Rättsteoretiska studier i anledning av skuldprincipens frånvaro i svensk skadeståndsrätt
(2022) JURM02 20221Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Den här uppsatsen är ägnad en studie i rättsligt ansvar på grund av skuld. De
två subdisciplinerna skadeståndsrätt respektive straffrätt möts i fråga om ett
rättsligt ansvar – en rättslig skyldighet – att ofrivilligt prestera någonting på
grund av rättsordningens underkännande av ett visst tillvägagångssätt. Men
på vilken grund vilar denna skyldighet? Inom civilrätten talas allt som oftast
om skulden såsom den skyldighet som följer av att någon träffat avtal om
prestation enligt monetära- eller naturliga utfästelser. Och i straffrätten talas
om skulden såsom klander tillika förutsättningen för straffsanktionen. Men i
skadeståndsrätten lyser skuldbegreppet med sin frånvaro. Ansvaret för skada
ankommer på en bedömning av... (More) - Den här uppsatsen är ägnad en studie i rättsligt ansvar på grund av skuld. De
två subdisciplinerna skadeståndsrätt respektive straffrätt möts i fråga om ett
rättsligt ansvar – en rättslig skyldighet – att ofrivilligt prestera någonting på
grund av rättsordningens underkännande av ett visst tillvägagångssätt. Men
på vilken grund vilar denna skyldighet? Inom civilrätten talas allt som oftast
om skulden såsom den skyldighet som följer av att någon träffat avtal om
prestation enligt monetära- eller naturliga utfästelser. Och i straffrätten talas
om skulden såsom klander tillika förutsättningen för straffsanktionen. Men i
skadeståndsrätten lyser skuldbegreppet med sin frånvaro. Ansvaret för skada
ankommer på en bedömning av händelseförloppet såsom ”adekvat kausalt”
till skadan och skadevållaren ska därtill befinnas ha agerat ”culpöst” i
förhållande till den därmed konstaterade orsaken. Om prövningen utvisar
detta, förs talan om en befintlig fordran och skadevållaren kan för egen del
konstatera sig häfta i skuld till käranden. Men rättsdogmatiken känner ingen
personlig skuld härvidlag. Och någon skuldprincip har det inte varit tal om
på 100 år. Den som i skadeståndsrättslig mening ålagts ansvar är istället
skyldig därför att det har konstaterats föreligga ett sorts naturalistiskt
samband mellan handlingen och skadan. Ett samband vartill skadevållarens
person rätteligen anknyts. Denna märkvärdiga skillnad är vad som i den här
uppsatsen är föremål för analys. Genom att som metod tillämpa historisk
institutionalism och undersöka skuldens förekomst och begrepp i svensk rätt
över tid, studeras rättsdogmatikens utveckling i syfte att förstå varför det
rättsliga ansvaret för en och samma händelse, inte kan bedömas på ett för
hela rättsordningen enhetligt sätt. (Less) - Abstract
- This is a study regarding legal liability due to guilt. The two sub-disciplines
of tort law and criminal law meet in terms of a legal responsibility – a legal
obligation – to involuntarily perform something due to the legal system's
disapproval of a certain course of action. But on what basis does this
obligation rest? In civil law, the debt is most often spoken of as the
obligation that follows from someone entering into an agreement to perform
monetary or natural commitments. In criminal law on the other hand, guilt is
spoken of as blame as well as the prerequisite for the criminal sanction. But
in tort law is the concept of guilt long gone. Responsibility for damage rests
on an assessment of the sequence of events as... (More) - This is a study regarding legal liability due to guilt. The two sub-disciplines
of tort law and criminal law meet in terms of a legal responsibility – a legal
obligation – to involuntarily perform something due to the legal system's
disapproval of a certain course of action. But on what basis does this
obligation rest? In civil law, the debt is most often spoken of as the
obligation that follows from someone entering into an agreement to perform
monetary or natural commitments. In criminal law on the other hand, guilt is
spoken of as blame as well as the prerequisite for the criminal sanction. But
in tort law is the concept of guilt long gone. Responsibility for damage rests
on an assessment of the sequence of events as “adequately causal” to the
damage, and in case of legal liability, the person causing the damage must
be found to have acted “culpably” in relation to the cause that's thereby been
stated. If the court comes to that end, the claimer has filed a lawsuit for an
existent claim and the tortfeasor thereby find himself in debt to the plaintiff.
But legal dogmatics feels no personal guilt in this regard. And there hasn't
been any talk of a debt-principle in 100 years. The person who has been
held responsible in the sense of tort law is instead guilty because it has been
established that there is a kind of naturalistic connection between the act and
the damage to which the tortfeasor is legally connected. This remarkable
difference is the subject of analysis in this thesis. By applying a historical
institutional method to discover the occurrence of guilt as well as the
concept of guilt in Swedish law, the development of legal dogma over time
is studied to understand why the legal responsibility for the same event
cannot be assessed in a uniform way for the entire legal system. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9096706
- author
- Hellstrand, Anders Rikard LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Legal theoretical studies due to the absence of the fault principle in Swedish tort law
- course
- JURM02 20221
- year
- 2022
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- Skadeståndsrätt, straffrätt, skuldprincipen, allmän rättslära, historisk institutionalism, rättssociologi, skuldbegreppet, culpa, civilrätt, orätt, statsrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9096706
- date added to LUP
- 2022-09-15 14:33:12
- date last changed
- 2022-09-29 09:59:34
@misc{9096706,
abstract = {{This is a study regarding legal liability due to guilt. The two sub-disciplines
of tort law and criminal law meet in terms of a legal responsibility – a legal
obligation – to involuntarily perform something due to the legal system's
disapproval of a certain course of action. But on what basis does this
obligation rest? In civil law, the debt is most often spoken of as the
obligation that follows from someone entering into an agreement to perform
monetary or natural commitments. In criminal law on the other hand, guilt is
spoken of as blame as well as the prerequisite for the criminal sanction. But
in tort law is the concept of guilt long gone. Responsibility for damage rests
on an assessment of the sequence of events as “adequately causal” to the
damage, and in case of legal liability, the person causing the damage must
be found to have acted “culpably” in relation to the cause that's thereby been
stated. If the court comes to that end, the claimer has filed a lawsuit for an
existent claim and the tortfeasor thereby find himself in debt to the plaintiff.
But legal dogmatics feels no personal guilt in this regard. And there hasn't
been any talk of a debt-principle in 100 years. The person who has been
held responsible in the sense of tort law is instead guilty because it has been
established that there is a kind of naturalistic connection between the act and
the damage to which the tortfeasor is legally connected. This remarkable
difference is the subject of analysis in this thesis. By applying a historical
institutional method to discover the occurrence of guilt as well as the
concept of guilt in Swedish law, the development of legal dogma over time
is studied to understand why the legal responsibility for the same event
cannot be assessed in a uniform way for the entire legal system.}},
author = {{Hellstrand, Anders Rikard}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Rättsteoretiska studier i anledning av skuldprincipens frånvaro i svensk skadeståndsrätt}},
year = {{2022}},
}