Styrelseledamotens bristtäckningsansvar - särskilt om förlikning och jämkning
(2011) JURM01 20111Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Värdeöverföringar av olika slag från ett aktiebolag kan innebära risker för såväl bolagets borgenärer som enskilda aktieägare. Borgenärerna exponeras för en större risk ju mindre kapital som finns kvar i bolaget till betalning av deras fordringar. Minoritetsägare riskerar att bli förfördelade när majoritetsägare driver igenom värdeöverföringar som gynnar dem själva. Värdeöverföringsförbudet i 17 kapitlet ABL är därför utformat för att tillvarata båda dessa skyddsintressen genom att begränsa omfattningen av värdeöverföringarna och ställa krav på under vilka former de får drivas igenom.
En värdeöverföring som sker i strid med 17 kapitlet ABL, oavsett om det den överskrider en borgenärsskydds- eller minoritetsskyddsregel, blir ogiltig.... (More) - Värdeöverföringar av olika slag från ett aktiebolag kan innebära risker för såväl bolagets borgenärer som enskilda aktieägare. Borgenärerna exponeras för en större risk ju mindre kapital som finns kvar i bolaget till betalning av deras fordringar. Minoritetsägare riskerar att bli förfördelade när majoritetsägare driver igenom värdeöverföringar som gynnar dem själva. Värdeöverföringsförbudet i 17 kapitlet ABL är därför utformat för att tillvarata båda dessa skyddsintressen genom att begränsa omfattningen av värdeöverföringarna och ställa krav på under vilka former de får drivas igenom.
En värdeöverföring som sker i strid med 17 kapitlet ABL, oavsett om det den överskrider en borgenärsskydds- eller minoritetsskyddsregel, blir ogiltig. Följden blir att prestationerna ska gå åter vilket i första hand gör mottagaren av de överförda medlen återbäringsskyldig. I andra hand, om återbäring inte kan ske, blir de som på ett vårdslöst sätt har medverkat till värdeöverföringen ansvariga att täcka den uppkomna bristen. Inte sällan är de som medverkat till värdeöverföringen ledamöter i den vid tiden sittande styrelsen.
Riktas ett bristtäckningsanspråk mot en styrelseledamot exponeras denne för en stor ekonomisk risk. De möjligheter som står till buds för att begränsa dennes bristtäckningsansvar är antingen jämkning i en domstolsprocess eller en förlikning med bolaget.
Jämkning av ett bristtäckningsansvar kan ske efter vad som är skäligt med hänsyn till arten av dennes medverkan, ansvarets omfattning och omständigheterna i övrigt. Jämkning sker främst om ringa vårdslöshet från styrelseledamotens sida resulterar i ett så omfattande ansvar att det skulle framstå som obilligt att kräva ledamoten på hela beloppet. I allmänhet kommer jämkning inte i fråga om styrelseledamotens medverkan utgör en uppsåtlig brottslig gärning.
Möjligheten till förlikning står inte alltid öppen för styrelseledamoten och bolaget. Rätten för bolaget att förfoga över ett bristtäckningsanspråk är beroende av vilka intressen påföljdsregleringen avser att skydda i en given situation. Man kan konstatera att i varje fall av bristtäckningsansvar aktualiseras bolagets intresse i egenskap av huvudman av att styrelseledamoten uppträder med den aktsamhet som krävs av en syssloman. Utöver detta kan antingen borgenärsintresset eller minoritetsintresset få betydelse för en eventuell förlikning. Syftar bristtäckningen till att främst skydda ett utomstående intresse som borgenärernas, talar det för att bolaget inte kan förfoga över bristtäckningsanspråket. Grundar sig bristtäckningsanspråket istället på en minoritetsskyddsregel som kan åsidosättas med samtliga aktieägares samtycke, talar det för att bolaget kan förlikas med styrelseledamoten avseende bristtäckningsansvaret. (Less) - Abstract
- Value transfers from a company may impose a substantial risk on both creditors and certain shareholders. As the coverage of the share capital decreases and less capital is kept within the company for the payment of its debts, the creditors are exposed to a greater financial risk. The minority shareholders on their part run the risk of being subjected to an undue disadvantage in the decision-making regarding a value transfer. The provisions in the 17 chapter of the Swedish Companies Act aim at protecting the interests of both creditors and minority shareholders by restricting the permitted value transfers to be undertaken under certain forms of decision-making and to be covered by the unrestricted equity of the company.
