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Agent Representation - At What Cost?

Hof, Gabriel LU and Petersson, Emanuel LU (2025) NEKH03 20251
Department of Economics
Abstract
This study examines the determinants of player salaries in Europe’s top five men’s football leagues (Premier League, La Liga, Serie A, Bundesliga, Ligue 1), focusing on the impact of player representation models for forward players. We compare players represented by football agencies versus those represented by relatives, and explore whether agency size affects salaries. Drawing on principal-agent theory, which highlights potential conflicts of interest due to differing goals between players and agents, we hypothesize that players represented by relatives earn higher salaries. Using a dataset of 398 forward players from the 2023/2024 season, we incorporate 53 objective performance variables from the 2022/2023 season, ELO ratings, and club... (More)
This study examines the determinants of player salaries in Europe’s top five men’s football leagues (Premier League, La Liga, Serie A, Bundesliga, Ligue 1), focusing on the impact of player representation models for forward players. We compare players represented by football agencies versus those represented by relatives, and explore whether agency size affects salaries. Drawing on principal-agent theory, which highlights potential conflicts of interest due to differing goals between players and agents, we hypothesize that players represented by relatives earn higher salaries. Using a dataset of 398 forward players from the 2023/2024 season, we incorporate 53 objective performance variables from the 2022/2023 season, ELO ratings, and club financial data, moving beyond subjective measures like market values used in prior studies. Statistical analysis reveals that players represented by relatives earn 50% higher salaries, all else equal, while agency size shows no significant impact. These findings suggest players may benefit from representation by trusted individuals over traditional agencies, prompting further exploration of agent necessity in football. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Hof, Gabriel LU and Petersson, Emanuel LU
supervisor
organization
course
NEKH03 20251
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Football agents, player salaries, European football, performance metrics, principal-agent theory.
language
English
id
9196959
date added to LUP
2025-09-12 09:20:12
date last changed
2025-09-12 09:20:12
@misc{9196959,
  abstract     = {{This study examines the determinants of player salaries in Europe’s top five men’s football leagues (Premier League, La Liga, Serie A, Bundesliga, Ligue 1), focusing on the impact of player representation models for forward players. We compare players represented by football agencies versus those represented by relatives, and explore whether agency size affects salaries. Drawing on principal-agent theory, which highlights potential conflicts of interest due to differing goals between players and agents, we hypothesize that players represented by relatives earn higher salaries. Using a dataset of 398 forward players from the 2023/2024 season, we incorporate 53 objective performance variables from the 2022/2023 season, ELO ratings, and club financial data, moving beyond subjective measures like market values used in prior studies. Statistical analysis reveals that players represented by relatives earn 50% higher salaries, all else equal, while agency size shows no significant impact. These findings suggest players may benefit from representation by trusted individuals over traditional agencies, prompting further exploration of agent necessity in football.}},
  author       = {{Hof, Gabriel and Petersson, Emanuel}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Agent Representation - At What Cost?}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}