Vem har varit grovt oaktsam – gärningspersonen eller domstolen? Om rättstillämpningen avseende oaktsam våldtäkt i ljuset av lagstiftarens syften
(2025) LAGF03 20251Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- År 2018 antogs den så kallade samtyckeslagen. Genom denna lagstiftningsreform skiftades fokuset i den svenska våldtäktsbestämmelsen från förekomsten av våld, hot och utnyttjande av offrets särskilt utsatta situation, till huruvida offret deltagit frivilligt. På så sätt markerades att det inte är tillåtet att företa sexuella handlingar med en person som inte själv har fått bestämma att denne vill delta. Ett centralt syfte med lagstiftningen var just att förstärka skyddet för den sexuella självbestämmanderätten.
Reformen innebar även ett kriminaliserande av oaktsamma våldtäkter genom införandet av 6 kap. 1 a § brottsbalken (BrB). Numera krävs därmed att en person är aktsam vid företagandet av sexuella handlingar med en annan person.... (More) - År 2018 antogs den så kallade samtyckeslagen. Genom denna lagstiftningsreform skiftades fokuset i den svenska våldtäktsbestämmelsen från förekomsten av våld, hot och utnyttjande av offrets särskilt utsatta situation, till huruvida offret deltagit frivilligt. På så sätt markerades att det inte är tillåtet att företa sexuella handlingar med en person som inte själv har fått bestämma att denne vill delta. Ett centralt syfte med lagstiftningen var just att förstärka skyddet för den sexuella självbestämmanderätten.
Reformen innebar även ett kriminaliserande av oaktsamma våldtäkter genom införandet av 6 kap. 1 a § brottsbalken (BrB). Numera krävs därmed att en person är aktsam vid företagandet av sexuella handlingar med en annan person. Kriminaliseringen begränsades till att endast omfatta grov oaktsamhet, men utan att något särskilt förtydligande gjordes av vad det innebar i sammanhanget. I stället skulle det vara upp till rättstillämpningen att skapa innehållet i skuldkravet.
Denna uppsats undersöker hur rättstillämpningen har sett ut avseende 6 kap. 1 a § BrB sedan dess ikraftträdande, med särskilt fokus på de två prejudicerande avgöranden som lämnats av Högsta domstolen (HD) i NJA 2019 s. 668 Övernattningen I och NJA 2022 s. 237 Övernattningen II. Fokuset i uppsatsen är tillämpningen av skuldkravet grov oaktsamhet i ljuset av syftena bakom 2018 års sexualbrottsreform, för att utreda huruvida det förra har skett i enlighet med det senare.
Av analysen framkommer att rättstillämpningen i viss utsträckning har skett i enlighet med lagstiftarens intentioner genom att en person kan dömas för sina klander- och straffvärda handlingar trots att uppsåt inte kan styrkas. Emellertid framgår att HD i sina avgöranden i princip har undvikt att klargöra rättsläget avseende gränsdragningen mellan uppsåt, medveten oaktsamhet och omedveten oaktsamhet. I den utsträckning HD gör förtydligande uttalanden, förefaller de dessutom föranleda en restriktivare tillämpning än lagstiftaren avsåg. Bedömningarna synes inte heller ske enligt lagstiftarens vilja om att placera mer fokus på gärningspersonens agerande. Det argumenteras för att HD behöver lämna fler avgöranden med tydligare vägledning för att faktiskt ge innehåll till skuldkravet, och för att lagstiftarens avsikter med kriminaliseringen ska få avsedd effekt. (Less) - Abstract
- In 2018, the so-called consent act was adopted. This legislative reform shifted the focus of the Swedish rape provision from the presence of violence, threats and exploitation of the victim's particularly vulnerable situation, to whether the victim participated voluntarily. This emphasised that it is not permitted to engage in sexual acts with a person who has not been allowed to decide that they want to participate. A key aim of the legislation was to strengthen the protection of sexual self-determination.
The reform also entailed the criminalisation of negligent rape through the introduction of chapter 6 paragraph 1 a of the Criminal Code. Thus, a person is now required to be regardful when engaging in sexual acts with another person.... (More) - In 2018, the so-called consent act was adopted. This legislative reform shifted the focus of the Swedish rape provision from the presence of violence, threats and exploitation of the victim's particularly vulnerable situation, to whether the victim participated voluntarily. This emphasised that it is not permitted to engage in sexual acts with a person who has not been allowed to decide that they want to participate. A key aim of the legislation was to strengthen the protection of sexual self-determination.