An unlawful... (More) - Value transfers from a company may impose a substantial risk on both creditors and certain shareholders. As the coverage of the share capital decreases and less capital is kept within the company for the payment of its debts, the creditors are exposed to a greater financial risk. The minority shareholders on their part run the risk of being subjected to an undue disadvantage in the decision-making regarding a value transfer. The provisions in the 17 chapter of the Swedish Companies Act aim at protecting the interests of both creditors and minority shareholders by restricting the permitted value transfers to be undertaken under certain forms of decision-making and to be covered by the unrestricted equity of the company.
An unlawful value transfer is considered void. Regardless of which provision it has violated the recipient has to return what he or she has received. Where any deficiency arises in conjunction with the restitution any persons who participated in the decision regarding the value transfer shall be liable for that deficiency provided that he or she acted with intent or negligence. Typically, such person is a member of the board of Directors at the time of the decision.
Deficient coverage liability represents a considerable financial risk for the board member personally. The means of limiting such risk are either to adjust the liability within a court procedure or to reach a settlement with the company regarding the claim.
The deficient coverage liability may be adjusted in accordance with what is reasonable taking into consideration the nature of the act with which the board member participated in the value transfer, the extent of the liability and the circumstances in general. An adjustment could come into question if the extent of the liability to cover the deficiency in the restitution of the property seems excessive in relation to the slight negligence that the board member has shown in his or her participation in the transfer. Liability for intentionally participating in a value transfer who constitutes a criminal act may as a general rule not be subject for adjustment.
The possibility of settling a claim based on deficient coverage liability of a board member is not always a possible. The right for the company to dispose of such claim depends on which interests the deficient coverage liability is supposed to protect in a specific situation. One can hold for certain that the liability always serves the company’s interest of having its officers performing their duties with due diligence. Other than that the liability is intended to protect the interests of the creditors and the minority shareholders. Depending on which interests that are represented in a certain situation the company may have the power to represent those interests in a settlement with the board member. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/2059846
- author
- Lindgren, Natalie LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Deficient coverage liability for board members
- course
- JURM01 20111
- year
- 2011
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- Aktiebolagsrätt, avtalsrätt, civilrätt, förmögenhetsrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 2059846
- date added to LUP
- 2011-08-25 16:15:02
- date last changed
- 2011-08-29 09:25:17
@misc{2059846,
abstract = {{Value transfers from a company may impose a substantial risk on both creditors and certain shareholders. As the coverage of the share capital decreases and less capital is kept within the company for the payment of its debts, the creditors are exposed to a greater financial risk. The minority shareholders on their part run the risk of being subjected to an undue disadvantage in the decision-making regarding a value transfer. The provisions in the 17 chapter of the Swedish Companies Act aim at protecting the interests of both creditors and minority shareholders by restricting the permitted value transfers to be undertaken under certain forms of decision-making and to be covered by the unrestricted equity of the company.
An unlawful value transfer is considered void. Regardless of which provision it has violated the recipient has to return what he or she has received. Where any deficiency arises in conjunction with the restitution any persons who participated in the decision regarding the value transfer shall be liable for that deficiency provided that he or she acted with intent or negligence. Typically, such person is a member of the board of Directors at the time of the decision.
Deficient coverage liability represents a considerable financial risk for the board member personally. The means of limiting such risk are either to adjust the liability within a court procedure or to reach a settlement with the company regarding the claim.
The deficient coverage liability may be adjusted in accordance with what is reasonable taking into consideration the nature of the act with which the board member participated in the value transfer, the extent of the liability and the circumstances in general. An adjustment could come into question if the extent of the liability to cover the deficiency in the restitution of the property seems excessive in relation to the slight negligence that the board member has shown in his or her participation in the transfer. Liability for intentionally participating in a value transfer who constitutes a criminal act may as a general rule not be subject for adjustment.
The possibility of settling a claim based on deficient coverage liability of a board member is not always a possible. The right for the company to dispose of such claim depends on which interests the deficient coverage liability is supposed to protect in a specific situation. One can hold for certain that the liability always serves the company’s interest of having its officers performing their duties with due diligence. Other than that the liability is intended to protect the interests of the creditors and the minority shareholders. Depending on which interests that are represented in a certain situation the company may have the power to represent those interests in a settlement with the board member.}},
author = {{Lindgren, Natalie}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Styrelseledamotens bristtäckningsansvar - särskilt om förlikning och jämkning}},
year = {{2011}},
}