1) What are the economic determinants of chairman compensation in Swedish firms?
(2010)Department of Business Administration
- Abstract
- Purpose: We attempt to fill a void in the research field of determinants of non-executive director compensation of the most actively traded companies in Sweden. Methodology: We are using a deductive and quantitative approach with a multiple regression to analyze our data and through that, serve our purpose. Theoretical perspective: Agency theory, Optimal Contracting theory, Stewardship theory, Managerial Power theory, Tournament theory and prior research has been used to fill our purpose. Conclusions: Swedish firms compensate their directors according to agency theory. We found that director compensation is positively linked to the variables: firm size, investment opportunities, ownership percentage, CEO compensation, Share-based... (More)
- Purpose: We attempt to fill a void in the research field of determinants of non-executive director compensation of the most actively traded companies in Sweden. Methodology: We are using a deductive and quantitative approach with a multiple regression to analyze our data and through that, serve our purpose. Theoretical perspective: Agency theory, Optimal Contracting theory, Stewardship theory, Managerial Power theory, Tournament theory and prior research has been used to fill our purpose. Conclusions: Swedish firms compensate their directors according to agency theory. We found that director compensation is positively linked to the variables: firm size, investment opportunities, ownership percentage, CEO compensation, Share-based remuneration and Anglo-American directors. We also found a negative relationship of voting-power and the other variables came out with an insignificant result. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1625284
- author
- Olsson, Alexander and Clarkson, Kevin
- supervisor
- organization
- year
- 2010
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Non-executive directors, remuneration, determinants, Sweden, Agency theory, Management of enterprises, Företagsledning, management
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 1625284
- date added to LUP
- 2010-06-07 00:00:00
- date last changed
- 2012-04-02 18:07:56
@misc{1625284, abstract = {{Purpose: We attempt to fill a void in the research field of determinants of non-executive director compensation of the most actively traded companies in Sweden. Methodology: We are using a deductive and quantitative approach with a multiple regression to analyze our data and through that, serve our purpose. Theoretical perspective: Agency theory, Optimal Contracting theory, Stewardship theory, Managerial Power theory, Tournament theory and prior research has been used to fill our purpose. Conclusions: Swedish firms compensate their directors according to agency theory. We found that director compensation is positively linked to the variables: firm size, investment opportunities, ownership percentage, CEO compensation, Share-based remuneration and Anglo-American directors. We also found a negative relationship of voting-power and the other variables came out with an insignificant result.}}, author = {{Olsson, Alexander and Clarkson, Kevin}}, language = {{swe}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{1) What are the economic determinants of chairman compensation in Swedish firms?}}, year = {{2010}}, }