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Tillämpningen av likgiltighetsuppsåtet på olika typer av brott - en rättsfallsstudie

Gergely, Erika LU (2011) JURM01 20111
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Sammanfattning
Uppsåtets nedre gräns mot medveten oaktsamhet utgjordes tidigare huvudsakligen av det eventuella uppsåtet med hypotetiskt prov. Att det hypotetiska eventuella uppsåtet skulle utgöra uppsåtslärans nedre gräns i svensk rätt fastslogs genom NJA 1959 s. 63 ”Råbypojkarna”. Trots 1959 års avgörande gjordes genom senare rättspraxis ett antal försök att omformulera uppsåtets nedre gräns. Följaktligen kom HD i flertalet mål att använda sig av ett slags likgiltighetsresonemang i sina domskäl. I 1996 års strafflagsreform föreslogs att uppsåtets nedre gräns borde ersättas med ett kvalificerat sannolikhetsuppsåt och att uppsåtet skulle tas med i lagstiftningen.

HD fastslog genom NJA 2002 s. 449 att det eventuella uppsåtet med... (More)
Sammanfattning
Uppsåtets nedre gräns mot medveten oaktsamhet utgjordes tidigare huvudsakligen av det eventuella uppsåtet med hypotetiskt prov. Att det hypotetiska eventuella uppsåtet skulle utgöra uppsåtslärans nedre gräns i svensk rätt fastslogs genom NJA 1959 s. 63 ”Råbypojkarna”. Trots 1959 års avgörande gjordes genom senare rättspraxis ett antal försök att omformulera uppsåtets nedre gräns. Följaktligen kom HD i flertalet mål att använda sig av ett slags likgiltighetsresonemang i sina domskäl. I 1996 års strafflagsreform föreslogs att uppsåtets nedre gräns borde ersättas med ett kvalificerat sannolikhetsuppsåt och att uppsåtet skulle tas med i lagstiftningen.

HD fastslog genom NJA 2002 s. 449 att det eventuella uppsåtet med hypotetiskt prov inte skulle utgöra gränsen mot medveten oaktsamhet. I övrigt var rättsläget oklart kring gränsdragningen mellan uppsåt och medveten oaktsamhet. HD tillämpade visserligen ett slags likgiltighetsuppsåt i kombination med en sannolikhetsbedömning i samband med prövningen av skuldfrågan, dock utan att dela upp bedömningen i två led, d.v.s. först en riskbedömning följd av en prövning av den tilltalades likgiltighet vid gärningstillfället.

Genom NJA 2004 s. 176 gav HD vissa riktlinjer för hur prövningen av den nya uppsåtsformen skulle göras. I domskälen tog HD även upp frågor avseende bevisningen, dock med betoningen att riktlinjerna skulle behandlas ”med försiktighet och urskiljning”, eftersom omständigheterna som kan tillmätas bevisverkan för den tilltalades likgiltighet varierar från fall till fall.

Beträffande rättsfallsstudien av avgöranden från underrätterna där likgiltighetsuppsåtet tillämpats på olika typer av brott och ett fåtal försöksbrott har studien fokuserats på frågor rörande dels tillämpningen och bedömningen av likgiltighetsuppsåtet, dels hur uppsåtsformen tillämpats i förhållande till olika rekvisit, dels huruvida det fanns risk för feltillämpning eller felbedömning i samband med prövningen av uppsåtet. (Less)
Abstract
Summary
The boundary between intent and conscious negligence in the Swedish legal system was previously set by the so called ‘dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test’. The latter was established by the Swedish Supreme Court (hereafter the Court) in a ruling from 1959, the “Råbyboys” case (NJA 1959 s. 63). Despite this there have been numerous attempts to replace dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test. Following these attempts the Court has, in its rulings, frequently substituted dolus eventualis by a kind intent based on indifference. In 1996 the Criminal Law Reform Commission made a suggestion that the lower limit of intent ought to be replaced by a concept of intent based on qualified probability and that this new variety of intent... (More)
Summary
The boundary between intent and conscious negligence in the Swedish legal system was previously set by the so called ‘dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test’. The latter was established by the Swedish Supreme Court (hereafter the Court) in a ruling from 1959, the “Råbyboys” case (NJA 1959 s. 63). Despite this there have been numerous attempts to replace dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test. Following these attempts the Court has, in its rulings, frequently substituted dolus eventualis by a kind intent based on indifference. In 1996 the Criminal Law Reform Commission made a suggestion that the lower limit of intent ought to be replaced by a concept of intent based on qualified probability and that this new variety of intent should explicitly be defined in law.

