Skadestånd vid konkurrensskada - Särskilt om visselblåsarens situation
(2014) JURM02 20141Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Att beivra brott mot EU:s konkurrensregler har länge varit en syssla för EU- Kommissionen som genom offentligrättsliga sanktioner både utrett, dömt och straffat bland annat företag verksamma i kartellsamarbeten. Det offentligrättsliga sanktionssystemet har under de senaste åren fått konkurrens från en allt mer utbyggd civilrättslig sanktionsmöjlighet. Detta arbete kommer undersöka en av de beröringspunkter som finns mellan dessa system; rätten till skadestånd vid konkurrensskada och ställningen för ett företag som agerat visselblåsare i samarbete med EU-Kommissionen.
I den här uppsatsen kommer jag metodiskt gå igenom de EU-rättsliga konkurrensreglerna och förklara de tillhörande offentligrättsliga och civilrättsliga sanktionssystemen. Det... (More) - Att beivra brott mot EU:s konkurrensregler har länge varit en syssla för EU- Kommissionen som genom offentligrättsliga sanktioner både utrett, dömt och straffat bland annat företag verksamma i kartellsamarbeten. Det offentligrättsliga sanktionssystemet har under de senaste åren fått konkurrens från en allt mer utbyggd civilrättslig sanktionsmöjlighet. Detta arbete kommer undersöka en av de beröringspunkter som finns mellan dessa system; rätten till skadestånd vid konkurrensskada och ställningen för ett företag som agerat visselblåsare i samarbete med EU-Kommissionen.
I den här uppsatsen kommer jag metodiskt gå igenom de EU-rättsliga konkurrensreglerna och förklara de tillhörande offentligrättsliga och civilrättsliga sanktionssystemen. Det offentligrättsliga sanktionssystemet använder sig av ett program som belönar företag i karteller som agerar visselblåsare med en straffrabatt. Kartellmedlemmen undgår då i stor utsträckning effekterna av den offentligrättsliga sanktionen. Detta program är centralt för att upptäcka och destabilisera karteller. Det civilrättsliga sanktionssystemet utgör en rätt för skadelidande att kräva ersättning från företag som varit medlemmar i en kartell.
Man kan konstatera att dessa två sanktionssystem kolliderar då visselblåsaren fortfarande kan träffas av den civilrättsliga sanktionen. Rätten till skadestånd kvarstår även då en visselblåsare tilldömts straffrabatt. Detta skapar en disharmoni där en kartellmedlem inte ges tillräckliga incitament för att agera som visselblåsare. I slutsatsen av arbetet kommer olika förslag på förändring av rättsläget diskuteras och deras meriter och nackdelar presenteras. (Less) - Abstract
- The punishment of competition law violations within the EU have for the longest time been the task endowed upon the Commission of the European Union. The Commission have utilised public enforcement to investigate, try and punish cartel agreements amongst other things. The public enforcement system has in recent years come under competition from a steadily evolving private enforcement system. This thesis will examine one of the points of contact between these two enforcement systems; the right to damages following a breach of competition law provisions and the legal position of undertakings part of a leniency programme.
This essay will account for the competition rules contained within the EU- law regime and explain the accompanying public... (More) - The punishment of competition law violations within the EU have for the longest time been the task endowed upon the Commission of the European Union. The Commission have utilised public enforcement to investigate, try and punish cartel agreements amongst other things. The public enforcement system has in recent years come under competition from a steadily evolving private enforcement system. This thesis will examine one of the points of contact between these two enforcement systems; the right to damages following a breach of competition law provisions and the legal position of undertakings part of a leniency programme.
This essay will account for the competition rules contained within the EU- law regime and explain the accompanying public and private enforcement systems. Public enforcement within the EU employs a program that rewards companies that are part of cartel agreements with a reduction in fines if they cooperate with the completion authorities. This way the company will largely avoid the punishment bestowed upon it by public enforcement. The leniency program is central to the discovery and destabilisation of cartels in the EU. Private enforcement constitutes a right for a party injured by the breach of competition law statutes to seek compensation from companies that took part in the cartel.
It can be determined that these two enforcement systems collide when the company rewarded with a reduction of fines because of its cooperation still is considered liable to pay damages to injured parties. The private enforcement action still applies even though a rebate has been give as regards to the public enforcement fine. This causes dissonance where a cartel member is not given reasonable incentive to partake in programs of cooperation. In the conclusion of this thesis different proposals for change and their merits will be discussed. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/4587855
- author
- Rafstedt, Niclas LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Competition damage claims - with focus on the whistleblowers situation
- course
- JURM02 20141
- year
- 2014
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- förmögenhetsrätt, Eu-rätt, Konkurrensrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 4587855
- date added to LUP
- 2014-09-24 13:37:43
- date last changed
- 2014-09-24 13:37:43
@misc{4587855,
abstract = {{The punishment of competition law violations within the EU have for the longest time been the task endowed upon the Commission of the European Union. The Commission have utilised public enforcement to investigate, try and punish cartel agreements amongst other things. The public enforcement system has in recent years come under competition from a steadily evolving private enforcement system. This thesis will examine one of the points of contact between these two enforcement systems; the right to damages following a breach of competition law provisions and the legal position of undertakings part of a leniency programme.
This essay will account for the competition rules contained within the EU- law regime and explain the accompanying public and private enforcement systems. Public enforcement within the EU employs a program that rewards companies that are part of cartel agreements with a reduction in fines if they cooperate with the completion authorities. This way the company will largely avoid the punishment bestowed upon it by public enforcement. The leniency program is central to the discovery and destabilisation of cartels in the EU. Private enforcement constitutes a right for a party injured by the breach of competition law statutes to seek compensation from companies that took part in the cartel.
It can be determined that these two enforcement systems collide when the company rewarded with a reduction of fines because of its cooperation still is considered liable to pay damages to injured parties. The private enforcement action still applies even though a rebate has been give as regards to the public enforcement fine. This causes dissonance where a cartel member is not given reasonable incentive to partake in programs of cooperation. In the conclusion of this thesis different proposals for change and their merits will be discussed.}},
author = {{Rafstedt, Niclas}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Skadestånd vid konkurrensskada - Särskilt om visselblåsarens situation}},
year = {{2014}},
}