Assessment of green horizontal agreements between competitors under Article 101(3) TFEU: An unfair share for the environment under the European competition regime?
(2024) JAEM03 20241Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- Increasing sustainability and combating climate change are one of the key objectives of the European Union’s policies. Adoption of the European Green Deal and commitment to different international treaties and programmes are affecting to various fields of EU law. In competition law, it has been established that the enhancement of environmental objectives must be considered also when assessing horizontal agreements. This has led to the concept of greening competition law. As a response, the European Commission adopted its revised Horizontal Guidelines in June 2023. As a global subject of concern, also several other competition authorities outside the EU have published their guidance on the interpretation of environmental sustainability... (More)
- Increasing sustainability and combating climate change are one of the key objectives of the European Union’s policies. Adoption of the European Green Deal and commitment to different international treaties and programmes are affecting to various fields of EU law. In competition law, it has been established that the enhancement of environmental objectives must be considered also when assessing horizontal agreements. This has led to the concept of greening competition law. As a response, the European Commission adopted its revised Horizontal Guidelines in June 2023. As a global subject of concern, also several other competition authorities outside the EU have published their guidance on the interpretation of environmental sustainability agreements recently.
Agreements prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU can be permitted if the four cumulative criteria embedded in Article 101(3) TFEU are met. This thesis analyses environmental sustainability agreements between horizontal competitors under the fair share criterion of Article 101(3) TFEU. According to the fair share criterion, consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits that outweigh the harm caused by the agreement. In the context of environmental sustainability agreements, the group of beneficiaries may be larger than the group of harmed. Hence, a legal framework in EU competition law for fair share criterion in environmental sustainability agreements is systemized. This thesis argues that under the EU competition law regime, there remains uncertainty for undertakings seeking cooperation to enhance environmental goals because out-of-market benefits resulting from the agreement are most likely not sufficient to fulfill the fair share criterion. Based on the wording of the law and comparison to guidance adopted in other jurisdictions, alternative suggestions of interpretation for the Commission’s approach are provided. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9163049
- author
- Bono, Sini Sofia LU
- supervisor
-
- Julian Nowag LU
- organization
- course
- JAEM03 20241
- year
- 2024
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- horizontal guidelines, environmental sustainability agreements, Article 101(3) TFEU, fair share criterion
- language
- English
- id
- 9163049
- date added to LUP
- 2024-06-25 12:20:05
- date last changed
- 2024-06-25 12:20:05
@misc{9163049,
abstract = {{Increasing sustainability and combating climate change are one of the key objectives of the European Union’s policies. Adoption of the European Green Deal and commitment to different international treaties and programmes are affecting to various fields of EU law. In competition law, it has been established that the enhancement of environmental objectives must be considered also when assessing horizontal agreements. This has led to the concept of greening competition law. As a response, the European Commission adopted its revised Horizontal Guidelines in June 2023. As a global subject of concern, also several other competition authorities outside the EU have published their guidance on the interpretation of environmental sustainability agreements recently.
Agreements prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU can be permitted if the four cumulative criteria embedded in Article 101(3) TFEU are met. This thesis analyses environmental sustainability agreements between horizontal competitors under the fair share criterion of Article 101(3) TFEU. According to the fair share criterion, consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits that outweigh the harm caused by the agreement. In the context of environmental sustainability agreements, the group of beneficiaries may be larger than the group of harmed. Hence, a legal framework in EU competition law for fair share criterion in environmental sustainability agreements is systemized. This thesis argues that under the EU competition law regime, there remains uncertainty for undertakings seeking cooperation to enhance environmental goals because out-of-market benefits resulting from the agreement are most likely not sufficient to fulfill the fair share criterion. Based on the wording of the law and comparison to guidance adopted in other jurisdictions, alternative suggestions of interpretation for the Commission’s approach are provided.}},
author = {{Bono, Sini Sofia}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Assessment of green horizontal agreements between competitors under Article 101(3) TFEU: An unfair share for the environment under the European competition regime?}},
year = {{2024}},
}