Concrete Complexes as Vague Objects
(2025) FTEK01 20242Theoretical Philosophy
- Abstract
- This essay examines whether ontological vagueness can coherently resolve Peter Unger’s "The Problem of the Many" — the dilemma that ordinary objects like clouds or stones must either not exist or exist in overwhelming multiplicity due to their indeterminate boundaries. While Unger rejects vague objects as incoherent, attributing vagueness instead to semantic imprecision, this essay defends ontological vagueness through three key arguments: Hershenov demonstrates that fuzzy boundaries cannot contain embedded vague objects of the same kind; Morreau preserves classical mereology by separating vague constitution from precise identity; and Jónsson grounds vagueness in primitive facts about parthood while rejecting the pairing principle. Though... (More)
- This essay examines whether ontological vagueness can coherently resolve Peter Unger’s "The Problem of the Many" — the dilemma that ordinary objects like clouds or stones must either not exist or exist in overwhelming multiplicity due to their indeterminate boundaries. While Unger rejects vague objects as incoherent, attributing vagueness instead to semantic imprecision, this essay defends ontological vagueness through three key arguments: Hershenov demonstrates that fuzzy boundaries cannot contain embedded vague objects of the same kind; Morreau preserves classical mereology by separating vague constitution from precise identity; and Jónsson grounds vagueness in primitive facts about parthood while rejecting the pairing principle. Though Lewis’ semantic framework offers a parsimonious alternative through supervaluation and partial identity, the ontological approach proves more faithful to our common-sense understanding of material objects. Ultimately, the essay argues that vague objects can provide a viable solution to Unger’s problem without the extreme consequences of his disjunction. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9204335
- author
- Wänman, Kajsa LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Konkreta komplex som vaga objekt
- course
- FTEK01 20242
- year
- 2025
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Vagueness, Ontological Vagueness, The Problem of the Many, Vague Objects, Indeterminate Boundaries, Mereology, Vague Constitution, Vague Parthood, Metaphysics, Ontology, Identity, Concrete Complexes, Peter Unger
- language
- English
- id
- 9204335
- date added to LUP
- 2025-11-19 12:47:06
- date last changed
- 2025-11-19 12:47:06
@misc{9204335,
abstract = {{This essay examines whether ontological vagueness can coherently resolve Peter Unger’s "The Problem of the Many" — the dilemma that ordinary objects like clouds or stones must either not exist or exist in overwhelming multiplicity due to their indeterminate boundaries. While Unger rejects vague objects as incoherent, attributing vagueness instead to semantic imprecision, this essay defends ontological vagueness through three key arguments: Hershenov demonstrates that fuzzy boundaries cannot contain embedded vague objects of the same kind; Morreau preserves classical mereology by separating vague constitution from precise identity; and Jónsson grounds vagueness in primitive facts about parthood while rejecting the pairing principle. Though Lewis’ semantic framework offers a parsimonious alternative through supervaluation and partial identity, the ontological approach proves more faithful to our common-sense understanding of material objects. Ultimately, the essay argues that vague objects can provide a viable solution to Unger’s problem without the extreme consequences of his disjunction.}},
author = {{Wänman, Kajsa}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Concrete Complexes as Vague Objects}},
year = {{2025}},
}