The reform also entailed the criminalisation of negligent rape through the introduction of chapter 6 paragraph 1 a of the Criminal Code. Thus, a person is now required to be regardful when engaging in sexual acts with another person. Criminalisation was limited to gross negligence, but without any specific clarification of what this meant in the context. Instead, it would be left to judicial practice to create the content of the culpability requirement.
This essay examines the case law regarding chapter 6 paragraph 1 a of the Criminal Code since its entry into force, with a particular focus on the two precedents from the Supreme Court in the cases NJA 2019 p. 668 Övernattningen I (The Overnight Stay I) and NJA 2022 p. 237 Övernattningen II (The Overnight Stay II). The focus of the paper is the application of the requirement of gross negligence in light of the purposes behind the 2018 sexual offence reform, in order to investigate whether the former has been done in accordance with the latter.
The analysis shows that the application of the law has been in accordance with the legislator's intentions to some extent, in that a person can be convicted for their reprehensible and punishable actions even though intent cannot be proven. However, it appears that the Supreme Court essentially has failed to clarify the legal position regarding the distinction between intent, conscious negligence and unconscious negligence in its decisions. To the extent that the Supreme Court makes clarifying statements, they also appear to lead to a more stringent application than the legislator intended. Nor do the assessments seem to be made in accordance with the legislator's intention to place more focus on the offender's behaviour. It is argued that the Supreme Court needs to issue more rulings with clearer guidance in order to actually give content to the guilt requirement, and for the legislator's intentions with the criminalisation to have desired effects. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9190416
- author
- Sparv Helgesson, Isabelle LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20251
- year
- 2025
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Straffrätt, criminal law, våldtäkt, oaktsam våldtäkt, grov oaktsamhet
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9190416
- date added to LUP
- 2025-06-23 13:31:11
- date last changed
- 2025-06-23 13:31:11
@misc{9190416,
abstract = {{In 2018, the so-called consent act was adopted. This legislative reform shifted the focus of the Swedish rape provision from the presence of violence, threats and exploitation of the victim's particularly vulnerable situation, to whether the victim participated voluntarily. This emphasised that it is not permitted to engage in sexual acts with a person who has not been allowed to decide that they want to participate. A key aim of the legislation was to strengthen the protection of sexual self-determination.
The reform also entailed the criminalisation of negligent rape through the introduction of chapter 6 paragraph 1 a of the Criminal Code. Thus, a person is now required to be regardful when engaging in sexual acts with another person. Criminalisation was limited to gross negligence, but without any specific clarification of what this meant in the context. Instead, it would be left to judicial practice to create the content of the culpability requirement.
This essay examines the case law regarding chapter 6 paragraph 1 a of the Criminal Code since its entry into force, with a particular focus on the two precedents from the Supreme Court in the cases NJA 2019 p. 668 Övernattningen I (The Overnight Stay I) and NJA 2022 p. 237 Övernattningen II (The Overnight Stay II). The focus of the paper is the application of the requirement of gross negligence in light of the purposes behind the 2018 sexual offence reform, in order to investigate whether the former has been done in accordance with the latter.
The analysis shows that the application of the law has been in accordance with the legislator's intentions to some extent, in that a person can be convicted for their reprehensible and punishable actions even though intent cannot be proven. However, it appears that the Supreme Court essentially has failed to clarify the legal position regarding the distinction between intent, conscious negligence and unconscious negligence in its decisions. To the extent that the Supreme Court makes clarifying statements, they also appear to lead to a more stringent application than the legislator intended. Nor do the assessments seem to be made in accordance with the legislator's intention to place more focus on the offender's behaviour. It is argued that the Supreme Court needs to issue more rulings with clearer guidance in order to actually give content to the guilt requirement, and for the legislator's intentions with the criminalisation to have desired effects.}},
author = {{Sparv Helgesson, Isabelle}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Vem har varit grovt oaktsam – gärningspersonen eller domstolen? Om rättstillämpningen avseende oaktsam våldtäkt i ljuset av lagstiftarens syften}},
year = {{2025}},
}