Uppsåtets gränsland - en rättsfilosofisk studie kring huruvida uppsåtets nedre gräns uppfyller kravet på rättssäkerhet
(2025) LAGF03 20252Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- As a general rule, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Swedish Criminal Code
requires intent on the part of the offender for a criminal act to be punishable,
whereas negligence is relevant only where expressly prescribed. Swedish
criminal law recognises three forms of intent: direct intent, indirect intent,
and intent by indifference. Intent by indifference was introduced into
Swedish law through the Supreme Court, case NJA 2004 s. 176, and has
since constituted the lower threshold of intent, that is, the boundary between
intent and conscius negligence. The previously applied concept of conditional intent, based on a hypothetical test, was considered ethically, as demonstrated through a legal-historical method.
Intent by indifference as... (More) - As a general rule, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Swedish Criminal Code
requires intent on the part of the offender for a criminal act to be punishable,
whereas negligence is relevant only where expressly prescribed. Swedish
criminal law recognises three forms of intent: direct intent, indirect intent,
and intent by indifference. Intent by indifference was introduced into
Swedish law through the Supreme Court, case NJA 2004 s. 176, and has
since constituted the lower threshold of intent, that is, the boundary between
intent and conscius negligence. The previously applied concept of conditional intent, based on a hypothetical test, was considered ethically, as demonstrated through a legal-historical method.
Intent by indifference as a legal construct is based on a two-stage assessment of the offender’s awareness of risk and indifference towards the occurrence of the harmful effect. This construction is illustrated through a case law analysis of NJA 2004 s. 176 and NJA 2016 s. 763. The latter case in particular highlights the difficulties of application, as the lower courts and
the Supreme Court reached different conclusions regarding intent despite relying on the same factual circumstances.
Taking legal certainty as its point of departure, the thesis examines whether
intent by indifference is compatible with formal and substantive legal
certainty. Formal legal certainty emphasises requirements of foreseeability,
clarity, and equality before the law, while substantive legal certainty also
encompasses ethical considerations and moral legitimacy. In this context,
the question of whether legal value judgments can be objectively correct,
and the significance of this for legal application, is also addressed.
The thesis examines whether intent by indifference fulfils the requirement of
legal certainty from a legal-philosophical perspective. The conclusion is that
this form of intent fulfils the requirement to some extent, as it provides
courts with tools to make legally sound assessments. At the same time,
difficulties arise in achieving a deep justification that is comprehensible to
the public. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Enligt 1 kap. 2 § första stycket brottsbalken krävs som huvudregel uppsåt hos den som begår en otillåten gärning, medan oaktsamhet aktualiseras i de fall det är särskilt föreskrivet. Svensk straffrätt utgår från tre uppsåtsformer: avsikts-, insikts- och likgiltighetsuppsåt. Likgiltighetsuppsåt infördes i svensk rätt genom rättsfallet NJA 2004 s. 176 och utgör sedan dess uppsåtets nedre gräns, det vill säga gränsen mot medveten oaktsamhet.
Likgiltighetsuppsåt som konstruktion bygger på en tvåledsbedömning av
gärningsmannens riskmedvetenhet och likgiltighet inför effekten. Konstruktionen illustreras genom en rättsfallsanalys av NJA 2004 s. 176 och NJA 2016 s. 763. Det senare fallet belyser tillämpningssvårigheterna, då underinstanserna... (More) - Enligt 1 kap. 2 § första stycket brottsbalken krävs som huvudregel uppsåt hos den som begår en otillåten gärning, medan oaktsamhet aktualiseras i de fall det är särskilt föreskrivet. Svensk straffrätt utgår från tre uppsåtsformer: avsikts-, insikts- och likgiltighetsuppsåt. Likgiltighetsuppsåt infördes i svensk rätt genom rättsfallet NJA 2004 s. 176 och utgör sedan dess uppsåtets nedre gräns, det vill säga gränsen mot medveten oaktsamhet.
Likgiltighetsuppsåt som konstruktion bygger på en tvåledsbedömning av
gärningsmannens riskmedvetenhet och likgiltighet inför effekten. Konstruktionen illustreras genom en rättsfallsanalys av NJA 2004 s. 176 och NJA 2016 s. 763. Det senare fallet belyser tillämpningssvårigheterna, då underinstanserna och Högsta domstolen gjorde olika bedömningar av uppsåtsfrågan trots samma faktiska underlag.
Med rättssäkerhet som utgångspunkt undersöks om likgiltighetsuppsåt är
förenligt med formell och materiell rättssäkerhet. Formell rättssäkerhet betonar krav på förutsebarhet, tydlighet och likhet inför lagen, medan materiell rättssäkerhet även omfattar etiska överväganden och moralisk legitimitet. I detta sammanhang aktualiseras även frågan om juridiska värdeomdömen kan vara objektivt riktiga och vilken betydelse detta har för rättstillämpningen.
Uppsatsen undersöker huruvida likgiltighetsuppsåt uppfyller kravet på
rättssäkerhet ur ett rättsfilosofiskt perspektiv. Slutsatsen är att
uppsåtsformen till viss del uppfyller detta krav, eftersom den ger domstolarna verktyg för juridiskt korrekta bedömningar. Samtidigt uppstår svårigheter att nå ett djupgående rättfärdigande som är begripligt för medborgarna. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9216811
- author
- Rye-Danjelsen, Judit LU
- supervisor
-
- Karol Nowak LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20252
- year
- 2025
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, likgiltighet, uppsåt, rättssäkerhet, rättsfilosofi
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9216811
- date added to LUP
- 2026-02-09 15:40:41
- date last changed
- 2026-02-09 15:40:41
@misc{9216811,
abstract = {{As a general rule, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Swedish Criminal Code
requires intent on the part of the offender for a criminal act to be punishable,
whereas negligence is relevant only where expressly prescribed. Swedish
criminal law recognises three forms of intent: direct intent, indirect intent,
and intent by indifference. Intent by indifference was introduced into
Swedish law through the Supreme Court, case NJA 2004 s. 176, and has
since constituted the lower threshold of intent, that is, the boundary between
intent and conscius negligence. The previously applied concept of conditional intent, based on a hypothetical test, was considered ethically, as demonstrated through a legal-historical method.
Intent by indifference as a legal construct is based on a two-stage assessment of the offender’s awareness of risk and indifference towards the occurrence of the harmful effect. This construction is illustrated through a case law analysis of NJA 2004 s. 176 and NJA 2016 s. 763. The latter case in particular highlights the difficulties of application, as the lower courts and
the Supreme Court reached different conclusions regarding intent despite relying on the same factual circumstances.
Taking legal certainty as its point of departure, the thesis examines whether
intent by indifference is compatible with formal and substantive legal
certainty. Formal legal certainty emphasises requirements of foreseeability,
clarity, and equality before the law, while substantive legal certainty also
encompasses ethical considerations and moral legitimacy. In this context,
the question of whether legal value judgments can be objectively correct,
and the significance of this for legal application, is also addressed.
The thesis examines whether intent by indifference fulfils the requirement of
legal certainty from a legal-philosophical perspective. The conclusion is that
this form of intent fulfils the requirement to some extent, as it provides
courts with tools to make legally sound assessments. At the same time,
difficulties arise in achieving a deep justification that is comprehensible to
the public.}},
author = {{Rye-Danjelsen, Judit}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Uppsåtets gränsland - en rättsfilosofisk studie kring huruvida uppsåtets nedre gräns uppfyller kravet på rättssäkerhet}},
year = {{2025}},
}