Självkostnadsprincipen i AB 04 – särskilt om entreprenörens skyldighet att åstadkomma bästa tekniska och ekonomiska resultat
(2024) JURM02 20242Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Enligt AB 04 kap. 6 § 10 p. 1 åläggs entreprenören att utföra sitt arbete på ett sådant sätt att beställaren erhåller både bästa tekniska resultat och bästa ekonomiska resultat. I praktiken är dessa två resultat ofta svåra att förena, då de sällan korrelerar. Ytterligare komplexitet tillförs genom entreprenörens incitament att maximera sin vinst. Eftersom entreprenörens arvode ofta beräknas som ett procentuellt påslag på självkostnaderna uppstår en inneboende konflikt; teknisk kvalitet tenderar att öka kostnaderna och därmed entreprenörens vinst, medan kostnadsminimering kan ske på bekostnad av teknisk standard, vilket i sin tur kan påverka entreprenörens vinst negativt.
Denna konflikt mellan teknisk kvalitet, ekonomisk optimering och... (More) - Enligt AB 04 kap. 6 § 10 p. 1 åläggs entreprenören att utföra sitt arbete på ett sådant sätt att beställaren erhåller både bästa tekniska resultat och bästa ekonomiska resultat. I praktiken är dessa två resultat ofta svåra att förena, då de sällan korrelerar. Ytterligare komplexitet tillförs genom entreprenörens incitament att maximera sin vinst. Eftersom entreprenörens arvode ofta beräknas som ett procentuellt påslag på självkostnaderna uppstår en inneboende konflikt; teknisk kvalitet tenderar att öka kostnaderna och därmed entreprenörens vinst, medan kostnadsminimering kan ske på bekostnad av teknisk standard, vilket i sin tur kan påverka entreprenörens vinst negativt.
Denna konflikt mellan teknisk kvalitet, ekonomisk optimering och vinstintresse skapar en svåravvägd balans, vilket gör regleringen i AB 04 kap. 6 § 10 p. 1 svår att tillämpa i praktiken. Konsekvensen är begränsad förutsebarhet för såväl beställaren som entreprenören, eftersom det sällan är tydligt hur dessa motstridiga intressen ska balanseras i det enskilda fallet.
I uppsatsen analyseras denna problematik, och det belyses särskilt att entreprenörens skyldighet snarare bör förstås som en omsorgsförpliktelse än en resultatförpliktelse. Det innebär att entreprenören ska agera fackmässigt och kostnadsmedvetet, med en strävan efter bästa tekniska och ekonomiska resultat, men utan att behöva garantera ett objektivt optimalt utfall.
Vidare konstateras att bevisbördan för att påvisa avvikelser från omsorgsförpliktelsen åvilar beställaren, medan entreprenören å sin sida måste kunna redovisa sina kostnader transparent och adekvat för att styrka sin rätt till ersättning. Trots denna tydliga ansvarsfördelning framgår det att beställaren i praktiken ofta bär en oproportionerligt stor del av den ekonomiska risken. Den aktiva roll som beställaren förväntas inta för att granska och ifrågasätta entreprenörens kostnader är både resurskrävande och komplex. Detta hämmar ytterligare möjligheterna att uppnå en förutsebar och rättvis riskfördelning mellan parterna.
Begreppet fackmässighet, som förefaller spela en central roll för entreprenörens skyldigheter i utförandet av entreprenaden, präglas av otydlighet och avsaknad av enhetliga riktlinjer för tolkning och tillämpning. I utkastet till AB 25 har fackmässighetskravet integrerats i den bestämmelse som motsvarar AB 04 kap. 6 § 10 p. 1. Trots denna tydligare koppling kvarstår betydande oklarheter som riskerar att vidmakthålla rättsosäkerhet och försvåra en förutsebar tillämpning i praktiken.
Uppsatsen belyser att AB 04 kap. 6 § 10 p. 1 präglas av inneboende konflikter och otydligheter, vilket försvårar dess praktiska tillämpning. Den ojämna riskfördelningen, där beställaren ofta bär en oproportionerligt stor del av den ekonomiska risken, i kombination med avsaknaden av enhetliga riktlinjer för tolkningen och tillämpningen av både fackmässighetskravet och entreprenörens omsorgsförpliktelse, skapar betydande utmaningar för såväl beställaren som entreprenören.
Slutsatsen är att det finns ett behov av tydligare och mer enhetliga riktlinjer som kan främja en förutsebar och rättvis riskfördelning såvitt avser AB 04 kap. 6 § 10 p. 1, då nuvarande reglering varken är rimlig eller ändamålsenlig. Detta kan i sin tur stärka förtroendet mellan parterna och förhoppningsvis minska risken för tvister hänförliga till denna bestämmelse. (Less) - Abstract
- Pursuant to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1, the contractor is obligated to perform their work in such a manner that the client receives both the best technical and economic result. In practice, these two outcomes are often difficult to achieve, since they rarely correlate. Additional complexity arises from the contractor’s incentive to maximise profit. Because the contractor’s fee is often calculated as a percentage markup on costs, an inherent conflict arises. Technical quality tends to increase costs and thereby the contractor’s profit, while cost minimization may occur at the expense of technical standards, which in turn could negatively impact the contractor’s profit.
This conflict between technical quality, economic... (More) - Pursuant to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1, the contractor is obligated to perform their work in such a manner that the client receives both the best technical and economic result. In practice, these two outcomes are often difficult to achieve, since they rarely correlate. Additional complexity arises from the contractor’s incentive to maximise profit. Because the contractor’s fee is often calculated as a percentage markup on costs, an inherent conflict arises. Technical quality tends to increase costs and thereby the contractor’s profit, while cost minimization may occur at the expense of technical standards, which in turn could negatively impact the contractor’s profit.
