Conflicts Between Superpowers and Norms: Implications for EU Operators Caught in the Gridlock Between U.S. Secondary Sanctions and EU Law
(2025) JURM02 20252Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The growing use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool has intensi-fied legal and political tensions in the international trade system. This trend has been particularly pronounced following the expansion of the United States’ (U.S.) secondary sanctions with extraterritorial reach, and in response to major geopolitical events, including the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the reimposition of sanctions against Iran in 2018, as well as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. By expanding its jurisdiction and utilising its dominance in global finance, the United States has been able to broaden its sanctions regime beyond its borders, thereby compelling non-U.S. actors to adhere to U.S.... (More)
- The growing use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool has intensi-fied legal and political tensions in the international trade system. This trend has been particularly pronounced following the expansion of the United States’ (U.S.) secondary sanctions with extraterritorial reach, and in response to major geopolitical events, including the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the reimposition of sanctions against Iran in 2018, as well as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. By expanding its jurisdiction and utilising its dominance in global finance, the United States has been able to broaden its sanctions regime beyond its borders, thereby compelling non-U.S. actors to adhere to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
This extraterritorial reach of U.S. secondary sanctions has been met with stark opposition by the European Union (EU), as they require its operators to comply with U.S. foreign policy rather than that of the EU. In response, the EU has adopted legislative countermeasures, including Council Regulation 2271/96 (the EU ”Blocking Statute”), which prohibits its operators from complying with certain U.S. sanctions. As a result, EU businesses get caught in a regulatory gridlock in which compliance with one regime may simultaneously constitute a breach of the other.
Against this backdrop, the thesis explores the legal and practical impacts of the conflict for EU operators, focusing on three main questions: the options available to EU operators caught between U.S. secondary sanctions and the EU Blocking Statute; how they navigate these options in practice; and the factors shaping their decisions.
It finds that, despite the formal prohibition in EU law on complying with U.S. sanctions, most EU operators generally tend to comply with U.S. secondary sanctions. This tendency is mainly due to enforcement imbalance, the severity and consistency of U.S. penalties, U.S. dominance in global finance, and legal uncertainties surrounding the Blocking Statute. Currently, the EU Blocking Statute mostly acts as a political signal rather than an effective safeguard, prompting EU operators to prioritise compliance with U.S. sanctions. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9217275
- author
- Johansson, Erika LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM02 20252
- year
- 2025
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- Public International Law, EU Law, Sanctions, U.S. Secondary Sanctions, EU Blocking Statute
- language
- English
- id
- 9217275
- date added to LUP
- 2026-01-26 12:13:46
- date last changed
- 2026-01-26 12:13:46
@misc{9217275,
abstract = {{The growing use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool has intensi-fied legal and political tensions in the international trade system. This trend has been particularly pronounced following the expansion of the United States’ (U.S.) secondary sanctions with extraterritorial reach, and in response to major geopolitical events, including the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the reimposition of sanctions against Iran in 2018, as well as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. By expanding its jurisdiction and utilising its dominance in global finance, the United States has been able to broaden its sanctions regime beyond its borders, thereby compelling non-U.S. actors to adhere to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
This extraterritorial reach of U.S. secondary sanctions has been met with stark opposition by the European Union (EU), as they require its operators to comply with U.S. foreign policy rather than that of the EU. In response, the EU has adopted legislative countermeasures, including Council Regulation 2271/96 (the EU ”Blocking Statute”), which prohibits its operators from complying with certain U.S. sanctions. As a result, EU businesses get caught in a regulatory gridlock in which compliance with one regime may simultaneously constitute a breach of the other.
Against this backdrop, the thesis explores the legal and practical impacts of the conflict for EU operators, focusing on three main questions: the options available to EU operators caught between U.S. secondary sanctions and the EU Blocking Statute; how they navigate these options in practice; and the factors shaping their decisions.
It finds that, despite the formal prohibition in EU law on complying with U.S. sanctions, most EU operators generally tend to comply with U.S. secondary sanctions. This tendency is mainly due to enforcement imbalance, the severity and consistency of U.S. penalties, U.S. dominance in global finance, and legal uncertainties surrounding the Blocking Statute. Currently, the EU Blocking Statute mostly acts as a political signal rather than an effective safeguard, prompting EU operators to prioritise compliance with U.S. sanctions.}},
author = {{Johansson, Erika}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Conflicts Between Superpowers and Norms: Implications for EU Operators Caught in the Gridlock Between U.S. Secondary Sanctions and EU Law}},
year = {{2025}},
}