Should David Armstrong be a Dispositionalist? An Indirect Defense of Powerful Properties
(2021) FTEM01 20211Theoretical Philosophy
- Abstract
- A well-known debate among proponents of natural properties concerns the very nature of such properties. On one extreme, known as Dispositionalism (or the ‘powers’ view), the essence of a property is given by the nomological or causal role(s) it plays. Properties are powers, existentially exhausted by how they affect the actual and potential behavior of their instances. On the other, known as Categoricalism, such nomological or causal roles are contingent features of a property, the essence of which is primitive and self-contained (called quiddities). David Armstrong famously holds a categorical conception of natural properties. I argue that, on the basis of some of Armstrong’s ontological commitments and endorsements of certain... (More)
- A well-known debate among proponents of natural properties concerns the very nature of such properties. On one extreme, known as Dispositionalism (or the ‘powers’ view), the essence of a property is given by the nomological or causal role(s) it plays. Properties are powers, existentially exhausted by how they affect the actual and potential behavior of their instances. On the other, known as Categoricalism, such nomological or causal roles are contingent features of a property, the essence of which is primitive and self-contained (called quiddities). David Armstrong famously holds a categorical conception of natural properties. I argue that, on the basis of some of Armstrong’s ontological commitments and endorsements of certain metaphysical principles, he should himself give more credence to Dispositionalism. In defending this claim, I hope to concurrently lend indirect support for the aforesaid theory. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9064812
- author
- Zander, Daniel LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- FTEM01 20211
- year
- 2021
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Properties, Power, Dispositions, Essence, Quidditism, Necessity
- language
- English
- id
- 9064812
- date added to LUP
- 2021-10-04 09:20:02
- date last changed
- 2021-10-04 09:20:02
@misc{9064812, abstract = {{A well-known debate among proponents of natural properties concerns the very nature of such properties. On one extreme, known as Dispositionalism (or the ‘powers’ view), the essence of a property is given by the nomological or causal role(s) it plays. Properties are powers, existentially exhausted by how they affect the actual and potential behavior of their instances. On the other, known as Categoricalism, such nomological or causal roles are contingent features of a property, the essence of which is primitive and self-contained (called quiddities). David Armstrong famously holds a categorical conception of natural properties. I argue that, on the basis of some of Armstrong’s ontological commitments and endorsements of certain metaphysical principles, he should himself give more credence to Dispositionalism. In defending this claim, I hope to concurrently lend indirect support for the aforesaid theory.}}, author = {{Zander, Daniel}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Should David Armstrong be a Dispositionalist? An Indirect Defense of Powerful Properties}}, year = {{2021}}, }