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En upphovsrättslig chimär - När föreligger en överföring till allmänheten?

Boberg, Carl LU (2012) JURM02 20121
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Vid Sveriges genomförande av direktiv 2001/29/EG av den 22 maj 2001 om harmonisering av vissa aspekter av upphovsrätt och närstående rättigheter i informationssamhället (Infosoc-direktivet) år 2005 infördes begreppet överföring till allmänheten i 2 § 3 st. 1 p. i lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk (URL). I denna uppsats utreds innebörden av detta begrepp.

Under senare år har EU-domstolen i flera avgöranden tolkat begreppet överföring till allmänheten. I arbetet har dessa avgöranden analyserats och jämförts med uttalanden i svenska förarbeten, doktrin samt praxis för att utreda i vilken utsträckning den svenska uppfattningen av begreppet överensstämmer med EU-rätten.

Studien visar att innebörden av... (More)
Vid Sveriges genomförande av direktiv 2001/29/EG av den 22 maj 2001 om harmonisering av vissa aspekter av upphovsrätt och närstående rättigheter i informationssamhället (Infosoc-direktivet) år 2005 infördes begreppet överföring till allmänheten i 2 § 3 st. 1 p. i lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk (URL). I denna uppsats utreds innebörden av detta begrepp.

Under senare år har EU-domstolen i flera avgöranden tolkat begreppet överföring till allmänheten. I arbetet har dessa avgöranden analyserats och jämförts med uttalanden i svenska förarbeten, doktrin samt praxis för att utreda i vilken utsträckning den svenska uppfattningen av begreppet överensstämmer med EU-rätten.

Studien visar att innebörden av begreppet överföring till allmänheten inte är helt självklar. Dels skiljer sig den svenska lagstiftarens uppfattning av begreppet överföring från EU-domstolens, dels tillämpar EU-domstolen ett annat allmänhetsbegrepp än Högsta domstolen.

I förhållande till överföringsbegreppet kan följande konstateras. Till skillnad från EU-domstolen har den svenska lagstiftaren utgått från att ett indirekt framförande, som t.ex. sådana offentliga återgivanden som reglerars i artikel 11bis.1.iii Bernkonvention, inte utgör en överföring. Det har istället antagits att indirekta framföranden omfattas av begreppet offentligt framförande i 2 § 3 st. 2 p. URL och därför inte är EU-harmoniserat genom Infosoc-direktivet. Det framgår dock av EU-domstolens praxis att indirekta framföranden ska anses omfattas av överföringsbegreppet. När den svenska lagstiftaren utformade inskränkningar i upphovsmannens framföranderätt har utgångspunkten att indirekta framföranden omfattas av dessa inskränkningar således varit felaktig. Eftersom ett indirekt offentligt framförande utgör en överföring måste eventuella inskränkningar vidare ske i enlighet med artikel 5 Infosoc-direktivet.

Enligt den svenska lagstiftaren ska begreppet allmänheten tolkas på nationell nivå. EU-domstolen har dock klargjort att begreppet ska ges en enhetlig och självständig tolkning inom hela unionen. Jämförs avgöranden från Högsta domstolen med avgöranden från EU-domstolen kan det konstateras att det svenska allmänhetsbegreppet skiljer sig från det EU-rättsliga. I t.ex. mål C-135/10 från den 15 mars 2012 framhåller EU-domstolen att kunderna i en privat tandläkarmottagning inte kan anses utgöra en allmänhet. En svensk domstol hade troligtvis kommit fram till motsatsen. Det EU-rättsliga allmänhetsbegreppet tycks således ge upphovsmännen ett sämre skydd än det svenska, i vart fall i ett ekonomiskt hänseende. Mot bakgrund av EU-domstolens praxis kan det vidare ifrågasättas om den s.k. kompletteringsregeln i 2 § 4 st. URL är förenlig med EU-rätten.

EU-domstolens tolkning av begreppet överföring till allmänheten kan emellertid kritiseras på flera punkter. Domstolens tolkning av överföringsbegreppet framstår enligt min mening som inkonsekvent mot bakgrund av de internationella överenskommelser som finns på upphovsrättens område. I dessa överenskommelser anses nämligen inte att indirekta framföranden omfattas av begreppet överföring till allmänheten.

I uppsatsen ges en mer utförlig redogörelse av konsekvenserna och omfattningen av den ovan beskrivna diskrepansen, liksom en djupare analys av EU-domstolens resonemang. (Less)
Abstract
When Sweden implemented directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (the copyright directive) the term communication to the public was introduced in sec. 2(3)(i) of the Swedish Copyright Act (1960:729). The meaning of this term will be determined in this paper.

There has been a variety of cases in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has decided on the meaning of the term. In order to determine to which extent the Swedish conception of the term is in compliance with EU law these cases have been analysed and compared to Swedish preparatory works, case law and works on copyright law.
... (More)
When Sweden implemented directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (the copyright directive) the term communication to the public was introduced in sec. 2(3)(i) of the Swedish Copyright Act (1960:729). The meaning of this term will be determined in this paper.

