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Negativ rättskraft över gränsen för domstolens sakliga behörighet - Särskilt om den negativa rättskraftens utsträckning vid skadeståndsanspråk med alternativa behörighetsfrämmande grunder

Norrby, Sebastian LU (2025) JURM02 20251
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
As the complexity of certain areas of law has increased, so too has the need for a court organization with specialized knowledge and competence to handle disputes within these areas of law. To achieve such specialization, the administration of justice in Sweden has been divided among various specialized courts, each of which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases falling within its respective substantive legal framework. However, this exclusivity also means that these courts have no jurisdiction to hear cases which do not explicitly fall within their assigned area of competence. Consequently, a court is not authorized to hear a claim based on an alternative legal ground that belongs to a different substantive legal domain outside the... (More)
As the complexity of certain areas of law has increased, so too has the need for a court organization with specialized knowledge and competence to handle disputes within these areas of law. To achieve such specialization, the administration of justice in Sweden has been divided among various specialized courts, each of which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases falling within its respective substantive legal framework. However, this exclusivity also means that these courts have no jurisdiction to hear cases which do not explicitly fall within their assigned area of competence. Consequently, a court is not authorized to hear a claim based on an alternative legal ground that belongs to a different substantive legal domain outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The question of how the principle of res judicata relates to such alternative jurisdictionally foreign legal grounds has only been addressed to a limited extent in legal scholarship. Several authors – most notably Per Henrik Lindblom – have observed that the scope of res judicata is limited by the substantive jurisdiction of the court. One implication of this is that a judgment from, for example, the Land and Environment Court in a prior court action does not prevent a claimant from initiating a new case before a general court regarding the same matter but based on an alternative ground that the Land and Environment Court lacked substantive jurisdiction to consider. Thus, res judicata does not bar a new examination of the same matter, provided the new claim is based on a jurisdictionally foreign ground.

This order has been justified on the basis that a claimant often faces difficulties prior to initiating proceedings in determining which legal ground is most likely to lead to success and, in addition, to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear a specific ground. For this reason, it is argued that the claimant should be afforded the opportunity to have their claim examined on all relevant legal grounds, not solely those that fall within the jurisdiction of the court hearing the initial case.

However, this paper demonstrates that a substantive limitation of the scope of res judicata is not in all situations a suitable solution to the problems that arise at the intersection of substantive jurisdiction and res judicata. The paper highlights examples where this order allows for two separate proceedings concerning, in all essential respects, an identical claim, and examines the problematic consequences this creates for the parties. Furthermore, it explores how such duplication conflicts with the fundamental purposes that the principle of res judicata is intended to serve. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
I takt med att komplexiteten inom vissa rättsområden ökat, har även behovet vuxit fram av en domstolsorganisation med fördjupad kunskap och kompetens att handlägga tvister inom dessa områden. För att uppnå sådan specialisering har rättskipningen i Sverige delats upp mellan olika särskilda och speciella domstolar, där varje domstolsslag har exklusiv behörighet att pröva mål som faller inom dess respektive materiella regelkomplex. Denna exklusivitet medför dock att dessa domstolar saknar behörighet att pröva mål som inte uttryckligen faller inom deras tilldelade behörighet. Det innebär att en domstol inte är behörig att pröva en talan på en alternativ grund tillhörande ett annat materiellt regelkomplex utanför domstolens behörighet.

... (More)
I takt med att komplexiteten inom vissa rättsområden ökat, har även behovet vuxit fram av en domstolsorganisation med fördjupad kunskap och kompetens att handlägga tvister inom dessa områden. För att uppnå sådan specialisering har rättskipningen i Sverige delats upp mellan olika särskilda och speciella domstolar, där varje domstolsslag har exklusiv behörighet att pröva mål som faller inom dess respektive materiella regelkomplex. Denna exklusivitet medför dock att dessa domstolar saknar behörighet att pröva mål som inte uttryckligen faller inom deras tilldelade behörighet. Det innebär att en domstol inte är behörig att pröva en talan på en alternativ grund tillhörande ett annat materiellt regelkomplex utanför domstolens behörighet.

