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Interoperability in EU Competition Law: Rethinking the Essential Facilities Doctrine for Digital Platforms after Android Auto

Ebenhardt, Hanna LU (2025) LAGM01 20251
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
This thesis explores how EU competition law governs interoperability obligations for dominant digital platforms. It shows how the CJEU’s judgment in Android Auto (C-233/23) redefines the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) established in Bronner judgment (C-7/97) and how this emerging doctrine interacts with the interoperability obligations introduced by the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

The Android Auto judgment marks a shift in the application of the EFD to digital platforms. The Court held that a refusal to enable interoperability may constitute an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU even where the infrastructure is not indispensable, provided the platform is designed for third-party participation. By shifting focus from... (More)
This thesis explores how EU competition law governs interoperability obligations for dominant digital platforms. It shows how the CJEU’s judgment in Android Auto (C-233/23) redefines the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) established in Bronner judgment (C-7/97) and how this emerging doctrine interacts with the interoperability obligations introduced by the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

The Android Auto judgment marks a shift in the application of the EFD to digital platforms. The Court held that a refusal to enable interoperability may constitute an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU even where the infrastructure is not indispensable, provided the platform is designed for third-party participation. By shifting focus from indispensability to attractiveness, and from the elimination of competition to the capability to hinder it, the Court lowered the strict Bronner criteria and moved beyond the traditional limits of the EFD. Furthermore, by recognising that a dominant undertaking may be required not only to grant access but also to develop interoperability templates where none exist, the Court brought antitrust enforcement through Article 102 TFEU closer to the preventive logic of regulation.

As this thesis demonstrates, the Android Auto judgment allows for both narrow and broad readings. A narrow interpretation confines the doctrine to app-level interoperability and digital platforms open to third parties, whereas a broader one could extend obligations beyond digital platforms strictly defined, potentially requiring dominant undertakings to create access templates for a broader range of infrastructures. Such an expansion risks blurring the line between ‘exceptional’ refusal to supply cases and general exclusionary abuses, and raises concerns about investment incentives, innovation and the scope of the fundamental right to property and the freedom to conduct a business.

The Court’s development takes place against the backdrop of the DMA, adopted to address the structural limitations of Article 102 TFEU in dealing with platform power. Whilst the DMA imposes interoperability obligations ex ante on designated gatekeepers, Android Auto now establishes similar duties through ex post competition law. As a result, the duty to ensure interoperability now operates within three overlapping frameworks comprising the DMA, the EFD and the emerging Android Auto doctrine. This overlap enhances flexibility and may help close enforcement gaps, but it also risks introducing legal uncertainty, double proceedings and threatens business freedom. Ultimately, this convergence reflects a broader evolution of EU competition policy towards a more integrated, though complex, framework for promoting openness, innovation and contestability in digital markets. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Denna uppsats undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning reglerar interoperabilitetsskyldigheter för dominerande digitala plattformar. Uppsatsen visar hur EU-domstolens avgörande i Android Auto (C-233/23) omformar teorin om nödvändiga nyttigheter (Essential Facilities Doctrine, EFD) som etablerades i Bronner-domen (C-7/97). Vidare analyseras denna framväxande doktrins samspel med de interoperabilitetsskyldigheter som införts genom förordningen om digitala marknader (Digital Markets Act, DMA).

Domen i Android Auto markerar ett skifte i tillämpningen av EFD på digitala plattformar. Domstolen slog fast att en vägran att möjliggöra interoperabilitet kan utgöra ett missbruk av dominerande ställning enligt artikel 102 FEUF även när... (More)
Denna uppsats undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning reglerar interoperabilitetsskyldigheter för dominerande digitala plattformar. Uppsatsen visar hur EU-domstolens avgörande i Android Auto (C-233/23) omformar teorin om nödvändiga nyttigheter (Essential Facilities Doctrine, EFD) som etablerades i Bronner-domen (C-7/97). Vidare analyseras denna framväxande doktrins samspel med de interoperabilitetsskyldigheter som införts genom förordningen om digitala marknader (Digital Markets Act, DMA).

Domen i Android Auto markerar ett skifte i tillämpningen av EFD på digitala plattformar. Domstolen slog fast att en vägran att möjliggöra interoperabilitet kan utgöra ett missbruk av dominerande ställning enligt artikel 102 FEUF även när infrastrukturen inte är oumbärlig, under förutsättning att plattformen är avsedd för utomstående företag. Genom att flytta fokus från oumbärlighet till attraktivitet, och från eliminering av konkurrens till möjligheten att hindra den, sänkte domstolen de strikta kriterierna i Bronner och gick bortom EFD:s traditionella ramar. Vidare konstaterade domstolen att ett dominerande företag i vissa fall kan vara skyldigt inte bara att ge tillgång, utan även att utveckla interoperabilitetsmallar där sådana saknas. På så sätt förde domstolen konkurrensrättslig rättsskipning enligt artikel 102 FEUF närmare den förebyggande logik som präglar förordningar.

