The European Gambit: A study examining how game theory can identify the strategic motives behind the interaction between the European Commission and Hungary.
(2026) STVA23 20252Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- In recent years, the European Commission has been in conflict with Hungary and its continued rule of law violations. While both parties justify their actions through normative ideology, this rhetoric lacks sufficient explanatory power for why the parties have incentives to continue cooperation. The main objective of this study is to identify the implicit motives of this conflict and explain the persistent outcome of the interaction. By applying motive analysis and game theory, the study uncovers implicit motives that diverge from the parties’ public explicit motivations. The findings suggest that neither party has an incentive to change courses of actions, due to mutual threats, resulting in a mixed equilibrium. Specifically, Hungary’s... (More)
- In recent years, the European Commission has been in conflict with Hungary and its continued rule of law violations. While both parties justify their actions through normative ideology, this rhetoric lacks sufficient explanatory power for why the parties have incentives to continue cooperation. The main objective of this study is to identify the implicit motives of this conflict and explain the persistent outcome of the interaction. By applying motive analysis and game theory, the study uncovers implicit motives that diverge from the parties’ public explicit motivations. The findings suggest that neither party has an incentive to change courses of actions, due to mutual threats, resulting in a mixed equilibrium. Specifically, Hungary’s strategy is driven by economic preferences, while the Commission’s measures are motivated by political preferences. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9217628
- author
- Rizvi, Frida LU and Larsen, Simon Gorm LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- STVA23 20252
- year
- 2026
- type
- L2 - 2nd term paper (old degree order)
- subject
- keywords
- Game theory, utility, preference, strategy, credible threat, equilibrium, explicit motivation, and implicit motive.
- language
- English
- id
- 9217628
- date added to LUP
- 2026-03-05 14:24:19
- date last changed
- 2026-03-05 14:24:19
@misc{9217628,
abstract = {{In recent years, the European Commission has been in conflict with Hungary and its continued rule of law violations. While both parties justify their actions through normative ideology, this rhetoric lacks sufficient explanatory power for why the parties have incentives to continue cooperation. The main objective of this study is to identify the implicit motives of this conflict and explain the persistent outcome of the interaction. By applying motive analysis and game theory, the study uncovers implicit motives that diverge from the parties’ public explicit motivations. The findings suggest that neither party has an incentive to change courses of actions, due to mutual threats, resulting in a mixed equilibrium. Specifically, Hungary’s strategy is driven by economic preferences, while the Commission’s measures are motivated by political preferences.}},
author = {{Rizvi, Frida and Larsen, Simon Gorm}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{The European Gambit: A study examining how game theory can identify the strategic motives behind the interaction between the European Commission and Hungary.}},
year = {{2026}},
}