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LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Deckarserien och avtalstolkning – Tolkning av upphovsrättsliga överlåtelse- och upplåtelseavtal i ljuset av NJA 2025 s. 162

Solenlind, Erik LU (2025) JURM02 20252
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Uppsatsen utgår från spänningen mellan en enhetlig avtalstolkningslära eller att låta branschspecifika omständigheter och principer styra avtalstolkning. Fokus ligger på upphovsrättsliga överlåtelse- och upplåtelseavtal, där specifikationsprincipen länge har förordat en restriktiv tolkning till upphovsmannens förmån, och där endast det som uttryckligen angetts i avtalet, ska anses ha överlåtits eller upplåtits. Genom NJA 2025 s. 162 har HD slagit fast att upphovsrätten inte motiverar särskilda tolkningsprinciper, i stället ska dess särdrag vägas in som kompletterande omständigheter inom den allmänna avtalsrättsliga tolkningsmetoden.

I uppsatsen analyseras särskilt hur NJA 2025 s. 162 förändrat rättsläget för upphovsrättslig... (More)
Uppsatsen utgår från spänningen mellan en enhetlig avtalstolkningslära eller att låta branschspecifika omständigheter och principer styra avtalstolkning. Fokus ligger på upphovsrättsliga överlåtelse- och upplåtelseavtal, där specifikationsprincipen länge har förordat en restriktiv tolkning till upphovsmannens förmån, och där endast det som uttryckligen angetts i avtalet, ska anses ha överlåtits eller upplåtits. Genom NJA 2025 s. 162 har HD slagit fast att upphovsrätten inte motiverar särskilda tolkningsprinciper, i stället ska dess särdrag vägas in som kompletterande omständigheter inom den allmänna avtalsrättsliga tolkningsmetoden.

I uppsatsen analyseras särskilt hur NJA 2025 s. 162 förändrat rättsläget för upphovsrättslig avtalstolkning och påverkat specifikationsprincipens betydelse. För att ha tillräckligt med underlag för en sådan analys, undersöker jag dessförinnan olika perspektiv på branschspecifika tolkningsläror och exemplifierar med försäkrings- och entreprenadrättslig avtalstolkning. Jag analyserar även de upphovsrättsliga hänsyn som tidigare motiverat en särskild tolkningsprincip. Specifikationsprincipen undersöks genom att analysera tidigare svensk lagstiftning och motivuttalanden, tillämpning i domstolar och dess behandling i juridisk litteratur. Det konstateras att specifikationsprincipen har haft en framskjuten roll i viss juridisk litteratur, äldre förarbeten och underrättspraxis, men svagare stöd i överinstanser och annan juridisk litteratur.

Slutsatsen är att tolkningsläran normaliseras. Specifikationsprincipens rättsliga ställning nedgraderas, och de branschspecifika hänsynen är tänkta att fungera som preciseringar av tolkningsdata, inte som överordnade principer. Jag konstaterar att tolkningspresumtionen i viss mån lever kvar och överlappar oklarhetsregeln. Prejudikatets räckvidd konstateras sträcka sig utanför upphovsrätten, och markerar en motvilja mot branschspecifika tolkningsprinciper. Jag reflekterar särskilt över HD:s linje om att stärkt enhetlighet och förutsebarhet riskerar att ge upphovsrättens legitima skyddsintressen ett begränsat genomslag när de numera endast betraktas som några i mängden av flera tolkningsfaktorer. Vidare reflekterar jag över att HD:s nya linje på ett missvisande sätt blandar en skälighetsinriktad tolkning – med alltför lite hänsyn till partsavsikten – med jämkning och utfyllning, på ett sätt som riskerar att prejudikatet missuppfattas. Genom jämförelsen visar jag att de skäl som specifikationsprincipen vilar på inte påverkas av NJA 2025 s. 162. (Less)
Abstract
The thesis explores the tension between a unified doctrine of contract interpretation or an approach that allows sector-specific circumstances and principles to influence the interpretation of contracts. The primary focus of this analysis is on copyright transfer and licensing agreements, where the principle of specification has long supported a restrictive interpretation in the author’s interest, such that only the explicitly stipulated rights set out in the agreement are considered to have been transferred or licensed. In NJA 2025 s. 162, the Supreme Court established that copyright does not justify special interpretive principles, rather its distinctive features should be considered as complementary circumstances within the framework of... (More)
The thesis explores the tension between a unified doctrine of contract interpretation or an approach that allows sector-specific circumstances and principles to influence the interpretation of contracts. The primary focus of this analysis is on copyright transfer and licensing agreements, where the principle of specification has long supported a restrictive interpretation in the author’s interest, such that only the explicitly stipulated rights set out in the agreement are considered to have been transferred or licensed. In NJA 2025 s. 162, the Supreme Court established that copyright does not justify special interpretive principles, rather its distinctive features should be considered as complementary circumstances within the framework of the general method of contract interpretation.

