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Rattlös rättvisa – Straffrättsligt ansvar och skuld i en tid av självkörande fordon

Hansson, Adam LU (2025) JURM02 20251
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
This thesis paper explores the possibility of criminal liability under Swedish law when highly automated vehicles (level 4–5 according to SAE's classifica-tion) are used. It focuses on whether a physical person can be held responsi-ble for careless driving under Section 1 of the Traffic Offences Act (TBL), even when the vehicle is controlled by an autonomous driving system.
A legal dogmatic method is used, based on the theoretical perspectives of Kleineman, Jareborg, and Peczenik. The analysis is conducted both de lege lata, by reconstructing current law, and de lege ferenda, by evaluating the normative foundations of criminal law. These include the principles of legali-ty, culpability, ultima ratio, and the requirement of individual... (More)
This thesis paper explores the possibility of criminal liability under Swedish law when highly automated vehicles (level 4–5 according to SAE's classifica-tion) are used. It focuses on whether a physical person can be held responsi-ble for careless driving under Section 1 of the Traffic Offences Act (TBL), even when the vehicle is controlled by an autonomous driving system.
A legal dogmatic method is used, based on the theoretical perspectives of Kleineman, Jareborg, and Peczenik. The analysis is conducted both de lege lata, by reconstructing current law, and de lege ferenda, by evaluating the normative foundations of criminal law. These include the principles of legali-ty, culpability, ultima ratio, and the requirement of individual moral responsi-bility. The thesis paper also examines different criminal law ideologies, in-cluding utilitarian and retributive ideas, to understand how they influence the legitimacy of criminalization in relation to autonomous technologies.
The study begins by clarifying key legal terms like “driver” and “control,” and shows the difficulties in assigning legal responsibility when a human is not actively driving. A central issue is whether a person who activates the self-driving system, or fails to take back control, can be held responsible for negli-gence or under the concept of guarantor responsibility (garantansvar), espe-cially if that responsibility is based on their own previous conduct. The thesis paper also discusses cases where the human actor has the ability to take con-trol during the automated driving.
The findings suggest that some existing legal terms can, in principle, be inter-preted to include certain forms of human interaction with automated vehicles. However, any such interpretation must be carefully justified. The criminal justice system risks undermining core principles if punishment is applied in situations where control, foreseeability, or fault are lacking. The thesis paper argues that any expansion of responsibility must be grounded in ideologically sound criteria that clearly connect the person’s behaviour to the values behind criminal law.
In conclusion, the thesis paper shows that a limited but principled application of responsibility is possible under current Swedish law, provided that core values like fault and proportionality are respected. It concludes that human actors can, under strict conditions, be held responsible for incidents involving self-driving vehicles, but such responsibility must be justified both legally and ideologically. As technology continues to evolve, the criminal law must adapt in ways that preserve both its integrity and legitimacy. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Denna uppsats undersöker möjligheten till straffrättsligt ansvar vid använd-ning av högautomatiserade fordon (nivå 4–5 enligt SAE:s indelning) enligt svensk rätt. Specifikt fokuserar uppsatsen på tillämpligheten av 1 § Trafik-brottslagen (TBL) och undersöker om en fysisk person kan hållas ansvarig för vårdslöshet i trafik när ett autonomt körsystem är i kontroll.
En rättsdogmatisk metod används med utgångspunkt i Kleinemans, Jareborgs och Peczeniks teoretiska perspektiv. Analysen genomförs både de lege lata, genom att rekonstruera gällande rätt, och de lege ferenda, genom att utvärdera straffrättens normativa grunder. Bland annat i legalitetsprincipen, skuldprinci-pen, ultima ratio och kravet på individuell moraliskt ansvar. Uppsatsen... (More)
Denna uppsats undersöker möjligheten till straffrättsligt ansvar vid använd-ning av högautomatiserade fordon (nivå 4–5 enligt SAE:s indelning) enligt svensk rätt. Specifikt fokuserar uppsatsen på tillämpligheten av 1 § Trafik-brottslagen (TBL) och undersöker om en fysisk person kan hållas ansvarig för vårdslöshet i trafik när ett autonomt körsystem är i kontroll.
En rättsdogmatisk metod används med utgångspunkt i Kleinemans, Jareborgs och Peczeniks teoretiska perspektiv. Analysen genomförs både de lege lata, genom att rekonstruera gällande rätt, och de lege ferenda, genom att utvärdera straffrättens normativa grunder. Bland annat i legalitetsprincipen, skuldprinci-pen, ultima ratio och kravet på individuell moraliskt ansvar. Uppsatsen be-handlar även straffrättsliga ideologier, innefattade utilitaristiska- och förtjäns-tetiska-idéer, för att förstå hur dessa påverkar kriminaliseringens legitimitet i förhållande till autonoma teknologier.