In a ruling from 2002 (NJA 2002 s. 449) the Court established that the lower limit of intent should no longer be constituted by dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test. However it was unclear how the boundary between intent and conscious negligence was to be determined. The Court applied a notion of intent based on the perpetrator’s indifference combined with a probability assessment during the trial of the defendant’s liability, although without dividing the examination into two parts; by first testing the defendant’s ability to foresee the risk of an effect of his criminal conduct and then considering the defendant’s indifferent attitude toward the predicted outcome and the realization of this outcome.

It was no until later through a ruling in 2004 (NJA 2004 s. 176) that the Court gave some guidelines on how indifference intent was to be applied. In its reasoning the Court mentioned a few points concerning evidence, but it also emphasized that these guidelines were to be interpreted and applied cautiously since the circumstances that prove the defendant’s indifference vary from case to case.

The case law study in this thesis of rulings from lower courts seeks to find out how indifference intent is applied to different prerequisites and in criminal attempts; what are the circumstances that can prove indifference intent, and lastly if there are any risks for mistakes when this intent is applied to various criminal acts. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Gergely, Erika LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
A Case Law Study of the Application of the Indifference Intent on Various Crimes
course
JURM01 20111
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Straffrätt, straffprocessrätt, likgiltighetsuppsåt, uppsåtets nedre gräns
language
Swedish
id
2213018
date added to LUP
2011-11-24 16:28:05
date last changed
2011-11-24 16:28:05
@misc{2213018,
  abstract     = {Summary
The boundary between intent and conscious negligence in the Swedish legal system was previously set by the so called ‘dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test’. The latter was established by the Swedish Supreme Court (hereafter the Court) in a ruling from 1959, the “Råbyboys” case (NJA 1959 s. 63). Despite this there have been numerous attempts to replace dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test. Following these attempts the Court has, in its rulings, frequently substituted dolus eventualis by a kind intent based on indifference. In 1996 the Criminal Law Reform Commission made a suggestion that the lower limit of intent ought to be replaced by a concept of intent based on qualified probability and that this new variety of intent should explicitly be defined in law. 

In a ruling from 2002 (NJA 2002 s. 449) the Court established that the lower limit of intent should no longer be constituted by dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test. However it was unclear how the boundary between intent and conscious negligence was to be determined. The Court applied a notion of intent based on the perpetrator’s indifference combined with a probability assessment during the trial of the defendant’s liability, although without dividing the examination into two parts; by first testing the defendant’s ability to foresee the risk of an effect of his criminal conduct and then considering the defendant’s indifferent attitude toward the predicted outcome and the realization of this outcome.

It was no until later through a ruling in 2004 (NJA 2004 s. 176) that the Court gave some guidelines on how indifference intent was to be applied. In its reasoning the Court mentioned a few points concerning evidence, but it also emphasized that these guidelines were to be interpreted and applied cautiously since the circumstances that prove the defendant’s indifference vary from case to case. 

The case law study in this thesis of rulings from lower courts seeks to find out how indifference intent is applied to different prerequisites and in criminal attempts; what are the circumstances that can prove indifference intent, and lastly if there are any risks for mistakes when this intent is applied to various criminal acts.},
  author       = {Gergely, Erika},
  keyword      = {Straffrätt,straffprocessrätt,likgiltighetsuppsåt,uppsåtets nedre gräns},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Tillämpningen av likgiltighetsuppsåtet på olika typer av brott - en rättsfallsstudie},
  year         = {2011},
}