Som uppsatsen visar tillåter Android Auto-domen såväl restriktiva som extensiva tolkningar. En restriktiv tolkning begränsar doktrinens tillämpning till interoperabilitet på app-nivå och digitala plattformar öppna för utomstående part, medan en mer extensiv tolkning kan utvidga skyldigheterna bortom digitala plattformar i strikt mening, och kräva att dominerande företag skapar tillgångsmekanismer för ett bredare spektrum av infrastrukturer. En sådan utvidgning riskerar att sudda ut gränsen mellan de ”exceptionella” fallen av leveransvägran och allmänna utestängande missbruk, och väcker frågor om investeringsincitament, innovation samt de grundläggande rättigheterna till egendom och näringsfrihet.

EU-domstolens utveckling sker mot bakgrund av DMA, som antagits för att hantera begränsningarna med att reglera plattformsmakt genom artikel 102 FEUF. Medan DMA inför ex ante-skyldigheter för utsedda grindvakter, stipulerar Android Auto nu liknande ansvar genom rättskipning ex post. Skyldigheten att säkerställa interoperabilitet verkar således numera över de tre parallella ramverken DMA, EFD och den framväxande Android Auto-doktrinen. Denna överlappning ökar flexibiliteten och kan täppa till luckor i rättstillämpningen, men riskerar samtidigt rättsosäkerhet, dubbla förfaranden och inskränkningar i näringsfriheten. Sammantaget speglar denna konvergens en bredare utveckling inom EU:s konkurrenspolitik mot ett mer integrerat, men samtidigt alltmer komplext, ramverk för att främja öppenhet, innovation och konkurrens på digitala marknader. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Ebenhardt, Hanna LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGM01 20251
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
Law, EU Law, Competition, Competition Law, EU Competition Law, Article 102 TFEU, Essential Facilities Doctrine, Refusal to Supply, Abuse of Dominance, Indispensability, Interoperability, Interoperability Obligations, Digital Platforms, Digital Ecosystems, Gatekeepers, Investment Incentives, DMA, Digital Markets Act, Bronner, Android Auto, Alphabet and Others
language
English
id
9214150
date added to LUP
2025-10-21 15:11:53
date last changed
2025-10-21 15:11:53
@misc{9214150,
  abstract     = {{This thesis explores how EU competition law governs interoperability obligations for dominant digital platforms. It shows how the CJEU’s judgment in Android Auto (C-233/23) redefines the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) established in Bronner judgment (C-7/97) and how this emerging doctrine interacts with the interoperability obligations introduced by the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

The Android Auto judgment marks a shift in the application of the EFD to digital platforms. The Court held that a refusal to enable interoperability may constitute an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU even where the infrastructure is not indispensable, provided the platform is designed for third-party participation. By shifting focus from indispensability to attractiveness, and from the elimination of competition to the capability to hinder it, the Court lowered the strict Bronner criteria and moved beyond the traditional limits of the EFD. Furthermore, by recognising that a dominant undertaking may be required not only to grant access but also to develop interoperability templates where none exist, the Court brought antitrust enforcement through Article 102 TFEU closer to the preventive logic of regulation.

As this thesis demonstrates, the Android Auto judgment allows for both narrow and broad readings. A narrow interpretation confines the doctrine to app-level interoperability and digital platforms open to third parties, whereas a broader one could extend obligations beyond digital platforms strictly defined, potentially requiring dominant undertakings to create access templates for a broader range of infrastructures. Such an expansion risks blurring the line between ‘exceptional’ refusal to supply cases and general exclusionary abuses, and raises concerns about investment incentives, innovation and the scope of the fundamental right to property and the freedom to conduct a business.

The Court’s development takes place against the backdrop of the DMA, adopted to address the structural limitations of Article 102 TFEU in dealing with platform power. Whilst the DMA imposes interoperability obligations ex ante on designated gatekeepers, Android Auto now establishes similar duties through ex post competition law. As a result, the duty to ensure interoperability now operates within three overlapping frameworks comprising the DMA, the EFD and the emerging Android Auto doctrine. This overlap enhances flexibility and may help close enforcement gaps, but it also risks introducing legal uncertainty, double proceedings and threatens business freedom. Ultimately, this convergence reflects a broader evolution of EU competition policy towards a more integrated, though complex, framework for promoting openness, innovation and contestability in digital markets.}},
  author       = {{Ebenhardt, Hanna}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Interoperability in EU Competition Law: Rethinking the Essential Facilities Doctrine for Digital Platforms after Android Auto}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}