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1) What are the economic determinants of chairman compensation in Swedish firms?

Olsson, Alexander and Clarkson, Kevin (2010)
Department of Business Administration
Abstract
Purpose: We attempt to fill a void in the research field of determinants of non-executive director compensation of the most actively traded companies in Sweden. Methodology: We are using a deductive and quantitative approach with a multiple regression to analyze our data and through that, serve our purpose. Theoretical perspective: Agency theory, Optimal Contracting theory, Stewardship theory, Managerial Power theory, Tournament theory and prior research has been used to fill our purpose. Conclusions: Swedish firms compensate their directors according to agency theory. We found that director compensation is positively linked to the variables: firm size, investment opportunities, ownership percentage, CEO compensation, Share-based... (More)
Purpose: We attempt to fill a void in the research field of determinants of non-executive director compensation of the most actively traded companies in Sweden. Methodology: We are using a deductive and quantitative approach with a multiple regression to analyze our data and through that, serve our purpose. Theoretical perspective: Agency theory, Optimal Contracting theory, Stewardship theory, Managerial Power theory, Tournament theory and prior research has been used to fill our purpose. Conclusions: Swedish firms compensate their directors according to agency theory. We found that director compensation is positively linked to the variables: firm size, investment opportunities, ownership percentage, CEO compensation, Share-based remuneration and Anglo-American directors. We also found a negative relationship of voting-power and the other variables came out with an insignificant result. (Less)
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author
Olsson, Alexander and Clarkson, Kevin
supervisor
organization
year
type
H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
subject
keywords
Non-executive directors, remuneration, determinants, Sweden, Agency theory, Management of enterprises, Företagsledning, management
language
Swedish
id
1625284
date added to LUP
2010-06-07 00:00:00
date last changed
2012-04-02 18:07:56
@misc{1625284,
  abstract     = {Purpose: We attempt to fill a void in the research field of determinants of non-executive director compensation of the most actively traded companies in Sweden. Methodology: We are using a deductive and quantitative approach with a multiple regression to analyze our data and through that, serve our purpose. Theoretical perspective: Agency theory, Optimal Contracting theory, Stewardship theory, Managerial Power theory, Tournament theory and prior research has been used to fill our purpose. Conclusions: Swedish firms compensate their directors according to agency theory. We found that director compensation is positively linked to the variables: firm size, investment opportunities, ownership percentage, CEO compensation, Share-based remuneration and Anglo-American directors. We also found a negative relationship of voting-power and the other variables came out with an insignificant result.},
  author       = {Olsson, Alexander and Clarkson, Kevin},
  keyword      = {Non-executive directors,remuneration,determinants,Sweden,Agency theory,Management of enterprises,Företagsledning, management},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {1) What are the economic determinants of chairman compensation in Swedish firms?},
  year         = {2010},
}