The Legality of Self-Preferencing under Article 102 TFEU
(2025) JURM02 20251Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- This thesis explores the evolving legal treatment of self-preferencing by dominant digital platforms under Article 102 TFEU. It aims to clarify the current legal position and contribute to a more coherent understanding by combining legal doctrinal analysis with law-and-economics reasoning. Three sub-questions guide the analysis: the economic rationale behind self-preferencing, applicable theories of harm under Article 102, and the implications of recent legal and regulatory developments.
The thesis begins by defining self-preferencing as a dominant firm's preferential treatment of its own services and outlines mechanisms through which it occurs. Economically, self-preferencing may generate efficiencies but can also harm competition by... (More) - This thesis explores the evolving legal treatment of self-preferencing by dominant digital platforms under Article 102 TFEU. It aims to clarify the current legal position and contribute to a more coherent understanding by combining legal doctrinal analysis with law-and-economics reasoning. Three sub-questions guide the analysis: the economic rationale behind self-preferencing, applicable theories of harm under Article 102, and the implications of recent legal and regulatory developments.
The thesis begins by defining self-preferencing as a dominant firm's preferential treatment of its own services and outlines mechanisms through which it occurs. Economically, self-preferencing may generate efficiencies but can also harm competition by excluding rivals or raising their costs, effects that are amplified in digital markets.
Legally, the thesis assesses whether existing abuse categories – refusal to deal, discrimination, and tying – can address self-preferencing. While each has limitations, they remain adaptable to many scenarios. A major development was the ECJ’s Google Shopping judgment in 2024, which confirmed that self-preferencing can constitute abuse even absent a refusal to deal. The Court introduced discriminatory leveraging as a distinct form of abuse: the use of dominance in one market to unfairly advantage a firm’s own adjacent service. While the ruling expanded the reach of Article 102 by recognizing a new form of abuse, it left the legal contours of the new category of abuse unclear, resulting in continued legal uncertainty for self-preferencing conduct.
Furthermore, the thesis examines the interaction between Article 102 and the DMA, which provides faster, rule-based enforcement against gatekeepers. It considers whether increased reliance on the DMA in self-preferencing cases could reduce the development of case law under Article 102. Additionally, it explores whether the DMA’s strong emphasis on fairness may gradually influence the interpretation of Article 102, pushing it toward a more fairness-oriented approach in digital markets. The Commission’s 2024 Draft Guidelines add to the uncertainty by presenting an inconsistent framing of self-preferencing.
The thesis concludes that while self-preferencing by digital platforms is now more clearly recognized as a potential abuse, its legal contours remain unsettled. Ongoing tensions between effects-based antitrust and ex ante regulation require a nuanced approach to ensure consistent and effective enforcement in the digital economy. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Denna uppsats undersöker hur självgynnande (“self-preferencing”) beteenden hos digitala plattformar i dominerande ställning behandlas rättsligt enligt artikel 102 FEUF. Syftet är att klargöra den nuvarande rättsliga situationen och skapa en mer sammanhängande förståelse genom att kombinera rättsdogmatisk metod och analys med rättsekonomiska resonemang. Analysen vägleds av tre delfrågor: den ekonomiska grunden för självgynnande, tillämpliga skadeteorier enligt artikel 102, samt de rättsliga och regulatoriska konsekvenserna av senare utvecklingar.
Uppsatsen inleds genom att definiera self-preferencing som en dominerande aktörs gynnande av sina egna tjänster och därefter identifiera mekanismerna genom vilka detta sker. Ur ett ekonomiskt... (More) - Denna uppsats undersöker hur självgynnande (“self-preferencing”) beteenden hos digitala plattformar i dominerande ställning behandlas rättsligt enligt artikel 102 FEUF. Syftet är att klargöra den nuvarande rättsliga situationen och skapa en mer sammanhängande förståelse genom att kombinera rättsdogmatisk metod och analys med rättsekonomiska resonemang. Analysen vägleds av tre delfrågor: den ekonomiska grunden för självgynnande, tillämpliga skadeteorier enligt artikel 102, samt de rättsliga och regulatoriska konsekvenserna av senare utvecklingar.
Uppsatsen inleds genom att definiera self-preferencing som en dominerande aktörs gynnande av sina egna tjänster och därefter identifiera mekanismerna genom vilka detta sker. Ur ett ekonomiskt perspektiv kan självpreferens medföra effektivitetsvinster, men även skada konkurrensen genom att utestänga konkurrenter från marknaden, effekter som förstärks i digitala kontexter.
