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Tillräknelighet genom bakdörren? Medvetenhetskravet och dess funktion som ansvarströskel i svensk straffrätt.

Amini, Yasin LU (2025) LAGF03 20251
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Svensk straffrätt intar en särställning genom sin avsaknad av ett formellt tillräknelighetskrav, vilket är en fundamental förutsättning för straffansvar i många jämförbara rättsordningar. Frågan om en gärningspersons bristande mentala kapacitet hanteras i stället primärt inom ramen för den subjektiva skuldprövningen, där medvetenhetskravet vid uppsåtsbedömningen spelar en central roll. Denna uppsats undersöker hur detta medvetenhetskrav har tolkats och tillämpats i svensk rättspraxis, särskilt i fall där gärningspersoner varit påverkade av en psykisk störning. Uppsatsen undersöker särskilt huruvida HD:s praxis har inneburit en faktisk förskjutning i medvetenhetsbedömningen. Det vägledande avgörandet NJA 2020 s. 169 utgör här en central... (More)
Svensk straffrätt intar en särställning genom sin avsaknad av ett formellt tillräknelighetskrav, vilket är en fundamental förutsättning för straffansvar i många jämförbara rättsordningar. Frågan om en gärningspersons bristande mentala kapacitet hanteras i stället primärt inom ramen för den subjektiva skuldprövningen, där medvetenhetskravet vid uppsåtsbedömningen spelar en central roll. Denna uppsats undersöker hur detta medvetenhetskrav har tolkats och tillämpats i svensk rättspraxis, särskilt i fall där gärningspersoner varit påverkade av en psykisk störning. Uppsatsen undersöker särskilt huruvida HD:s praxis har inneburit en faktisk förskjutning i medvetenhetsbedömningen. Det vägledande avgörandet NJA 2020 s. 169 utgör här en central referenspunkt för frågan om medvetenhetsprövningen i praktiken närmat sig ett de facto tillräknelighetskrav.

Undersökningen av rättsutvecklingen, från tidigare hovrättspraxis till HD:s senare avgöranden, visar på en gradvis precisering av medvetenhetskravet. I synnerhet HD:s formulering i NJA 2020 s. 169 om att det måste finnas ”ett visst mått av basal grundförståelse” för gärningens sammanhang har markerat en viktig utveckling. Utvecklingen antyder en förskjutning från en prövning som tidigare möjligen i högre grad fokuserat på insikt om enskilda gärningsmoment, mot en bedömning som nu starkare beaktar gärningspersonens övergripande kognitiva förmåga och verklighetsförankring vid gärningstillfället.

Slutsatsen är att medvetenhetskravet vid psykisk störning, genom den analyserade rättsutvecklingen, i betydande mån har närmat sig en prövning som funktionellt och innehållsmässigt uppvisar starka likheter med ett tillräknelighetskrav. HD:s krav på ”basal grundförståelse” kan i praktiken fungera som en tröskel som liknar den som ett uttryckligt tillräknelighetsrekvisit skulle innebära. Trots detta underströk HD att ett formellt sådant krav alltjämt saknas i svensk rätt och att dess eventuella återinförande är en fråga för lagstiftaren. Kvarstående oklarheter i praxis kring den exakta innebörden och tillämpningen av detta preciserade medvetenhetskrav indikerar dock ett fortsatt behov av vägledning. (Less)
Abstract
Swedish criminal law is distinctive in that it lacks a formal requirement of accountability, even though such a requirement is considered fundamental to criminal liability in many other legal systems. Instead, when a perpetrator has a reduced mental capacity, this is primarily addressed by examining their subjective guilt. A crucial part of this assessment is the awareness requirement when deciding whether intent was present. This thesis examines how this awareness requirement has been interpreted and used in Swedish courts, especially in cases where perpetrators have been affected by mental disorders. Particular attention is given to the Supreme Court’s decisions, most notably the important NJA 2020 s. 169 ruling, which may have... (More)
Swedish criminal law is distinctive in that it lacks a formal requirement of accountability, even though such a requirement is considered fundamental to criminal liability in many other legal systems. Instead, when a perpetrator has a reduced mental capacity, this is primarily addressed by examining their subjective guilt. A crucial part of this assessment is the awareness requirement when deciding whether intent was present. This thesis examines how this awareness requirement has been interpreted and used in Swedish courts, especially in cases where perpetrators have been affected by mental disorders. Particular attention is given to the Supreme Court’s decisions, most notably the important NJA 2020 s. 169 ruling, which may have significantly changed how awareness is assessed, making it resemble a de facto accountability requirement.

A review of how the law has developed, from earlier appeal court cases to recent Supreme Court judgments, shows that the awareness requirement has gradually become more precise. The Supreme Court’s statement in NJA 2020 s. 169, which requires ”a certain degree of basic fundamental understanding” of the situation surrounding the act, has been a key development. This sug- gests a shift from an assessment that previously might have focused more on whether the person understood individual parts of the act, towards an evaluation that now more strongly considers the perpetrator’s overall cognitive ability and grasp of reality at the time of the offence.

It can be concluded that, as a result of these legal developments, the awareness requirement in cases of mental disorder has increasingly come to approximate and accountability assessment. The Supreme Court’s demand for ”basic fundamental understanding” can, in practice, act as a threshold much like an explicit accountability rule would. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that no such formal requirement currently exists in Swedish law and introducing one would be up to the legislature. Ongoing uncertainties in case law about the exact meaning and use of this more precise awareness requirement show that further guidance is still needed. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Amini, Yasin LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20251
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Straffrätt, Tillräknelighet, Medvetenhetskrav, Psykisk störning, Straffansvar, Uppsåt
language
Swedish
id
9191006
date added to LUP
2025-06-23 12:10:47
date last changed
2025-06-23 12:10:47
@misc{9191006,
  abstract     = {{Swedish criminal law is distinctive in that it lacks a formal requirement of accountability, even though such a requirement is considered fundamental to criminal liability in many other legal systems. Instead, when a perpetrator has a reduced mental capacity, this is primarily addressed by examining their subjective guilt. A crucial part of this assessment is the awareness requirement when deciding whether intent was present. This thesis examines how this awareness requirement has been interpreted and used in Swedish courts, especially in cases where perpetrators have been affected by mental disorders. Particular attention is given to the Supreme Court’s decisions, most notably the important NJA 2020 s. 169 ruling, which may have significantly changed how awareness is assessed, making it resemble a de facto accountability requirement. 

A review of how the law has developed, from earlier appeal court cases to recent Supreme Court judgments, shows that the awareness requirement has gradually become more precise. The Supreme Court’s statement in NJA 2020 s. 169, which requires ”a certain degree of basic fundamental understanding” of the situation surrounding the act, has been a key development. This sug- gests a shift from an assessment that previously might have focused more on whether the person understood individual parts of the act, towards an evaluation that now more strongly considers the perpetrator’s overall cognitive ability and grasp of reality at the time of the offence. 

It can be concluded that, as a result of these legal developments, the awareness requirement in cases of mental disorder has increasingly come to approximate and accountability assessment. The Supreme Court’s demand for ”basic fundamental understanding” can, in practice, act as a threshold much like an explicit accountability rule would. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that no such formal requirement currently exists in Swedish law and introducing one would be up to the legislature. Ongoing uncertainties in case law about the exact meaning and use of this more precise awareness requirement show that further guidance is still needed.}},
  author       = {{Amini, Yasin}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Tillräknelighet genom bakdörren? Medvetenhetskravet och dess funktion som ansvarströskel i svensk straffrätt.}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}