Frågan om hur domens rättskraft förhåller sig till en sådan alternativa behörighetsfrämmande grund har endast i begränsad utsträckning behandlats i doktrinen. Ett antal författare men främst Per Henrik Lindblom har konstaterat att rättskraftens utsträckning begränsas av den dömande domstolens sakliga behörighet. En följd av detta är att en dom från exempelvis mark- och miljödomstolen i en första process inte hindrar en kärande från att i en ny process väcka talan vid allmän domstol om samma sak på en alternativ grund som mark- och miljödomstolen saknade behörighet att pröva. Rättskraften hindrar alltså inte en ny prövning av samma sak, förutsatt att den nya talan bygger på en alternativ behörighetsfrämmande grund. Denna ordning har motiverats med hänsyn till att en kärande ofta har svårt att innan en process inleds avgöra vilken alternativ grund som har störst möjlighet att leda till bifall och att utöver detta avgöra vilken domstol är behörig att pröva en specifik grund. Baserat på detta bör därför käranden ha möjligheten att få sitt anspråk prövat på samtliga relevanta grunder – inte endast de grunder som en domstol i en första process haft behörighet att pröva.

Denna uppsats visar emellertid på att en saklig begränsning av rättskraftens utsträckning inte i alla situationer är ändamålsenlig lösning på de problem som uppstår i skärningspunkten mellan domstolars behörighet och rättskraftens räckvidd. Uppsatsen lyfter fram exempel där denna ordning medför att en, i alla väsentliga delar, identisk talan kan väckas i två skilda processer, och vilka problematiska konsekvenser detta får för parterna samt hur detta strider mot de grundläggande syften som rättskraften är tänkt att tillgodose. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Norrby, Sebastian LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Negative legal force over the limit of the court's substantive jurisdiction
course
JURM02 20251
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
skadeståndsrätt, processrätt, civil procedure, rättskraft, saklig behörighet, alternativ behörighetsfrämmande grund
language
Swedish
id
9188892
date added to LUP
2025-06-16 15:54:24
date last changed
2025-06-16 15:54:24
@misc{9188892,
  abstract     = {{As the complexity of certain areas of law has increased, so too has the need for a court organization with specialized knowledge and competence to handle disputes within these areas of law. To achieve such specialization, the administration of justice in Sweden has been divided among various specialized courts, each of which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases falling within its respective substantive legal framework. However, this exclusivity also means that these courts have no jurisdiction to hear cases which do not explicitly fall within their assigned area of competence. Consequently, a court is not authorized to hear a claim based on an alternative legal ground that belongs to a different substantive legal domain outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The question of how the principle of res judicata relates to such alternative jurisdictionally foreign legal grounds has only been addressed to a limited extent in legal scholarship. Several authors – most notably Per Henrik Lindblom – have observed that the scope of res judicata is limited by the substantive jurisdiction of the court. One implication of this is that a judgment from, for example, the Land and Environment Court in a prior court action does not prevent a claimant from initiating a new case before a general court regarding the same matter but based on an alternative ground that the Land and Environment Court lacked substantive jurisdiction to consider. Thus, res judicata does not bar a new examination of the same matter, provided the new claim is based on a jurisdictionally foreign ground.

This order has been justified on the basis that a claimant often faces difficulties prior to initiating proceedings in determining which legal ground is most likely to lead to success and, in addition, to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear a specific ground. For this reason, it is argued that the claimant should be afforded the opportunity to have their claim examined on all relevant legal grounds, not solely those that fall within the jurisdiction of the court hearing the initial case.

However, this paper demonstrates that a substantive limitation of the scope of res judicata is not in all situations a suitable solution to the problems that arise at the intersection of substantive jurisdiction and res judicata. The paper highlights examples where this order allows for two separate proceedings concerning, in all essential respects, an identical claim, and examines the problematic consequences this creates for the parties. Furthermore, it explores how such duplication conflicts with the fundamental purposes that the principle of res judicata is intended to serve.}},
  author       = {{Norrby, Sebastian}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Negativ rättskraft över gränsen för domstolens sakliga behörighet - Särskilt om den negativa rättskraftens utsträckning vid skadeståndsanspråk med alternativa behörighetsfrämmande grunder}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}