Studien börjar med att klargöra några grundläggande lagstadgade begrepp som ”förare” och ”kontroll”, och visar svårigheterna med att fastställa straff-rättsligt ansvar när den mänskliga föraren kanske inte aktivt kör fordonet. Centralt i diskussionen är om en person som aktiverar det självkörande sy-stemet eller underlåter att ta tillbaka kontrollen kan hållas ansvarig på grund av personlig oaktsamhet eller genom garantläran, framför allt om ett garantansvar kan härledas från personens eget föregående handlande. Även situationer där den mänskliga aktören har möjlighet att utöva kontroll under den automatiska körningen har varit en viktig fråga i uppsatsen.
Resultaten tyder på att vissa nuvarande juridiska begrepp i princip kan tolkas så de omfattar vissa former av mänsklig interaktion med det självkörande for-donet. Den normativa motiveringen för att göra en tolkning måste dock prövas noggrant. Det straffrättsliga systemet riskerar att underminera grundläggande principer om straff utdöms i situationer där kontroll, förutsebarhet eller skuld saknas. Uppsatsen argumenterar därför för att en utvidgning av ansvar måste vara förankrat i ideologiskt försvarbara kriterier, grundade i en tydlig koppling mellan aktörens beteende och straffrättssystemets underliggande värderingar.
Sammantaget visar uppsatsen att en begränsad men principiell tillämpning av ansvar är möjlig inom gällande rätt, men förutsatt att tillämpningen respekterar grundläggande värden som skuld och proportionalitet. Slutsatsen är att svensk straffrätt, under strikta villkor, kan ålägga mänskliga aktörer ansvar vid an-vändning av självkörande fordon, men att detta måste ske med hänsyn till både rättslig förenlighet och ideologisk motivering. I takt med att den tekniska utvecklingen fortsätter måste straffrättssystemet utvecklas på ett sätt som upp-rätthåller både straffrättens integritet och legitimitet. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Hansson, Adam LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Driverless Justice – Criminal Responsibility and Culpability in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles
course
JURM02 20251
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
ansvar, straffrätt, allmän rättslära, självkörande fordon, autonom teknik
language
Swedish
id
9189361
date added to LUP
2025-06-13 14:42:39
date last changed
2025-06-13 14:42:39
@misc{9189361,
  abstract     = {{This thesis paper explores the possibility of criminal liability under Swedish law when highly automated vehicles (level 4–5 according to SAE's classifica-tion) are used. It focuses on whether a physical person can be held responsi-ble for careless driving under Section 1 of the Traffic Offences Act (TBL), even when the vehicle is controlled by an autonomous driving system.
A legal dogmatic method is used, based on the theoretical perspectives of Kleineman, Jareborg, and Peczenik. The analysis is conducted both de lege lata, by reconstructing current law, and de lege ferenda, by evaluating the normative foundations of criminal law. These include the principles of legali-ty, culpability, ultima ratio, and the requirement of individual moral responsi-bility. The thesis paper also examines different criminal law ideologies, in-cluding utilitarian and retributive ideas, to understand how they influence the legitimacy of criminalization in relation to autonomous technologies.
The study begins by clarifying key legal terms like “driver” and “control,” and shows the difficulties in assigning legal responsibility when a human is not actively driving. A central issue is whether a person who activates the self-driving system, or fails to take back control, can be held responsible for negli-gence or under the concept of guarantor responsibility (garantansvar), espe-cially if that responsibility is based on their own previous conduct. The thesis paper also discusses cases where the human actor has the ability to take con-trol during the automated driving.
The findings suggest that some existing legal terms can, in principle, be inter-preted to include certain forms of human interaction with automated vehicles. However, any such interpretation must be carefully justified. The criminal justice system risks undermining core principles if punishment is applied in situations where control, foreseeability, or fault are lacking. The thesis paper argues that any expansion of responsibility must be grounded in ideologically sound criteria that clearly connect the person’s behaviour to the values behind criminal law.
In conclusion, the thesis paper shows that a limited but principled application of responsibility is possible under current Swedish law, provided that core values like fault and proportionality are respected. It concludes that human actors can, under strict conditions, be held responsible for incidents involving self-driving vehicles, but such responsibility must be justified both legally and ideologically. As technology continues to evolve, the criminal law must adapt in ways that preserve both its integrity and legitimacy.}},
  author       = {{Hansson, Adam}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Rattlös rättvisa – Straffrättsligt ansvar och skuld i en tid av självkörande fordon}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}