Why do states comply? - A game theoretic approach to international law
(2018) LAGF03 20182Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The absence of a central enforcement mechanism in international law has often raised the question of why international law is complied with. Several possible motives and whole theories have been put forth to explain it. This thesis is an attempt at demonstrating how international law can be upheld even if the actors within the legal system are self-interested rational actors. The model is constructed within a rational choice framework. Finally it is shown how under certain conditions, mutual compliance can be achieved.
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Frånvaron av en central mekanism för att försäkra reglers efterlevnad inom folkrätten har ofta väckt frågan om varför reglerna faktiskt efterlevs. Flera möjliga motiv och hela teorier har föreslagits som förklaringar. Den här uppsatsen är ett försök att demonstrera hur folkrätten kan upprätthållas även om det skulle vara så att det folkrättsliga systemets består av rationella egennyttiga aktörer. Slutligen visas hur vissa förutsättningar leder till att folkrättsliga avtal kan upprätthållas.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8965816
- author
- Bengtsson, Simon LU
- supervisor
-
- David Dryselius LU
- Per Nilsén LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20182
- year
- 2018
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- folkrätt, public international law, rättsvetenskap, law, game theory
- language
- English
- id
- 8965816
- date added to LUP
- 2019-03-10 13:54:36
- date last changed
- 2019-03-10 13:54:36
@misc{8965816, abstract = {{The absence of a central enforcement mechanism in international law has often raised the question of why international law is complied with. Several possible motives and whole theories have been put forth to explain it. This thesis is an attempt at demonstrating how international law can be upheld even if the actors within the legal system are self-interested rational actors. The model is constructed within a rational choice framework. Finally it is shown how under certain conditions, mutual compliance can be achieved.}}, author = {{Bengtsson, Simon}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Why do states comply? - A game theoretic approach to international law}}, year = {{2018}}, }