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A Company's Guide to Environmental Action

Teorell, Alexandra LU (2019) JURM02 20191
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
While industries stand responsible for many of the emissions leading to global warming, tackling climate change seems to fall upon individuals and states. The limited course of corporate action may in many ways be traced back to competition law. Corporations that collaborate with the aim to reduce their environmental pressure will run the risk of breaching Article 101 TFEU, as such collaborations often qualify as illegal horizontal agreements or ‘cartels.’ Environmental agreements between undertakings may be an essential tool for combating the prevailing environmental crisis. With an economic approach to competition law it however seems unlikely that environmental objectives would receive exemption from prohibition pursuant to Article 101... (More)
While industries stand responsible for many of the emissions leading to global warming, tackling climate change seems to fall upon individuals and states. The limited course of corporate action may in many ways be traced back to competition law. Corporations that collaborate with the aim to reduce their environmental pressure will run the risk of breaching Article 101 TFEU, as such collaborations often qualify as illegal horizontal agreements or ‘cartels.’ Environmental agreements between undertakings may be an essential tool for combating the prevailing environmental crisis. With an economic approach to competition law it however seems unlikely that environmental objectives would receive exemption from prohibition pursuant to Article 101 TFEU. Meanwhile, the Commission has taken a positive approach to standardisation agreements, which also may take the form of horizontal agreements between competitors. Standardisation agreements are, in contrast to traditional horizontal environmental agreements, provided with an unofficial safe harbour that stipulates defined criterions for compliance with competition law. Horizontal environmental agreements and standardisation agreements many times overlap to an extent that makes it difficult to distinguish between the two; an overlap that perhaps enables the usage of standardisation regulations for environmental purposes. This paper carries out an exploration of horizontal environmental agreements and standardisation agreements respectively in an attempt to map a lawful path to horizontal collaboration between undertakings. The paper first examines how horizontal environmental agreements are currently assessed under Article 101 TFEU. It then carries out the same investigation with regard to standardisation agreements, before comparing and contrasting the two in order to demarcate and display differences relevant to their legal assessments. Finally, the paper deduces a guide for constructing environmental agreements that are compliant with current competition law regulations. The paper argues that horizontal agreements have a greater chance of compliance if constructed and assessed as standardisation agreements, rather than traditional horizontal agreements. To fall under the regulations for standardisation agreements, environmental objectives must be declared in the form of limits rather than action. Agreements are required to have unrestricted access and be transparent, fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Adopting this format allows parties to agree upon defined terms and construct compliance mechanisms, as long as the agreement does not give rise to commercial liability. It also allows the agreement to affect product or production outcome, which probably would be prohibited if assessed as a traditional horizontal agreement. Further, the format allows firms to collaborate despite holding large market shares. Finally, the paper finds that although the European rule of reason provides a means to include public policy consideration, is too uncertain to rely on when constructing environmental agreements. Ultimately, the paper aims to map a guide for undertakings wishing to construct horizontal environmental agreements to target climate impact. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Trots att industrier står för många av de utsläpp som leder till klimatförändringar verkar ansvar för att vidta åtgärder tillfalla privatpersoner och regeringar. De begränsade företagsåtgärderna kan på många sätt spåras till konkurrenslagstiftningen. Företag som samarbetar i miljösyfte riskerar att strida mot Artikel 101 i FEUF, eftersom sådana samarbeten kan kvalificeras som olagliga horisontella avtal eller karteller. Då fokus i nuläget ligger på att bibehålla ekonomisk effektivitet verkar det osannolikt att horisontella miljöavtal skulle undantas från konkurrensförbudet i Artikel 101 FEUF. Samtidigt har kommissionen intagit en positiv inställning gentemot
standardiseringsavtal, som också kan upprättas i form av horisontella avtal
... (More)
Trots att industrier står för många av de utsläpp som leder till klimatförändringar verkar ansvar för att vidta åtgärder tillfalla privatpersoner och regeringar. De begränsade företagsåtgärderna kan på många sätt spåras till konkurrenslagstiftningen. Företag som samarbetar i miljösyfte riskerar att strida mot Artikel 101 i FEUF, eftersom sådana samarbeten kan kvalificeras som olagliga horisontella avtal eller karteller. Då fokus i nuläget ligger på att bibehålla ekonomisk effektivitet verkar det osannolikt att horisontella miljöavtal skulle undantas från konkurrensförbudet i Artikel 101 FEUF. Samtidigt har kommissionen intagit en positiv inställning gentemot
standardiseringsavtal, som också kan upprättas i form av horisontella avtal
mellan konkurrenter. Standardiseringsavtal är, till skillnad från traditionella
horisontella miljöavtal, försedda med en inofficiell ”säker hamn” som
