Oskyldighetspresumtionen och den talande tystnaden
(2013) LAGF03 20132Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Principerna om oskyldighetspresumtion och fri bevisprövning existerar med det gemensamma målet att nå så pass materiellt korrekta domar som möjligt. Dessa två rättssäkerhetsprinciper hamnar på ytan i konflikt med varandra när den tilltalade använder sig av sin rätt att tiga för att undvika att belasta sig själv; tystnaden får inte tolkas negativt för den tilltalade, men domstolen är å andra sidan fri att bevispröva allt som förekommit i målet.
Rätten till tystnad emanerar i dagens läge ur oskyldighetspresumtionen, en övergripande princip som i sin tur tillhör en av hörnstenarna i den moderna straffprocessrätten. Presumtionen om oskyldighet har således direkt tillämpats i olika grad genom åren, men saknar en uttrycklig reglering i svensk... (More) - Principerna om oskyldighetspresumtion och fri bevisprövning existerar med det gemensamma målet att nå så pass materiellt korrekta domar som möjligt. Dessa två rättssäkerhetsprinciper hamnar på ytan i konflikt med varandra när den tilltalade använder sig av sin rätt att tiga för att undvika att belasta sig själv; tystnaden får inte tolkas negativt för den tilltalade, men domstolen är å andra sidan fri att bevispröva allt som förekommit i målet.
Rätten till tystnad emanerar i dagens läge ur oskyldighetspresumtionen, en övergripande princip som i sin tur tillhör en av hörnstenarna i den moderna straffprocessrätten. Presumtionen om oskyldighet har således direkt tillämpats i olika grad genom åren, men saknar en uttrycklig reglering i svensk rätt; dess främsta hänvisningskälla är artikel 6 och rätten till en rättvis rättegång i Europakonventionen om mänskliga rättigheter.
Europadomstolen har slagit fast rätten till tystnad som en del av oskyldighetspresumtionen, och därmed kan tystnaden hos en person anklagad för brott som grundregel inte innebära ett negativt bevisvärde för den anklagade. Oskyldighetspresumtionen hamnar därmed skenbart på kollisionskurs med principen om fri bevisprövning, då den tillåter domstolen att fritt värdera allt som förekommit i målet.
Europadomstolens lösning har varit att medge ett visst negativt bevisvärde av den tilltalades tystnad, men enbart i form av stödbevisning då andra, rimliga alternativ tycks saknas. Möjligheten att rubricera förfarandet på ett sådant sätt att artikel 6 kringgås har avskurits av Europadomstolens praxis, då den tidpunkt rätten till tystnad aktualiseras har givits en autonom innebörd. I både svensk och europeisk rätt har Europakonventionens artikel 6 tydliggjorts och erhållit en mer framträdande ställning, varför möjligheten att åberopa rätten till tystnad har genomgått en undanskymd utveckling vars praxis har gått från en styvmoderlig behandling till dess erkännande som en grundläggande rättssäkerhetsprincip. Den alltmer framåtskridande tillnärmningen av europakonventionens staters lagstiftning ligger till grund för en stor del av denna utveckling. Oskyldighetspresumtionen har kunnat bibehållas intakt, framför allt då bevisprövningsmetoden om alternativa hypoteser kräver att domstolen ex officio beaktar rimliga, friande förklaringar åt den tilltalade. (Less) - Abstract
- The principles of presumption of innocence and free evaluation of evidence
share a common raison d’être in their strife to produce as materially proper judgements as possible. However, these two principles of rule of law seemingly appear to conflict when a suspect exercises his right to remain silent in order to avoid self-incrimination; a suspect’s silence may not be interpreted negatively as evidence of his guilt, yet at the same time the free evaluation of evidence allows the courts this very freedom.
The right to remain silent emanates from the presumption of innocence, a general and cornerstone principle of modern criminal law. It has as such been put into practice with varying emphasis throughout history, though it still lacks an... (More) - The principles of presumption of innocence and free evaluation of evidence
share a common raison d’être in their strife to produce as materially proper judgements as possible. However, these two principles of rule of law seemingly appear to conflict when a suspect exercises his right to remain silent in order to avoid self-incrimination; a suspect’s silence may not be interpreted negatively as evidence of his guilt, yet at the same time the free evaluation of evidence allows the courts this very freedom.
The right to remain silent emanates from the presumption of innocence, a general and cornerstone principle of modern criminal law. It has as such been put into practice with varying emphasis throughout history, though it still lacks an explicit regulation within Swedish law; it’s primary reference source is article 6 and the right to a fair trial as apparent in the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court has established the right to remain silent as part of the presumption of innocence, whereby silence, as a main rule, cannot be used as evidence against a suspect. The presumption of innocence appears thus to collide with the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as the latter allows the court to freely weigh all presented facts of the case.
The European Court has solved this by allowing the silence of the suspect a certain degree of negative consideration, but only as supporting evidence when no other reasonable explanations remain. The Court’s case law has furthermore restricted the national court’s possibilities of bypassing the rights contained within article 6 by providing its applicability with an autonomous definition.
Legislation and case law in both Swedish and European law has strengthened the poignancy and significance of article 6 of the European Convention, whereby the right to remain silent has undergone a noteworthy yet inconspicuous development in Swedish law, granting it a more prominent status as a fundamental principle of the rule of law.
The presumption of innocence has been able to remain intact, as the alternative hypothesis-method of evidence evaluation compels the court to ex officio consider reasonable exculpatory explanations in the defendant’s favour. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/4196337
- author
- Husberg, Martin LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20132
- year
- 2013
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, processrätt, criminal law, procedural law
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 4196337
- date added to LUP
- 2014-01-28 17:28:36
- date last changed
- 2014-01-28 17:28:36
@misc{4196337,
abstract = {{The principles of presumption of innocence and free evaluation of evidence
share a common raison d’être in their strife to produce as materially proper judgements as possible. However, these two principles of rule of law seemingly appear to conflict when a suspect exercises his right to remain silent in order to avoid self-incrimination; a suspect’s silence may not be interpreted negatively as evidence of his guilt, yet at the same time the free evaluation of evidence allows the courts this very freedom.
The right to remain silent emanates from the presumption of innocence, a general and cornerstone principle of modern criminal law. It has as such been put into practice with varying emphasis throughout history, though it still lacks an explicit regulation within Swedish law; it’s primary reference source is article 6 and the right to a fair trial as apparent in the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court has established the right to remain silent as part of the presumption of innocence, whereby silence, as a main rule, cannot be used as evidence against a suspect. The presumption of innocence appears thus to collide with the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as the latter allows the court to freely weigh all presented facts of the case.
The European Court has solved this by allowing the silence of the suspect a certain degree of negative consideration, but only as supporting evidence when no other reasonable explanations remain. The Court’s case law has furthermore restricted the national court’s possibilities of bypassing the rights contained within article 6 by providing its applicability with an autonomous definition.
Legislation and case law in both Swedish and European law has strengthened the poignancy and significance of article 6 of the European Convention, whereby the right to remain silent has undergone a noteworthy yet inconspicuous development in Swedish law, granting it a more prominent status as a fundamental principle of the rule of law.
The presumption of innocence has been able to remain intact, as the alternative hypothesis-method of evidence evaluation compels the court to ex officio consider reasonable exculpatory explanations in the defendant’s favour.}},
author = {{Husberg, Martin}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Oskyldighetspresumtionen och den talande tystnaden}},
year = {{2013}},
}