The thesis examines, in particular, how NJA 2025 s. 162 changes the legal landscape for interpreting copyright agreements and affected the significance of the principle of specification. To provide a sufficient basis for this analysis, I first explore different perspectives on sector‑specific interpretive doctrines, illustrated by contract interpretation in insurance and construction law. I also analyse the historical justifications invoked to support distinct interpretive frameworks within the context of copyright law. The principle of specification is examined through an analysis of earlier Swedish legislation and preparatory works, its application in the courts, and its treatment in legal scholarship. It is concluded that the principle has held a prominent position in certain legal literature, older preparatory materials, and lower‑court practice, but has found weaker support in higher courts and other legal literature.

The conclusion is that contract interpretation is being normalised. The legal status of the principle of specification is downgraded, and sector‑specific considerations are now intended to function as refinements of interpretive data rather than as overarching rules. I observe that the interpretation presumption persists to some extent and overlaps with the contra proferentem rule. The scope of the precedent is found to extend beyond copyright law, signalling a broader reluctance towards sector‑specific interpretive principles. I reflect, in particular, on the risk that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on greater uniformity and predictability may limit the practical impact of copyright’s legitimate protective interests, now when they are treated merely as one factor among many in the interpretive assessment. I further reflect on how the Court’s new approach misleadingly conflates a reasonableness-oriented interpretation – with insufficient regard for the parties’ intentions – with adjustment of agreements and gap‑filling, in a way that risks the precedent being misunderstood. Through this comparison, I demonstrate that the underlying reasons for the principle of specification remain unaffected by NJA 2025 s. 162. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Solenlind, Erik LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Deckarserien and Contract Interpretation – Interpretation of Copyright Transfer- and License Agreements Considering NJA 2025 s. 162
course
JURM02 20252
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
avtalsrätt, förmögenhetsrätt, immaterialrätt
language
Swedish
id
9216837
date added to LUP
2026-01-18 12:46:50
date last changed
2026-01-18 12:46:50
@misc{9216837,
  abstract     = {{The thesis explores the tension between a unified doctrine of contract interpretation or an approach that allows sector-specific circumstances and principles to influence the interpretation of contracts. The primary focus of this analysis is on copyright transfer and licensing agreements, where the principle of specification has long supported a restrictive interpretation in the author’s interest, such that only the explicitly stipulated rights set out in the agreement are considered to have been transferred or licensed. In NJA 2025 s. 162, the Supreme Court established that copyright does not justify special interpretive principles, rather its distinctive features should be considered as complementary circumstances within the framework of the general method of contract interpretation.

The thesis examines, in particular, how NJA 2025 s. 162 changes the legal landscape for interpreting copyright agreements and affected the significance of the principle of specification. To provide a sufficient basis for this analysis, I first explore different perspectives on sector‑specific interpretive doctrines, illustrated by contract interpretation in insurance and construction law. I also analyse the historical justifications invoked to support distinct interpretive frameworks within the context of copyright law. The principle of specification is examined through an analysis of earlier Swedish legislation and preparatory works, its application in the courts, and its treatment in legal scholarship. It is concluded that the principle has held a prominent position in certain legal literature, older preparatory materials, and lower‑court practice, but has found weaker support in higher courts and other legal literature.

The conclusion is that contract interpretation is being normalised. The legal status of the principle of specification is downgraded, and sector‑specific considerations are now intended to function as refinements of interpretive data rather than as overarching rules. I observe that the interpretation presumption persists to some extent and overlaps with the contra proferentem rule. The scope of the precedent is found to extend beyond copyright law, signalling a broader reluctance towards sector‑specific interpretive principles. I reflect, in particular, on the risk that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on greater uniformity and predictability may limit the practical impact of copyright’s legitimate protective interests, now when they are treated merely as one factor among many in the interpretive assessment. I further reflect on how the Court’s new approach misleadingly conflates a reasonableness-oriented interpretation – with insufficient regard for the parties’ intentions – with adjustment of agreements and gap‑filling, in a way that risks the precedent being misunderstood. Through this comparison, I demonstrate that the underlying reasons for the principle of specification remain unaffected by NJA 2025 s. 162.}},
  author       = {{Solenlind, Erik}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Deckarserien och avtalstolkning – Tolkning av upphovsrättsliga överlåtelse- och upplåtelseavtal i ljuset av NJA 2025 s. 162}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}