Competition Law Framework through European Commission’s Block Exemption Regulations with focus on Motor Vehicles Sector Aftermarket & reliance on Non-Personal Data
(2025) HARN63 20251Department of Business Law
- Abstract
- The aftermarket, with its spare parts and services, is a strong business driver compared to products from OEMs in the primary market. The MV sector, with features like autonomous driving, advanced mobility, etc., relies on data driven ecosystems apart from the conventional spare parts business. Such a market involves independent repairers, spare parts manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, end users, etc., as actors. The thesis analyses the application of BERs as administered by EC, which provides exemptions to business agreements with pro-competitive effects, essentially meeting Article 101 (3) TFEU requirements for the aftermarket involving MV. It provides a process to analyze the interplay of different BERs (e.g., horizontal, vertical,... (More)
- The aftermarket, with its spare parts and services, is a strong business driver compared to products from OEMs in the primary market. The MV sector, with features like autonomous driving, advanced mobility, etc., relies on data driven ecosystems apart from the conventional spare parts business. Such a market involves independent repairers, spare parts manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, end users, etc., as actors. The thesis analyses the application of BERs as administered by EC, which provides exemptions to business agreements with pro-competitive effects, essentially meeting Article 101 (3) TFEU requirements for the aftermarket involving MV. It provides a process to analyze the interplay of different BERs (e.g., horizontal, vertical, and MV-specific). Hardcore restrictions that deny the benefit of exemption under BER have been examined while exploring the intersection of the Data Act and Competition law regarding data sharing/refusal practices. The study considered the legal dogmatic method, factoring TFEU provisos, guidelines from EC, CJEU rulings, and the teleological approach. According to CJEU, (a) BERs provide a less burdensome option compared to the assessment under TFEUs, a requirement under the individual exemption (b)the burden of proof is on the party claiming the benefit (c) failing to claim under BER does not presume violation of Article 101(1) TFEU, and (d) having hardcore restriction under BER does not automatically imply being anti-competitive "by object" and "by effect." Along with a few other rulings, hardcore restrictions such as RPM and different types of restrictions on sales have been analysed. Certain restrictions have been allowed, implying exceptions, viz. passing on clauses from supplier to buyer and further regarding whom and where to sell, restricting sales from wholesalers to end users (skipping retailers), etc. The paper explores FRAND as a theoretical solution under the Data Act and discusses correlation topics of information exchange and technical information from BERs. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9195614
- author
- Dey, Sayantan LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- HARN63 20251
- year
- 2025
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Aftermarket, Block Exemption Regulations, Data Act, Competition Law
- language
- English
- id
- 9195614
- date added to LUP
- 2025-06-10 15:26:16
- date last changed
- 2025-06-26 08:50:49
@misc{9195614,
abstract = {{The aftermarket, with its spare parts and services, is a strong business driver compared to products from OEMs in the primary market. The MV sector, with features like autonomous driving, advanced mobility, etc., relies on data driven ecosystems apart from the conventional spare parts business. Such a market involves independent repairers, spare parts manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, end users, etc., as actors. The thesis analyses the application of BERs as administered by EC, which provides exemptions to business agreements with pro-competitive effects, essentially meeting Article 101 (3) TFEU requirements for the aftermarket involving MV. It provides a process to analyze the interplay of different BERs (e.g., horizontal, vertical, and MV-specific). Hardcore restrictions that deny the benefit of exemption under BER have been examined while exploring the intersection of the Data Act and Competition law regarding data sharing/refusal practices. The study considered the legal dogmatic method, factoring TFEU provisos, guidelines from EC, CJEU rulings, and the teleological approach. According to CJEU, (a) BERs provide a less burdensome option compared to the assessment under TFEUs, a requirement under the individual exemption (b)the burden of proof is on the party claiming the benefit (c) failing to claim under BER does not presume violation of Article 101(1) TFEU, and (d) having hardcore restriction under BER does not automatically imply being anti-competitive "by object" and "by effect." Along with a few other rulings, hardcore restrictions such as RPM and different types of restrictions on sales have been analysed. Certain restrictions have been allowed, implying exceptions, viz. passing on clauses from supplier to buyer and further regarding whom and where to sell, restricting sales from wholesalers to end users (skipping retailers), etc. The paper explores FRAND as a theoretical solution under the Data Act and discusses correlation topics of information exchange and technical information from BERs.}},
author = {{Dey, Sayantan}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Competition Law Framework through European Commission’s Block Exemption Regulations with focus on Motor Vehicles Sector Aftermarket & reliance on Non-Personal Data}},
year = {{2025}},
}