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Moral Intuition in Metaethics

Eckerberg, Alexandra LU (2025) FPRK01 20252
Practical Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis explores the difference between how moral realists and moral error theorists relate to moral intuitions in metaethical theory building. While moral realists claim Moorean arguments in their favour, arguments based around a highly intuitive Moorean premise, error theorists claim that a moral premise being intuitive is not the same as it being true. Error theorists use debunking arguments to reveal that moral intuitions are corrupted by evolutionary and other factors, and thus cannot be trusted to lead the way to moral truth. I argue that debunking arguments are stronger than Moorean arguments because intuitions are misleading. Unless it is argued why moral intuitions are fundamentally different from other intuitions, we have no... (More)
This thesis explores the difference between how moral realists and moral error theorists relate to moral intuitions in metaethical theory building. While moral realists claim Moorean arguments in their favour, arguments based around a highly intuitive Moorean premise, error theorists claim that a moral premise being intuitive is not the same as it being true. Error theorists use debunking arguments to reveal that moral intuitions are corrupted by evolutionary and other factors, and thus cannot be trusted to lead the way to moral truth. I argue that debunking arguments are stronger than Moorean arguments because intuitions are misleading. Unless it is argued why moral intuitions are fundamentally different from other intuitions, we have no reason to trust that they lead us to moral truths. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Eckerberg, Alexandra LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Moraliska Intuitioner inom Metaetik
course
FPRK01 20252
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Moorean arguments, debunking arguments, moral intuitions, metaethics, moral realism, moral error theory.
language
English
id
9216412
date added to LUP
2026-02-03 13:47:38
date last changed
2026-02-03 13:47:38
@misc{9216412,
  abstract     = {{This thesis explores the difference between how moral realists and moral error theorists relate to moral intuitions in metaethical theory building. While moral realists claim Moorean arguments in their favour, arguments based around a highly intuitive Moorean premise, error theorists claim that a moral premise being intuitive is not the same as it being true. Error theorists use debunking arguments to reveal that moral intuitions are corrupted by evolutionary and other factors, and thus cannot be trusted to lead the way to moral truth. I argue that debunking arguments are stronger than Moorean arguments because intuitions are misleading. Unless it is argued why moral intuitions are fundamentally different from other intuitions, we have no reason to trust that they lead us to moral truths.}},
  author       = {{Eckerberg, Alexandra}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Moral Intuition in Metaethics}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}