Motiverad restriktivitet till motivation? - om institutionella investerares inställning till incitamentsprogram
(2014) JURM02 20141Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Sammanfattning
De institutionella investerarna utgör en viktig roll på aktiemarknaden, eftersom de står för majoriteten av aktieinnehav på den svenska aktiemarknaden. Det har framkommit att de institutionella investerarna har en restriktiv syn på incitamentsprogram som idag är ett vanligt förekommande fenomen i aktiemarknadsbolag. Med tanke på de institutionella investerarnas omfattande innehav på aktiemarknaden, skulle det påverka aktiemarknaden märkbart om de avstod från att investera i aktiebolag vars bolagsledning deltar i incitamentsprogram.
Incitamentsprogram har ofta till syfte att få bolagsledningen och aktieägarna att sträva mot samma mål och jämna ut den intressekonflikt som generellt föreligger mellan aktieägare och... (More) - Sammanfattning
De institutionella investerarna utgör en viktig roll på aktiemarknaden, eftersom de står för majoriteten av aktieinnehav på den svenska aktiemarknaden. Det har framkommit att de institutionella investerarna har en restriktiv syn på incitamentsprogram som idag är ett vanligt förekommande fenomen i aktiemarknadsbolag. Med tanke på de institutionella investerarnas omfattande innehav på aktiemarknaden, skulle det påverka aktiemarknaden märkbart om de avstod från att investera i aktiebolag vars bolagsledning deltar i incitamentsprogram.
Incitamentsprogram har ofta till syfte att få bolagsledningen och aktieägarna att sträva mot samma mål och jämna ut den intressekonflikt som generellt föreligger mellan aktieägare och bolagsledningen. Incitamentprogram motiverar bolagsledningen att öka bolagets värde och agera i såväl aktieägarnas som bolagets bästa intresse. Framställningen inriktas på incitamentsprogram som sker i form av riktad emission till bolagsledningen.
I uppsatsen undersöks om de institutionella investerarnas restriktivitet mot incitamentsprogram är motiverad eller inte. För att besvara min frågeställning undersöks såväl bolagsrätt som självreglering i den mån de behandlar incitamentsprogram och riktade emissioner till bolagsledningen.
Vidare undersöks institutionella investerares ägarpolicies. De institutionella investerarna ägarpolicies utgör ett viktigt verktyg för att de privata investerarna ska kunna skapa sig en uppfattning om hur deras kapital förvaltas. I ägarpolicies redogör de institutionella investerarna för sina investeringsprinciper och vilka intressen de tar i beaktande vid investeringar. För att utreda om denna restriktivitet är riktad mot incitamentsprogrammet som fenomen eller mot dess utformning granskas de institutionella investerarnas ägarpolicies samt dess rapporter från stämmosäsongen 2013.
Min undersökning visar att den restriktivitet som speglas i de institutionella investerarnas ägarpolicies i första hand inte är mot incitamentsprogrammets existens eller funktion. Restriktiviteten förmedlar istället främst ett budskap till de privata investerarna att det kan känna sig trygga med att de institutionella investerarna förvaltar deras kapital på bästa vis. (Less) - Abstract
- Summary
Institutional investors account for the majority of shareholding on the Swedish stock market; therefore they also have an important role to play in this market. It has emerged that the institutional investors have a restrictive view of incentive programs, which today is a common phenomenon in listed companies. Given the institutional investors' extensive holdings on the stock market, it would affect the market significantly if they refrained from investing in the company whose senior management participates in incentive programs. This thesis examines whether institutional investors restrictiveness toward incentive programs is motivated or not.
Incentive programs often aim towards eliminating the conflict of interest that... (More) - Summary
Institutional investors account for the majority of shareholding on the Swedish stock market; therefore they also have an important role to play in this market. It has emerged that the institutional investors have a restrictive view of incentive programs, which today is a common phenomenon in listed companies. Given the institutional investors' extensive holdings on the stock market, it would affect the market significantly if they refrained from investing in the company whose senior management participates in incentive programs. This thesis examines whether institutional investors restrictiveness toward incentive programs is motivated or not.
Incentive programs often aim towards eliminating the conflict of interest that generally exists between shareholders and company management, by encouraging them to pursue the same goal. An incentive program creates incentives for the management to act in both the shareholders and the company's best interest, since the management benefits from the company's increased value and development. This thesis will examine stock share incentive programs directed to the company management.
This paper assesses whether institutional investors restrictiveness toward incentive programs are justified or not. In order to answer this question, both corporate law and self-regulation will be examined to the extent it deals with incentive programs and directed stock issues to the management.
Furthermore, also institutional investors’ corporate governance policies are studied. Institutional investors corporate governance policies are an important tool for private investors in order to form an opinion about how their assets are managed. In their corporate governance policies the institutional investors outline their investment policies and which interests they take into consideration when investing. To evaluate whether this is a general restrictiveness towards incentive programs as a phenomenon or its design, institutional investors' corporate governance policies and its reports from the AGM season 2013 are studied.
My investigation shows that the restrictiveness reflected in the institutional investors' corporate governance policies is not directed towards the incentive program's existence or functioning, but primarily communicates a message to the private investors that they can be confident that the institutional investors will manage their capital in the best manner possible. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/4451666
- author
- Käll, Klara LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Motivated restrictiveness to motivation? - about institutional investors attitude towards incentive programs
- course
- JURM02 20141
- year
- 2014
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- associationsrätt, incitamentsprogram, principal-agent teorin
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 4451666
- date added to LUP
- 2014-07-01 07:14:27
- date last changed
- 2014-07-01 07:14:27
@misc{4451666,
abstract = {{Summary
Institutional investors account for the majority of shareholding on the Swedish stock market; therefore they also have an important role to play in this market. It has emerged that the institutional investors have a restrictive view of incentive programs, which today is a common phenomenon in listed companies. Given the institutional investors' extensive holdings on the stock market, it would affect the market significantly if they refrained from investing in the company whose senior management participates in incentive programs. This thesis examines whether institutional investors restrictiveness toward incentive programs is motivated or not.
Incentive programs often aim towards eliminating the conflict of interest that generally exists between shareholders and company management, by encouraging them to pursue the same goal. An incentive program creates incentives for the management to act in both the shareholders and the company's best interest, since the management benefits from the company's increased value and development. This thesis will examine stock share incentive programs directed to the company management.
This paper assesses whether institutional investors restrictiveness toward incentive programs are justified or not. In order to answer this question, both corporate law and self-regulation will be examined to the extent it deals with incentive programs and directed stock issues to the management.
Furthermore, also institutional investors’ corporate governance policies are studied. Institutional investors corporate governance policies are an important tool for private investors in order to form an opinion about how their assets are managed. In their corporate governance policies the institutional investors outline their investment policies and which interests they take into consideration when investing. To evaluate whether this is a general restrictiveness towards incentive programs as a phenomenon or its design, institutional investors' corporate governance policies and its reports from the AGM season 2013 are studied.
My investigation shows that the restrictiveness reflected in the institutional investors' corporate governance policies is not directed towards the incentive program's existence or functioning, but primarily communicates a message to the private investors that they can be confident that the institutional investors will manage their capital in the best manner possible.}},
author = {{Käll, Klara}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Motiverad restriktivitet till motivation? - om institutionella investerares inställning till incitamentsprogram}},
year = {{2014}},
}