fastställer definierade kriterier för överensstämmelse med konkurrenslagstiftningen. På många sätt har horisontella miljöavtal och standardiseringsavtal gemensamma nämnare till den grad att det kan bli svårt att skilja mellan de två. Dessa gemensamma nämnare kan möjliggöra användningen av standardiseringsregler för att inkorporera miljöändamål i företagssamarbeten. Miljöavtal mellan företag kan vara ett viktigt verktyg för att bekämpa den rådande miljökrisen. Därför undersöker denna uppsats både horisontella miljöavtal och standardiseringsavtal i syfte att kartlägga en laglig väg till horisontella samarbeten mellan företag. Uppsatsen undersöker först
hur horisontella miljöavtal i nuläget utvärderas enligt Artikel 101 i FEUF och
utför sedan en motsvarande undersökning för standardiseringsavtal. Därefter
jämförs de två för att påvisa skillnader som är eller kan vara relevanta för
deras rättsliga bedömningar. Slutligen lägger uppsatsen fram ett förslag på
hur man bäst går tillväga för att konstruera horisontella miljöavtal i enlighet
med gällande konkurrenslagstiftning. Uppsatsen hävdar att horisontella avtal
har större möjligheter att påvisa laglighet om de konstrueras och bedöms som
standardiseringsavtal, istället för traditionella horisontella avtal. För att
omfattas av reglerna för standardiseringsavtal måste miljömål anges i form
av gränser snarare än åtgärder. Avtal kan inte ålägga någon skyldighet att
följas och bör ge öppet tillträde till standarden på transparenta, rättvisa,
rimliga och icke-diskriminerande villkor. Genom att anta detta format kan
parter avtala om definierade avtalsvillkor samt konstruera tillsynsmekanismer, såtillvida avtalet inte ger upphov till kommersiellt ansvar. Det möjliggör också för avtalet att påverka produkt- och produktionsresultat, vilket förmodligen skulle vara otillåtet om bedömningen skedde i enlighet med reglerna för traditionella horisontella avtal. Vidare tillåter formatet samarbete mellan företag även om de besitter stora marknadsandelar. Slutligen finner uppsatsen att det, även om rule of reasonprincipen ger en möjlighet att inkludera allmänpolitiska mål i dess intresseavvägning, är för osäkert att förlita sig på denna vid upprättande av miljöavtal. Det är uppsatsens huvudsakliga ändamål att kartlägga en guide för företag som önskar upprätta horisontella miljöavtal i syfte att främja miljön. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Teorell, Alexandra LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM02 20191
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
EU law, Competition law, Environmental Law, Environmental Integration, Horizontal Agreements, Cartels
language
English
id
8976734
date added to LUP
2019-06-20 09:39:28
date last changed
2019-06-20 09:39:28
@misc{8976734,
  abstract     = {{While industries stand responsible for many of the emissions leading to global warming, tackling climate change seems to fall upon individuals and states. The limited course of corporate action may in many ways be traced back to competition law. Corporations that collaborate with the aim to reduce their environmental pressure will run the risk of breaching Article 101 TFEU, as such collaborations often qualify as illegal horizontal agreements or ‘cartels.’ Environmental agreements between undertakings may be an essential tool for combating the prevailing environmental crisis. With an economic approach to competition law it however seems unlikely that environmental objectives would receive exemption from prohibition pursuant to Article 101 TFEU. Meanwhile, the Commission has taken a positive approach to standardisation agreements, which also may take the form of horizontal agreements between competitors. Standardisation agreements are, in contrast to traditional horizontal environmental agreements, provided with an unofficial safe harbour that stipulates defined criterions for compliance with competition law. Horizontal environmental agreements and standardisation agreements many times overlap to an extent that makes it difficult to distinguish between the two; an overlap that perhaps enables the usage of standardisation regulations for environmental purposes. This paper carries out an exploration of horizontal environmental agreements and standardisation agreements respectively in an attempt to map a lawful path to horizontal collaboration between undertakings. The paper first examines how horizontal environmental agreements are currently assessed under Article 101 TFEU. It then carries out the same investigation with regard to standardisation agreements, before comparing and contrasting the two in order to demarcate and display differences relevant to their legal assessments. Finally, the paper deduces a guide for constructing environmental agreements that are compliant with current competition law regulations. The paper argues that horizontal agreements have a greater chance of compliance if constructed and assessed as standardisation agreements, rather than traditional horizontal agreements. To fall under the regulations for standardisation agreements, environmental objectives must be declared in the form of limits rather than action. Agreements are required to have unrestricted access and be transparent, fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Adopting this format allows parties to agree upon defined terms and construct compliance mechanisms, as long as the agreement does not give rise to commercial liability. It also allows the agreement to affect product or production outcome, which probably would be prohibited if assessed as a traditional horizontal agreement. Further, the format allows firms to collaborate despite holding large market shares. Finally, the paper finds that although the European rule of reason provides a means to include public policy consideration, is too uncertain to rely on when constructing environmental agreements. Ultimately, the paper aims to map a guide for undertakings wishing to construct horizontal environmental agreements to target climate impact.}},
  author       = {{Teorell, Alexandra}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{A Company's Guide to Environmental Action}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}