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An Introduction to Fair and Non-Manipulable Allocations of Indivisible Objects

Gudmundsson, Jens (2009)
Department of Economics
Abstract
This paper analyzes a way of allocating primarily three indivisible objects to the same number of individuals. We define an allocation rule that, given the preferences of the individuals, distributes an amount of money together with exactly one indivisible object to each of the individuals in a fair and optimal way. The monetary distributions are foremost interpreted as compensations and are regulated by an exogenously given upper limit. We examine some of the rule's properties, with the most important one being that the rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
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@misc{1436784,
  abstract     = {This paper analyzes a way of allocating primarily three indivisible objects to the same number of individuals. We define an allocation rule that, given the preferences of the individuals, distributes an amount of money together with exactly one indivisible object to each of the individuals in a fair and optimal way. The monetary distributions are foremost interpreted as compensations and are regulated by an exogenously given upper limit. We examine some of the rule's properties, with the most important one being that the rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.},
  author       = {Gudmundsson, Jens},
  keyword      = {indivisible objects,fairness,coalitionally strategy-proofness,auctions,Economics, econometrics, economic theory, economic systems, economic policy,Nationalekonomi, ekonometri, ekonomisk teori, ekonomiska system, ekonomisk politik},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {An Introduction to Fair and Non-Manipulable Allocations of Indivisible Objects},
  year         = {2009},
}