper level, this thesis ana-lyzes case law and the literal, historical, and teleological interpretations of the phrase “intent to destroy”. After examining the case law, this thesis identifies several issues with the purpose-based approach. Also, it concludes that the literal interpretation of the “intent to destroy” does not clearly mandate that genocidal intent should be construed in a particular manner. On the other hand, a historical and teleological interpretation of intent indicate that genocide is a special crime and should be distinguished from crimes against humanity and war crimes by its genocidal intent.
The knowledge-based approach is developed as an alternative approach to the notion of the purpose-based reading of genocidal intent. It simply suggests that the perpetrator’s knowledge of the genocidal campaign should suffice to meet the “intent to destroy” requirement, as opposed to the purpose-based understanding, which requires the perpetrator’s conscious desire for the de-struction of the protected group.
Opponents to the purpose-based approach criticizes it for being a source of confusion and difficulties in applying the definition of genocide in practice. As a solution, the knowledge-based theory suggests lowering the mens rea requirement to dolus directus in the second degree (indirect intent) with regard to the low-level perpetrators. However, the knowledge-based theory expands the definition of genocide and has inconsistencies in addressing the objective of mens rea, which does not align with the integrity of the offence and the nullum crimen principle. Also, the purpose-based theory employs the com-plicity theory, which is deemed a better solution in comparison to the knowledge-based theory. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the purpose-based approach should not be interpreted in a broader sense.}},
author = {{Gunes, Elif}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Genocidal Intent}},
year = {{2024}},
}