På det rättsliga planet analyseras om befintliga missbruksformer – vägran att
tillhandahålla (refusal to deal), diskriminering och kopplingsförbehåll – kan omfatta self-preferencing. Även om dessa har begränsningar i förhållande till vissa typer av self-preferencing bedöms de vara tillämpliga i ett flertal situationer. En viktig utveckling i detta avseende var EU-domstolens dom i Google Shopping-målet 2024, där domstolen fastslog att self-preferencing
kan utgöra missbruk även om det inte utgör en vägran att tillhandahålla. I
domen introducerades en ny kategori av missbruk: “discriminatory leveraging,” vilket innebär att dominans i ett marknadsled används för att otillbörligt gynna egna tjänster på en angränsande marknad genom diskriminerande metoder. Även om domen breddade tillämpningen av artikel 102, är denna nya missbruksforms legala gränser fortfarande otydliga, vilket fortsatt skapar osäkerhet kring var gränsen går mellan tillåten och otillåten self-preferencing.
Vidare behandlar uppsatsen samspelet mellan artikel 102 och DMA, som
möjliggör snabbare och regelbaserad tillsyn mot grindvakter. Det diskuteras
huruvida ett ökat fokus på DMA i ärenden som rör self-preferencing kan
hämma rättsutvecklingen under artikel 102. Uppsatsen undersöker också om
DMA kan komma att påverka tolkningen av artikel 102, och driva den i en
mer rättvisebaserad riktning i digitala sammanhang. Kommissionens utkast
till nya riktlinjer för missbruk av dominerande ställning från 2024 bidrar
samtidigt till rättsosäkerhet genom att presentera en inkonsekvent tolkning av
självpreferens.
Slutsatsen är att self-preferencing av digitala plattformar numera i högre grad erkänns som en möjlig form av missbruk, men att dess rättsliga konturer fortfarande är oklara. Den pågående spänningen mellan effektbaserad konkurrensrätt och ex ante-reglering kräver ett nyanserat angreppssätt för att säkerställa en enhetlig och effektiv tillämpning i den digitala ekonomin. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9189266
- author
- Dyrefors, Filippa LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM02 20251
- year
- 2025
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- EU law, competition law, law and economics, self-preferencing, Article 102 TFEU, DMA, digital markets, Google Shopping
- language
- English
- id
- 9189266
- date added to LUP
- 2025-06-13 14:43:38
- date last changed
- 2025-06-13 14:43:38
@misc{9189266,
abstract = {{This thesis explores the evolving legal treatment of self-preferencing by dominant digital platforms under Article 102 TFEU. It aims to clarify the current legal position and contribute to a more coherent understanding by combining legal doctrinal analysis with law-and-economics reasoning. Three sub-questions guide the analysis: the economic rationale behind self-preferencing, applicable theories of harm under Article 102, and the implications of recent legal and regulatory developments.
The thesis begins by defining self-preferencing as a dominant firm's preferential treatment of its own services and outlines mechanisms through which it occurs. Economically, self-preferencing may generate efficiencies but can also harm competition by excluding rivals or raising their costs, effects that are amplified in digital markets.
Legally, the thesis assesses whether existing abuse categories – refusal to deal, discrimination, and tying – can address self-preferencing. While each has limitations, they remain adaptable to many scenarios. A major development was the ECJ’s Google Shopping judgment in 2024, which confirmed that self-preferencing can constitute abuse even absent a refusal to deal. The Court introduced discriminatory leveraging as a distinct form of abuse: the use of dominance in one market to unfairly advantage a firm’s own adjacent service. While the ruling expanded the reach of Article 102 by recognizing a new form of abuse, it left the legal contours of the new category of abuse unclear, resulting in continued legal uncertainty for self-preferencing conduct.
Furthermore, the thesis examines the interaction between Article 102 and the DMA, which provides faster, rule-based enforcement against gatekeepers. It considers whether increased reliance on the DMA in self-preferencing cases could reduce the development of case law under Article 102. Additionally, it explores whether the DMA’s strong emphasis on fairness may gradually influence the interpretation of Article 102, pushing it toward a more fairness-oriented approach in digital markets. The Commission’s 2024 Draft Guidelines add to the uncertainty by presenting an inconsistent framing of self-preferencing.
The thesis concludes that while self-preferencing by digital platforms is now more clearly recognized as a potential abuse, its legal contours remain unsettled. Ongoing tensions between effects-based antitrust and ex ante regulation require a nuanced approach to ensure consistent and effective enforcement in the digital economy.}},
author = {{Dyrefors, Filippa}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{The Legality of Self-Preferencing under Article 102 TFEU}},
year = {{2025}},
}