There has been a variety of cases in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has decided on the meaning of the term. In order to determine to which extent the Swedish conception of the term is in compliance with EU law these cases have been analysed and compared to Swedish preparatory works, case law and works on copyright law.

The meaning of the term is not entirely clear. The Swedish legislator’s perception of the concept of communication differs from the one of the ECJ. Furthermore the Swedish Supreme Court and the ECJ appear to define “public” differently.

Regarding the concept of communication the following has been concluded. The Swedish legislator has assumed that the concept of communication does not include indirect performances like those in article 11 bis (1)(iii) of the Berne Convention of 1886. Instead, it has been assumed that indirect performances constitute a public performance under sec. 2(3)(ii) of the Copyright Act and thus falls outside the scope of the copyright directive. On the other hand the ECJ has concluded that indirect performances do constitute a communication within the meaning of the copyright directive. When designing exceptions to the authors’ exclusive right to publicly perform his works, the Swedish legislator’s assumption that these exceptions include indirect performances has therefore been incorrect. Furthermore, since indirect performances constitute a communication, exceptions can only be made in accordance with article 5.3 of the copyright directive.

According to the Swedish legislator it is a matter for the national law to define “public”. This assumption has been shown to be incorrect; the ECJ has stated that the term is to be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the community. By comparing decisions from the Swedish Supreme Court with decisions from the ECJ it has been shown that there is a difference in how the term public is perceived. In case C-135/10, 15 March 2012, the ECJ concludes that customers in a private dental practice are not a part of the public. A Swedish court is likely to have reached a different conclusion. From an author’s point of view the Swedish definition of “public” therefore provides better protection. In light of the decisions from the ECJ one may also question the legality of the so called complementary rule (“kompletteringsregeln”) in sec. 2(4) of the Copyright Act.

The ECJ´s interpretation of the term communication to the public can however be called into question. For instance, when used in international copyright law the concept of communication does not include indirect performances.

This paper provides a more detailed account of the implications and scope of the described discrepancy as well as a comprehensive analysis of the ECJ´s reasoning. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Boberg, Carl LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
What constitutes a communication to the public?
course
JURM02 20121
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
immaterialrätt, upphovsrätt, överföring till allmänheten, allmänheten
language
Swedish
id
2740271
date added to LUP
2012-10-15 12:06:18
date last changed
2017-02-21 10:23:44
@misc{2740271,
  abstract     = {{When Sweden implemented directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (the copyright directive) the term communication to the public was introduced in sec. 2(3)(i) of the Swedish Copyright Act (1960:729). The meaning of this term will be determined in this paper. 

There has been a variety of cases in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has decided on the meaning of the term. In order to determine to which extent the Swedish conception of the term is in compliance with EU law these cases have been analysed and compared to Swedish preparatory works, case law and works on copyright law. 

The meaning of the term is not entirely clear. The Swedish legislator’s perception of the concept of communication differs from the one of the ECJ. Furthermore the Swedish Supreme Court and the ECJ appear to define “public” differently. 

Regarding the concept of communication the following has been concluded. The Swedish legislator has assumed that the concept of communication does not include indirect performances like those in article 11 bis (1)(iii) of the Berne Convention of 1886. Instead, it has been assumed that indirect performances constitute a public performance under sec. 2(3)(ii) of the Copyright Act and thus falls outside the scope of the copyright directive. On the other hand the ECJ has concluded that indirect performances do constitute a communication within the meaning of the copyright directive. When designing exceptions to the authors’ exclusive right to publicly perform his works, the Swedish legislator’s assumption that these exceptions include indirect performances has therefore been incorrect. Furthermore, since indirect performances constitute a communication, exceptions can only be made in accordance with article 5.3 of the copyright directive. 

According to the Swedish legislator it is a matter for the national law to define “public”. This assumption has been shown to be incorrect; the ECJ has stated that the term is to be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the community. By comparing decisions from the Swedish Supreme Court with decisions from the ECJ it has been shown that there is a difference in how the term public is perceived. In case C-135/10, 15 March 2012, the ECJ concludes that customers in a private dental practice are not a part of the public. A Swedish court is likely to have reached a different conclusion. From an author’s point of view the Swedish definition of “public” therefore provides better protection. In light of the decisions from the ECJ one may also question the legality of the so called complementary rule (“kompletteringsregeln”) in sec. 2(4) of the Copyright Act.

The ECJ´s interpretation of the term communication to the public can however be called into question. For instance, when used in international copyright law the concept of communication does not include indirect performances.

This paper provides a more detailed account of the implications and scope of the described discrepancy as well as a comprehensive analysis of the ECJ´s reasoning.}},
  author       = {{Boberg, Carl}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{En upphovsrättslig chimär - När föreligger en överföring till allmänheten?}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}