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Two Effective Solutions from Matching Theory to Solve the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Europe

Alvarez Luque, Ignacio LU (2018) EKHS42 20181
Department of Economic History
Abstract
The European Union has proved to be unable to efficiently deal with the refugee
crisis that is devastating Middle East since 2011. The problem grew bigger in 2014 and
2015, when Syrian migrants illegally entered some frontier Member States, forcing the
European Union to introduce a new relocation mechanism that is far from being more
effective than previous solutions. To address this distributional problem, I resort to matching
theory, which provides some mechanisms that can improve the current policies. In this research
I use two well-known algorithms that are adjusted to allow for some specific characteristics of
the refugee crisis, the You Request My House - I Get Your Turn, which I studied in
previous research, and the Deferred... (More)
The European Union has proved to be unable to efficiently deal with the refugee
crisis that is devastating Middle East since 2011. The problem grew bigger in 2014 and
2015, when Syrian migrants illegally entered some frontier Member States, forcing the
European Union to introduce a new relocation mechanism that is far from being more
effective than previous solutions. To address this distributional problem, I resort to matching
theory, which provides some mechanisms that can improve the current policies. In this research
I use two well-known algorithms that are adjusted to allow for some specific characteristics of
the refugee crisis, the You Request My House - I Get Your Turn, which I studied in
previous research, and the Deferred Acceptance. Both mechanisms are faced against each
other in a pilot experiment that sheds some results supporting the use of the former algorithm. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Alvarez Luque, Ignacio LU
supervisor
organization
course
EKHS42 20181
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
Refugee, Matching, House allocation, Existing tenants, You request my house I get your turn, Deferred Acceptance, Quotas, Preferences, Families, Efficiency, Stability
language
English
id
8949111
date added to LUP
2018-08-20 14:42:47
date last changed
2018-08-20 14:42:47
@misc{8949111,
  abstract     = {{The European Union has proved to be unable to efficiently deal with the refugee
crisis that is devastating Middle East since 2011. The problem grew bigger in 2014 and
2015, when Syrian migrants illegally entered some frontier Member States, forcing the
European Union to introduce a new relocation mechanism that is far from being more
effective than previous solutions. To address this distributional problem, I resort to matching
theory, which provides some mechanisms that can improve the current policies. In this research
I use two well-known algorithms that are adjusted to allow for some specific characteristics of
the refugee crisis, the You Request My House - I Get Your Turn, which I studied in
previous research, and the Deferred Acceptance. Both mechanisms are faced against each
other in a pilot experiment that sheds some results supporting the use of the former algorithm.}},
  author       = {{Alvarez Luque, Ignacio}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Two Effective Solutions from Matching Theory to Solve the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Europe}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}