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Terrorism as an International Customary Crime An Examination of the Legal Situation in Light of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s 2011 Interlocutory Decision

Egermo, Anna-Corinne LU (2025) LAGF03 20242
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Terrorism är ett begrepp som sedan länge har varit svårt att definiera inom den internationella rätten. Trots omfattande internationell reglering har det inte vuxit fram någon övergripande och allmänt accepterad definition inom vare sig traktaträtten eller sedvanerätten. Mot denna bakgrund hävdade Specialtribunalen för Libanons överklagandekammare i ett beslut från 2011 att internationell terrorism i fredstid hade utvecklats till ett brott enligt internationell sedvanerätt. Detta ställningstagande avvek från den dominerande uppfattningen inom doktrinen och har mött betydande kritik.

Denna uppsats undersöker om kammarens slutsats vilar på en övertygande och metodologiskt hållbar värdering av den internationella rättens källor. Analysen... (More)
Terrorism är ett begrepp som sedan länge har varit svårt att definiera inom den internationella rätten. Trots omfattande internationell reglering har det inte vuxit fram någon övergripande och allmänt accepterad definition inom vare sig traktaträtten eller sedvanerätten. Mot denna bakgrund hävdade Specialtribunalen för Libanons överklagandekammare i ett beslut från 2011 att internationell terrorism i fredstid hade utvecklats till ett brott enligt internationell sedvanerätt. Detta ställningstagande avvek från den dominerande uppfattningen inom doktrinen och har mött betydande kritik.

Denna uppsats undersöker om kammarens slutsats vilar på en övertygande och metodologiskt hållbar värdering av den internationella rättens källor. Analysen omfattar traktaträtt, Förenta nationernas resolutioner samt staters lagstiftnings- och rättspraxis, vilka i princip kan utgöra bevis för allmän praxis och opinio juris. Särskild vikt läggs vid legalitetsprincipen (nullum crimen sine lege), som kräver att straffbud är tillräckligt klara, förutsebara och otvetydiga.

Granskningen visar att de källor som åberopades av kammaren visserligen ger uttryck för ett starkt internationellt fördömande av terrorism, men att de inte uppvisar den grad av enhetlighet och precision som krävs för att grunda individuellt straffansvar direkt enligt internationell rätt. Variationen i traktat-definitioner, resolutionernas icke-bindande karaktär samt skillnader i nationell praxis talar mot att terrorism har uppnått status som internationellt sedvanerättsligt brott.

Uppsatsen drar därför slutsatsen att internationell terrorism i fredstid, mot bakgrund av det undersökta materialet, inte kan anses utgöra ett verkligt in-ternationellt brott enligt sedvanerätten. (Less)
Abstract
The definition of terrorism has long posed difficulties within international law, and despite extensive international regulation, no comprehensive and generally accepted definition has emerged under either treaty law or customary international law. Against this background, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon asserted in its 2011 Interlocutory Decision that international terrorism in peacetime had crystallised into a crime under customary international law. This conclusion marked a departure from the prevailing view in legal scholarship and has since attracted considerable criticism.

This essay examines whether the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion is supported by a convincing and methodologically sound evaluation of the... (More)
The definition of terrorism has long posed difficulties within international law, and despite extensive international regulation, no comprehensive and generally accepted definition has emerged under either treaty law or customary international law. Against this background, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon asserted in its 2011 Interlocutory Decision that international terrorism in peacetime had crystallised into a crime under customary international law. This conclusion marked a departure from the prevailing view in legal scholarship and has since attracted considerable criticism.

This essay examines whether the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion is supported by a convincing and methodologically sound evaluation of the sources of international law upon which it relied. The analysis focuses on treaty law, United Nations resolutions, and national legislative and judicial practice, all of which may, in principle, constitute evidence of state practice and opinio juris. Particular attention is paid to the requirements imposed by the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), which demands that criminal norms be sufficiently clear, foreseeable, and unambiguous.

The examination shows that while the sources relied upon by the Appeals Chamber demonstrate widespread condemnation of terrorism and a high degree of international concern, they do not establish a sufficiently clear and uniform definition capable of grounding individual criminal responsibility directly under international law. The diversity of treaty definitions, the non-binding character of United Nations resolutions, and the variability of national practice undermine the claim that terrorism has emerged as a customary international crime.

The essay therefore concludes that, on the basis of the sources examined, international terrorism in peacetime cannot be regarded as a true international crime under customary international law. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Egermo, Anna-Corinne LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20242
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Public international law, International customary law, international terrorism, terrorism, Special Tribunal for Lebanon
language
English
id
9180435
date added to LUP
2026-02-09 14:23:31
date last changed
2026-02-09 14:23:31
@misc{9180435,
  abstract     = {{The definition of terrorism has long posed difficulties within international law, and despite extensive international regulation, no comprehensive and generally accepted definition has emerged under either treaty law or customary international law. Against this background, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon asserted in its 2011 Interlocutory Decision that international terrorism in peacetime had crystallised into a crime under customary international law. This conclusion marked a departure from the prevailing view in legal scholarship and has since attracted considerable criticism.

This essay examines whether the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion is supported by a convincing and methodologically sound evaluation of the sources of international law upon which it relied. The analysis focuses on treaty law, United Nations resolutions, and national legislative and judicial practice, all of which may, in principle, constitute evidence of state practice and opinio juris. Particular attention is paid to the requirements imposed by the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), which demands that criminal norms be sufficiently clear, foreseeable, and unambiguous.

The examination shows that while the sources relied upon by the Appeals Chamber demonstrate widespread condemnation of terrorism and a high degree of international concern, they do not establish a sufficiently clear and uniform definition capable of grounding individual criminal responsibility directly under international law. The diversity of treaty definitions, the non-binding character of United Nations resolutions, and the variability of national practice undermine the claim that terrorism has emerged as a customary international crime.

The essay therefore concludes that, on the basis of the sources examined, international terrorism in peacetime cannot be regarded as a true international crime under customary international law.}},
  author       = {{Egermo, Anna-Corinne}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Terrorism as an International Customary Crime An Examination of the Legal Situation in Light of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s 2011 Interlocutory Decision}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}