This conflict between technical quality, economic optimisation and profit creates a delicate balance, making the regulation in AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1 challenging to apply in practice. The consequence is limited predictability for both the client and the contractor, as it is rarely clear how these conflicting interests should be balanced in individual cases.
This thesis analyses this issue and emphasises that the contractor’s obligation should be understood as a duty of care rather than as an obligation of result. This means that the contractor must act professionally and cost-consciously, striving for the best technical and economic outcome, but without being required to guarantee an objectively optimal result.
Furthermore, it is noted that the burden of proof to demonstrate deviations from the duty of care lies with the client, while the contractor, on their part, must be able to account for their costs transparently and adequately to justify their entitlement to compensation. Despite this clear allocation of responsibility, it becomes evident that, in practice, the client often bears a disproportionately large share of the economic risk. The active role expected of the client in reviewing and questioning the contractor’s costs is both resourceintensive and complex. This further inhibits the ability to achieve a predictable and fair distribution of risk between the parties.
The concept of professionalism (Sw: fackmässighet), which seems to play a central role in defining the contractor’s obligations in performing the contract, is characterised by ambiguity and a lack of uniform guidelines for interpretation and application. In the draft of AB 25, the requirement of professionalism has been integrated into the provision corresponding to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1. Despite this clearer connection, significant uncertainties remain, which risk maintaining legal uncertainty and complicating predictable application in practice.
The thesis highlights that AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1 is characterised by inherent conflicts and ambiguities, making its practical application challenging. The uneven distribution of risk, where the client often bears a disproportionately large share of the economic risk, combined with the lack of uniform guidelines for interpreting and applying both the requirement of professionalism and the contractor’s duty of care, creates significant challenges for both the client and the contractor.
The conclusion is that there is a need for clearer and more consistent guidelines that can promote a predictable and fair allocation of risk with regard to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1, as the current regulation is neither reasonable nor appropriate. This, in turn, can strengthen trust between the parties and hopefully reduce the risk of disputes related to this provision. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9180274
- author
- Wihlstrand, Oskar LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- The prime cost principle in AB 04 – in particular on the contractor's obligation to achieve the best technical and economic result
- course
- JURM02 20242
- year
- 2024
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- AB 04, Avtalsrätt, Bästa tekniska och ekonomiska resultat, Civilrätt, Entreprenadavtal, Entreprenadrätt, Förmögenhetsrätt, Löpande räkning, Självkostnadsprincipen
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9180274
- date added to LUP
- 2025-01-29 12:08:30
- date last changed
- 2025-01-29 12:08:30
@misc{9180274, abstract = {{Pursuant to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1, the contractor is obligated to perform their work in such a manner that the client receives both the best technical and economic result. In practice, these two outcomes are often difficult to achieve, since they rarely correlate. Additional complexity arises from the contractor’s incentive to maximise profit. Because the contractor’s fee is often calculated as a percentage markup on costs, an inherent conflict arises. Technical quality tends to increase costs and thereby the contractor’s profit, while cost minimization may occur at the expense of technical standards, which in turn could negatively impact the contractor’s profit. This conflict between technical quality, economic optimisation and profit creates a delicate balance, making the regulation in AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1 challenging to apply in practice. The consequence is limited predictability for both the client and the contractor, as it is rarely clear how these conflicting interests should be balanced in individual cases. This thesis analyses this issue and emphasises that the contractor’s obligation should be understood as a duty of care rather than as an obligation of result. This means that the contractor must act professionally and cost-consciously, striving for the best technical and economic outcome, but without being required to guarantee an objectively optimal result. Furthermore, it is noted that the burden of proof to demonstrate deviations from the duty of care lies with the client, while the contractor, on their part, must be able to account for their costs transparently and adequately to justify their entitlement to compensation. Despite this clear allocation of responsibility, it becomes evident that, in practice, the client often bears a disproportionately large share of the economic risk. The active role expected of the client in reviewing and questioning the contractor’s costs is both resourceintensive and complex. This further inhibits the ability to achieve a predictable and fair distribution of risk between the parties. The concept of professionalism (Sw: fackmässighet), which seems to play a central role in defining the contractor’s obligations in performing the contract, is characterised by ambiguity and a lack of uniform guidelines for interpretation and application. In the draft of AB 25, the requirement of professionalism has been integrated into the provision corresponding to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1. Despite this clearer connection, significant uncertainties remain, which risk maintaining legal uncertainty and complicating predictable application in practice. The thesis highlights that AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1 is characterised by inherent conflicts and ambiguities, making its practical application challenging. The uneven distribution of risk, where the client often bears a disproportionately large share of the economic risk, combined with the lack of uniform guidelines for interpreting and applying both the requirement of professionalism and the contractor’s duty of care, creates significant challenges for both the client and the contractor. The conclusion is that there is a need for clearer and more consistent guidelines that can promote a predictable and fair allocation of risk with regard to AB 04 chapter 6 section 10 item 1, as the current regulation is neither reasonable nor appropriate. This, in turn, can strengthen trust between the parties and hopefully reduce the risk of disputes related to this provision.}}, author = {{Wihlstrand, Oskar}}, language = {{swe}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Självkostnadsprincipen i AB 04 – särskilt om entreprenörens skyldighet att åstadkomma bästa tekniska och ekonomiska resultat}}, year = {{2024}}, }