Anknytningsdoktrinen som Lagtolkningsmaxim - en grundläggande studie av konkretionskravet inom skiljedomsrätten
(2020) LAGF03 20201Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- 1 § lagen (1999:116) om skiljeförfarande befäster ett konkretionskrav med innebörden att skiljeklausuler kan avse framtida tvister om ett konkretiserat rättsförhållande. Utifrån restriktiv tolkning kan skiljeklausuler omfatta enbart tvister inom ett konkretiserat rättsförhållande. Utifrån extensiv tolkning kan även tvister därutom omfattas förutsatt tillräcklig anknytning till rättsförhållandet, vilket benämns anknytningsdoktrinen.
Uppsatsens syfte är att klargöra konkretionskravets innebörd, för vilket en rättsdogmatisk metod, eklektisk lagtolkning och ett kritiskt perspektiv till-lämpas. Huvudfrågan är om en skiljeklausul kan omfatta tvister som inte grundas på konkretiserat rättsförhållande. För besvarande undersöks... (More) - 1 § lagen (1999:116) om skiljeförfarande befäster ett konkretionskrav med innebörden att skiljeklausuler kan avse framtida tvister om ett konkretiserat rättsförhållande. Utifrån restriktiv tolkning kan skiljeklausuler omfatta enbart tvister inom ett konkretiserat rättsförhållande. Utifrån extensiv tolkning kan även tvister därutom omfattas förutsatt tillräcklig anknytning till rättsförhållandet, vilket benämns anknytningsdoktrinen.
Uppsatsens syfte är att klargöra konkretionskravets innebörd, för vilket en rättsdogmatisk metod, eklektisk lagtolkning och ett kritiskt perspektiv till-lämpas. Huvudfrågan är om en skiljeklausul kan omfatta tvister som inte grundas på konkretiserat rättsförhållande. För besvarande undersöks anknytningsdoktrinens existens samt vad doktrinen utgör. Hållbarheten av dels alternativförklaringar till anknytningsdoktrinen, dels olika uppfattningar av anknytningsdoktrinen granskas kritiskt. Av stor betydelse är klargöranden i prejudikat, särskilt i NJA 2019 s. 171.
Alternativförklaringar till anknytningsdoktrinen utgörs av dels en sammanläggningsregel, dels en självständig genomlysningsdoktrin. Sammanläggningsregeln konkluderas inkonform med rätten till domstolsprövning respektive New York-konventionen. Den självständiga genomlysningsdoktrinen konstateras oförenlig med förståelsen av begreppet rättsförhållande.
Slutsatsen är att en skiljeklausul kan omfatta tvister utom ett konkretiserat rättsförhållande, förutsatt tillräcklig anknytning till rättsförhållandet. En distinktion urskiljs mellan en skiljeklausuls avtalsomfattning respektive giltighetsomfattning, vilket innebär en åtskillnad mellan lagtolkning och avtalstolkning. Genom ytterligare en distinktion mellan, av en skiljeklausul, omfattat rättsförhållande respektive omfattad tvist, konkluderas att anknytningsdoktrinen existerar som en lagtolkningsmaxim. Anknytningsdoktrinen som en avtalstolkningsmaxim påvisas oförenlig med sistnämnda distinktion. (Less) - Abstract
- The first section of the Swedish Arbitration Act (SFS 1999:116) prescribes a requirement of definition whereby an arbitration clause may cover future disputes pertaining to a defined legal relationship. Restrictively interpreted, a clause may cover only disputes founded on that relationship. Liberally interpreted, adhering to the doctrine of connection, other disputes sufficiently connected to the defined legal relationship may also be covered.
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the requirement of definition, by using a legal dogmatic method, eclectic interpretation, and a critical perspective. In means of answering the main question – whether a clause may cover disputes not founded on a defined legal relationship – the existence... (More) - The first section of the Swedish Arbitration Act (SFS 1999:116) prescribes a requirement of definition whereby an arbitration clause may cover future disputes pertaining to a defined legal relationship. Restrictively interpreted, a clause may cover only disputes founded on that relationship. Liberally interpreted, adhering to the doctrine of connection, other disputes sufficiently connected to the defined legal relationship may also be covered.
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the requirement of definition, by using a legal dogmatic method, eclectic interpretation, and a critical perspective. In means of answering the main question – whether a clause may cover disputes not founded on a defined legal relationship – the existence and composition of the doctrine of connection are examined. The tenability of, both, alternative explanations to the doctrine and alternative interpretations of the doctrine are critically scrutinised. Of great importance are clarifications in judicial precedents, especially in NJA 2019 s. 171.
Alternative explanations are an aggregation rule and an independent doctrine of revealed cause of action; however, both are found untenable. Firstly, the former is found inconsistent with the right to a fair trial and the New York-convention. Secondly, the latter is found incompatible with the prevailing definition of a defined legal relationship.
In conclusion, a clause may cover disputes sufficiently connected to the defined legal relationship, even if not within that relationship. A distinction is discerned between a clause’s scope of validity and its contractual scope, respectively, which implies a separation between the interpretation of law and contractual interpretation. By a further distinction between, by a clause covered, legal relationships and disputes, the doctrine of connection is found to exist as a maxim of interpretation of law. The doctrine as a maxim of contractual interpretation is found incompatible with the latter distinction. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9010618
- author
- Lindén, Joar LU
- supervisor
-
- Jacob Öberg LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20201
- year
- 2020
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- avtalsrätt, internationell privaträtt, processrätt, skiljedomsrätt, skiljeavtal, skiljeklausul, anknytningsdoktrinen, genomlysningsdoktrinen, sammanläggningsregeln, avtalsomfattning, giltighetsomfattning, avtalstolkningsmaxim, lagtolkningsmaxim.
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9010618
- date added to LUP
- 2020-09-17 10:49:54
- date last changed
- 2020-09-17 10:49:54
@misc{9010618,
abstract = {{The first section of the Swedish Arbitration Act (SFS 1999:116) prescribes a requirement of definition whereby an arbitration clause may cover future disputes pertaining to a defined legal relationship. Restrictively interpreted, a clause may cover only disputes founded on that relationship. Liberally interpreted, adhering to the doctrine of connection, other disputes sufficiently connected to the defined legal relationship may also be covered.
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the requirement of definition, by using a legal dogmatic method, eclectic interpretation, and a critical perspective. In means of answering the main question – whether a clause may cover disputes not founded on a defined legal relationship – the existence and composition of the doctrine of connection are examined. The tenability of, both, alternative explanations to the doctrine and alternative interpretations of the doctrine are critically scrutinised. Of great importance are clarifications in judicial precedents, especially in NJA 2019 s. 171.
Alternative explanations are an aggregation rule and an independent doctrine of revealed cause of action; however, both are found untenable. Firstly, the former is found inconsistent with the right to a fair trial and the New York-convention. Secondly, the latter is found incompatible with the prevailing definition of a defined legal relationship.
In conclusion, a clause may cover disputes sufficiently connected to the defined legal relationship, even if not within that relationship. A distinction is discerned between a clause’s scope of validity and its contractual scope, respectively, which implies a separation between the interpretation of law and contractual interpretation. By a further distinction between, by a clause covered, legal relationships and disputes, the doctrine of connection is found to exist as a maxim of interpretation of law. The doctrine as a maxim of contractual interpretation is found incompatible with the latter distinction.}},
author = {{Lindén, Joar}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Anknytningsdoktrinen som Lagtolkningsmaxim - en grundläggande studie av konkretionskravet inom skiljedomsrätten}},
year = {{2020}},
}