Ex-ante and Ex-post Enforcement Mechanisms in Digital Markets under EU Competition Law and Digital Markets Act
(2025) JAEM01 20251Faculty of Law
Department of Law
- Abstract
- In recent decades, digital markets have become one of the most significant and debated areas not only in the world of politics and economics, but also in legal doctrine and practice. The rapid evolution of dynamic digital markets, coupled with the outline of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), has led to significant debate within EU competition law on the appropriate balance between ex-ante and ex-post enforcement mechanisms in the EU. A central legal question concerns whether the ex-ante obligations introduced by the DMA are intended to replace or supplement the traditional antitrust instruments contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Although academic interest in this area is growing, comprehensive comparisons of the scope, objectives, and... (More)
- In recent decades, digital markets have become one of the most significant and debated areas not only in the world of politics and economics, but also in legal doctrine and practice. The rapid evolution of dynamic digital markets, coupled with the outline of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), has led to significant debate within EU competition law on the appropriate balance between ex-ante and ex-post enforcement mechanisms in the EU. A central legal question concerns whether the ex-ante obligations introduced by the DMA are intended to replace or supplement the traditional antitrust instruments contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Although academic interest in this area is growing, comprehensive comparisons of the scope, objectives, and practical applications of these two enforcement models remain relatively limited, particularly in the context of today’s data-intensive digital markets.
The primary objective of this study is to examine the legal rationale, historical background, and implications of opting for ex-ante versus ex-post enforcement and to assess whether a hybrid approach could more effectively regulate dominant digital platforms. The analysis initially focuses on Article 102 TFEU and its interpretation and application by the Court of Justice of the European Union, with particular emphasis on the Google Shopping case, which involve a prominent dominant undertaking in the digital market. The analysis subsequently proceeds to an institutional and legal examination of the Digital Markets Act, identifying its key objectives, regulatory structure, and the specific obligations imposed on designated gatekeepers. A central is-sue addressed is whether the legal framework promoted by the DMA adequately addresses the structural limitations of traditional EU competition law, particularly in cases involving systemic and data-driven market failures.
Methodologically, the thesis adopts an inferential and strategic approach, sup-ported by a literature review which was used to apply these approaches in discussing a specific case study of ByteDance v Commission. This case was selected to examine the economic realities and to provide a foundation for the legal analysis under the DMA. The legal analysis benefits from examining previous competition law practices within the EU. Furthermore, the analysis of the DMA focused on the concept of the ‘gatekeeper’ and its obligations.
The thesis subsequently compares the regulatory scope of the DMA with the broader framework of EU competition law and considers whether a combined, hybrid approach using both systems might be more effective. It also discusses potential legal challenges, such as legal ambiguity, overlapping rules, and the impact on the ne bis in idem principle. In addition, the study investigates whether the DMA’s strict rules could hinder competitive behaviour and slow down innovation.
In conclusion, this thesis aims to support to current debates on shaping an EU digital market that remains fair, open, and competitive, in line with the demands of today’s digital economy. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9199572
- author
- Kasikci Unalan, Asli LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JAEM01 20251
- year
- 2025
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- abuse of a dominant position, EU competition law, digital markets, self-preferencing, article 102 TFEU, DMA, Court of Justice of the European Union
- language
- English
- id
- 9199572
- date added to LUP
- 2025-06-16 08:27:11
- date last changed
- 2025-06-16 08:27:11
@misc{9199572,
abstract = {{In recent decades, digital markets have become one of the most significant and debated areas not only in the world of politics and economics, but also in legal doctrine and practice. The rapid evolution of dynamic digital markets, coupled with the outline of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), has led to significant debate within EU competition law on the appropriate balance between ex-ante and ex-post enforcement mechanisms in the EU. A central legal question concerns whether the ex-ante obligations introduced by the DMA are intended to replace or supplement the traditional antitrust instruments contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Although academic interest in this area is growing, comprehensive comparisons of the scope, objectives, and practical applications of these two enforcement models remain relatively limited, particularly in the context of today’s data-intensive digital markets.
The primary objective of this study is to examine the legal rationale, historical background, and implications of opting for ex-ante versus ex-post enforcement and to assess whether a hybrid approach could more effectively regulate dominant digital platforms. The analysis initially focuses on Article 102 TFEU and its interpretation and application by the Court of Justice of the European Union, with particular emphasis on the Google Shopping case, which involve a prominent dominant undertaking in the digital market. The analysis subsequently proceeds to an institutional and legal examination of the Digital Markets Act, identifying its key objectives, regulatory structure, and the specific obligations imposed on designated gatekeepers. A central is-sue addressed is whether the legal framework promoted by the DMA adequately addresses the structural limitations of traditional EU competition law, particularly in cases involving systemic and data-driven market failures.
Methodologically, the thesis adopts an inferential and strategic approach, sup-ported by a literature review which was used to apply these approaches in discussing a specific case study of ByteDance v Commission. This case was selected to examine the economic realities and to provide a foundation for the legal analysis under the DMA. The legal analysis benefits from examining previous competition law practices within the EU. Furthermore, the analysis of the DMA focused on the concept of the ‘gatekeeper’ and its obligations.
The thesis subsequently compares the regulatory scope of the DMA with the broader framework of EU competition law and considers whether a combined, hybrid approach using both systems might be more effective. It also discusses potential legal challenges, such as legal ambiguity, overlapping rules, and the impact on the ne bis in idem principle. In addition, the study investigates whether the DMA’s strict rules could hinder competitive behaviour and slow down innovation.
In conclusion, this thesis aims to support to current debates on shaping an EU digital market that remains fair, open, and competitive, in line with the demands of today’s digital economy.}},
author = {{Kasikci Unalan, Asli}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Ex-ante and Ex-post Enforcement Mechanisms in Digital Markets under EU Competition Law and Digital Markets Act}},
year = {{2025}},
}