Hur de svenska bevekelsegrunderna för förtjänstbaserade straff förhåller sig till determinism - En moralfilosofisk studie om förtjänstbaserade straff
(2024) JURM02 20242Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The institution of punishment is the Swedish state's most intrusive means of power against its citizens, with its legitimacy partly grounded in the notion that punishment is just. Historically, the motives for deliberately inflicting suffering through punishment have varied, but a central idea has always been that punishment and blame are justified by the offender's desert for their committed act.
This thesis examines, from a moral-philosophical perspective, whether the idea of deserved moral blameworthiness in Swedish criminal law can be understood as compatible with the notion of determinism. The focal point is on whether free will is a necessary condition for the construction of blame in criminal law. Through a hermeneutic analysis... (More) - The institution of punishment is the Swedish state's most intrusive means of power against its citizens, with its legitimacy partly grounded in the notion that punishment is just. Historically, the motives for deliberately inflicting suffering through punishment have varied, but a central idea has always been that punishment and blame are justified by the offender's desert for their committed act.
This thesis examines, from a moral-philosophical perspective, whether the idea of deserved moral blameworthiness in Swedish criminal law can be understood as compatible with the notion of determinism. The focal point is on whether free will is a necessary condition for the construction of blame in criminal law. Through a hermeneutic analysis of preparatory works and legal doctrine, the thesis examines key reforms from the 20th century and certain contemporary developments, with particular attention to how determinism is considered in questions of guilt and blame, as well as the conformity principle's requirement that no one should be punished if they lacked the capacity to act otherwise.
The findings show that considerations of determinism had a decisive role during the drafting of the Penal Code but have since seemingly been marginalized by legislators, even though the issue continues to be discussed in legal doc-trine. Furthermore, the construction of punishment as morally deserved blame in criminal law appears to be based on retributive ethics that presuppose free will – a premise challenged by determinism.
The conformity principle’s requirement that the offender must have been able to act differently seems particularly problematic in a deterministic context, where alternative past scenarios are impossible. The thesis concludes that the fundamental structure of criminal law presupposes free will, which is difficult to reconcile with a deterministic worldview and the concept of desert-based blame. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Straffinstitutet är svenska statens mest ingripande maktmedel mot sina medborgare, vars legitimitet delvis bygger på att straff anses rättvisa. Historiskt har motiven för att medvetet åsamka lidande genom straffet varierat, men en central idé har alltid varit att straff och klander motiveras av gärningspersonens förtjänst för den begångna gärningen.
Denna uppsats undersöker, ur ett moralfilosofiskt perspektiv, huruvida idén om förtjänad moralisk klandervärdhet inom straffrätten kan förstås förenligt med en determinism. Fokus ligger på om fri vilja är en nödvändig förutsättning för straffrättens konstruktion av klander. Genom en hermeneutisk analys av förarbeten och doktrin granskas centrala reformer från 1900-talet och vissa samtida... (More) - Straffinstitutet är svenska statens mest ingripande maktmedel mot sina medborgare, vars legitimitet delvis bygger på att straff anses rättvisa. Historiskt har motiven för att medvetet åsamka lidande genom straffet varierat, men en central idé har alltid varit att straff och klander motiveras av gärningspersonens förtjänst för den begångna gärningen.
Denna uppsats undersöker, ur ett moralfilosofiskt perspektiv, huruvida idén om förtjänad moralisk klandervärdhet inom straffrätten kan förstås förenligt med en determinism. Fokus ligger på om fri vilja är en nödvändig förutsättning för straffrättens konstruktion av klander. Genom en hermeneutisk analys av förarbeten och doktrin granskas centrala reformer från 1900-talet och vissa samtida förändringar, med särskilt fokus på hur determinism beaktas i frågor om skuld och klander, samt konformitetsprincipens krav att ingen ska straffas om denne saknat förmåga att handla annorlunda.
Resultatet visar att överväganden om determinism hade avgörande betydelse vid brottsbalkens införande men senare marginaliserats av lagstiftaren, även om doktrinen fortsatt diskuterar frågan. Straffrättens konstruktion av straff som moraliskt förtjänat klander verkar bygga på förtjänstetik som förutsätter fri vilja – ett antagande som utmanas av determinism. Konformitetsprincipens krav på att gärningspersonen måste ha kunnat agera annorlunda verkar särskilt problematiskt i en deterministisk kontext, där alternativa förlopp i det förflutna är omöjliga. Uppsatsen konkluderar att straffrättens grundläggande konstruktion förutsätter en fri vilja som är svårförenlig med en deterministisk världsbild och förtjänstbaserat klander. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9179486
- author
- Öfver, Axel LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- How the Swedish justifications for desert-based punishment relate to determinism
- course
- JURM02 20242
- year
- 2024
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, allmän rättslära, determinism, fri vilja, förtjänst, moralfilosofi, rättsfilosofi.
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9179486
- date added to LUP
- 2025-01-20 13:36:44
- date last changed
- 2025-01-20 13:36:44
@misc{9179486,
abstract = {{The institution of punishment is the Swedish state's most intrusive means of power against its citizens, with its legitimacy partly grounded in the notion that punishment is just. Historically, the motives for deliberately inflicting suffering through punishment have varied, but a central idea has always been that punishment and blame are justified by the offender's desert for their committed act.
This thesis examines, from a moral-philosophical perspective, whether the idea of deserved moral blameworthiness in Swedish criminal law can be understood as compatible with the notion of determinism. The focal point is on whether free will is a necessary condition for the construction of blame in criminal law. Through a hermeneutic analysis of preparatory works and legal doctrine, the thesis examines key reforms from the 20th century and certain contemporary developments, with particular attention to how determinism is considered in questions of guilt and blame, as well as the conformity principle's requirement that no one should be punished if they lacked the capacity to act otherwise.
The findings show that considerations of determinism had a decisive role during the drafting of the Penal Code but have since seemingly been marginalized by legislators, even though the issue continues to be discussed in legal doc-trine. Furthermore, the construction of punishment as morally deserved blame in criminal law appears to be based on retributive ethics that presuppose free will – a premise challenged by determinism.
The conformity principle’s requirement that the offender must have been able to act differently seems particularly problematic in a deterministic context, where alternative past scenarios are impossible. The thesis concludes that the fundamental structure of criminal law presupposes free will, which is difficult to reconcile with a deterministic worldview and the concept of desert-based blame.}},
author = {{Öfver, Axel}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Hur de svenska bevekelsegrunderna för förtjänstbaserade straff förhåller sig till determinism - En moralfilosofisk studie om förtjänstbaserade straff}},
year = {{2024}},
}